This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

Tactical decisions and orders

Albert Buddecke

Digitized by Google

Harvard College Library

FROM THE

BRIGHT LEGACY.

One half the income from this Legacy, which was received in 1880 under the will of

JONATHAN BROWN BRIGHT

of Waltham, Massachusetts, is to be expended for books for the College Library. The other half of the income is devoted to scholarships in Harvard University for the benefit of descendants of

HENRY BRIGHT, JR.,

who died at Watertown, Massachusetts, in 1686. In the absence of such descendants, other persons are eligible to the scholarships. The will requires that this announcement shall be made in every book added to the Library under its provisions.

Digitized by Google

125

16/3

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Tactical Decisions and Orders.

A STUDY IN TROOP-LEADING (BASED ON THE OPERATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT DIVISION) FOR INDIVIDUAL INSTRUCTION.

BY

ALBERT BUDDECKE,

Captain, Attached to the Great General Staff.

THIRD REVISED EDITION, 1906.

Translated from the German by

CAPTAIN A. L. CONGER, 29TH U. S. INFANTRY.

1908.

FRANKLIN HUDSON PUBLISHING CO.,

KANSAS CITY, MO.

Digitized by Google

War 859.08

HARVARD COLLEGE
MAR 8 1916
LIBRARY.

Bright fund

COPYRIGHT 1908,
BY FRANKLIN HUDSON PUBLISHING CO.,
KANSAS CITY, MO.

Digitized by Google

TO HIS HONORED TEACHER,
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL COUNT VON MOLTKE,
THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY DEDICATED
BY THE AUTHOR.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

This translation has been undertaken at the instance of Major John F. Morrison, General Staff, who desired to make use of this book in the Military Art course in Tactics at the Army School of the Line.

No attempt has been made herein to produce a work of any literary merit. The aim has been rather to give the meaning of the original as closely as the idiom of the English language and the skill of the translator would allow, the idea being that a technical book of this sort is read for its content, not its style, and that the military student prefers the ideas of the author simply and directly expressed, without any intrusion on the translator's part, even though, from a literary standpoint, a freer translation might often make smoother reading.

For similar reasons no attempt has been made to change the German organization to conform to the American. The organization of the German army is to-day well known to American army officers, and experience has shown that German problems and solutions of a complex character changed in translation to conform to American units are often more troublesome for the student to understand than the original would be, as, on account of the difference in the size of the units, it is often nec-

Digitized by Google

essary in reading such a translation to go back to the German organization in order to explain a distribution of troops, which, though simple for a German division, would be an awkward one for a division organized after our own Field Service Regulations.

It is unnecessary to add any comment on the professional value of this work, particularly to the younger officer. The translator can only wish that the reader might have had with him the pleasure of studying it in the original, in which it possesses a forcefulness and *naivete* difficult to analyze and doubly difficult to transpose into another language.

The translator wishes to express here his thanks to Mr. H. Bell and to Prof. Parke R. Kolbe of Buchtel College, for their kind and valuable assistance and critical review of his work.

Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth,
September, 1908.

Digitized by Google

FOREWORD.

A tactical problem, which has been given out for study at the War College, has been taken up for discussion in this book. Herein have been considered the operations, for a period of eight days, of an independent infantry division, with a cavalry brigade attached; the object being to discuss, in connection with the special situations created, tactical rules, decisions and orders, and the correct application of the governing principles laid down in the regulations.

In the continuous war-situation, in which both causes and results of events are seen, all branches of the art of war come up for consideration: combat, marches and camping, reconnaissance and protection, retreat and pursuit, communications, supply, ammunition replenishment, and sanitation.

In accordance with the plan followed at our most advanced military school, this work will aim primarily to acquaint the younger officer with the essentials of troop-leading and teach him the technical details of the issuing of orders, and, in addition, to offer to the older officer subject-matter of sufficient interest to serve as a basis for individual and more advanced investigation.

Thus may each reader, according to his own advancement, utilize the solutions which follow the

Digitized by Google

problems, either for guidance or for comparison with solutions of his own.

It is hoped that this work, which in the present edition has undergone a revision in accordance with the latest regulations, may continue to prove itself a reliable means of tactical instruction and of preparation for tactical and General Staff rides, maneuvers and war games, and useful especially to those who are fitting themselves to take the entrance examination for admission to the War College.

The Author.

Digitized by Google

CONTENTS.

Translator's Preface 9
Foreword 11
Introduction 15
General Situation 19
Organization of the Division 21
Discussion of the Problem 23
Psychological Course in Solving a Tactical Problem 32
Marks of Sound Tactical Procedure 34
Reports and Their Analysis 36
Estimate of the Situation, Decision and Orders for August 2d 44
Concerning Tactical Orders 47
Discretionary Orders to the Independent Cavalry 49
Destruction of Railroad and Telegraph Lines 52
Discretionary Order to the Hussar Regiment 53
Rest Order for the Division on August 2d 55
Transmission of Orders 56
Replenishment of Ammunition and Supplies 59
Arrangements for Telegraphic Communication 68
The Commanding Officer and His Orders 69
Advance Guard and Outpost Orders 72, 75
The Conduct of the 17th Cavalry Brigade 78
Intentions of the Cavalry Brigade for August 3d 86
Situation of the Division on August 2d 88
March Order for August 3d 91
Officers' Patrols 108
Sketch of the March of the Division 112
Proving the Correctness of the March Orders 114
Estimate of the Situation at Noon, August 3d, and Decision 123
Orders for the Night of August 3d 127
Attack on a Prepared Position 133
Attack Orders for August 4th 137
Replenishment of Ammunition and Sanitary Service 154, 155
The Pursuit 157

Digitized by Google

Further Measures Taken after the Battle....160
Decision and Rest Order of the Division, Evening of August 4th 162, 165
The Defense....167
Field Fortifications....177
The Retreat....182
Situation on the Evening of August 4th....189
Orders for August 5th....193
Bridge-Building....197
Marching in Two Columns....198
Events on August 5th....199
Report of Operations by the Division Commander, August 2d to 5th..201
Events on August 6th, 7th, and 8th....208
Estimate of the Situation and Decision, August 8th....210
Orders for August 9th....214
Meeting Engagement....221
Deployment for Battle of an Infantry Brigade....227
Conclusion....230

Digitized by Google

INTRODUCTION.

On the Value of Tactical Studies.

However high may be the duties which come to an officer in the departments of education, instruction, administration and scientific investigation, he nevertheless enters upon the activity corresponding to the real character of his calling only when he exercises command of troops and when he exercises such command in the presence of the enemy. It must be the aim of every officer to become at some time a commander, to become a responsible leader in action.

For this purpose he needs, in addition to the development of peculiar personal characteristics and in addition to experience and service with troops, before all else, a thorough tactical education.

The tactical instruction which an officer gains in military schools and with troops is not alone sufficient. Study on his own part must be added. The tactician has need, in his profession, of steady and uninterrupted training in order both to preserve and to develop his powers once he has discovered them. The commander receives his education not only in the saddle, but also at his desk. This is proved by many illustrious examples of celebrated commanders.

Digitized by Google

Military history offers inexhaustible material to the officer who wishes to pursue his education in tactics. It leads him directly to the conditions of war and, by showing the ever-changing relations between cause and effect, brings him to a realization of the conditions upon which success and failure depend.

Military history, however, offers only what is finished and completed. The mental activity exercised in its study is a reproductive one and its value to the student depends directly upon the extent to which he is able to grasp and synthesize the real conditions and their relations and to enter into the thoughts of the leading personalities.

The education of the tactician demands, in addition to this, a productive activity, in the exercise of which he is confronted by questions still unsolved, which he himself must solve. Therein lies the worth of tactical problems, which are the more valuable the nearer the conditions approach those of actual warfare and the more latitude they give for the exercise of judgment and decision. They must provide the student with the means of developing his tactical judgment and of gaining practice in the use of forms.

The tactician needs a thorough knowledge of the fundamental principles to build on as well as the faculty of rightly applying them. Through uncultivated genius alone, which pays no attention to

Digitized by Google

form, he will never become equal to the difficult problems of a serious crisis. Still less will the mere theorist be able to fill the position if his powers be limited to the knowledge of formal tactics.

That power of decision and action which is able to cope with all the situations of war is gained only by developing the ability to form a judgment in technical matters with certainty.

Therefore tactics is an art to be learned. Like every other art, it demands a measure of talent, and the highest stage of perfection can be reached only by those highly gifted at the start. In spite of this, however, the less gifted can, through practice, gain a considerable degree of facility, and many a tactician has only begun to find out his powers as he advanced in the knowledge of his profession. Here also, one may say: "industry is genius."

It should therefore be the aim of every officer to progress through the individual study of tactics and thus to prepare himself for the highest duties of his calling.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

PROBLEM.

General Situation.

A Red army, defeated on August 1st at Bentschen and Tirschtiegal, has begun its retreat on Frankfurt on the Oder and to the north thereof. Parts of the army have retreated in a southwesterly direction through Bomst. The latter have succeeded, by a night march on August 1-2, in drawing away from the Blue army and have also destroyed the railroad and telegraph lines between Bentschen and Züllichau.

Special Situation for Blue.

The Blue army has, on August 2d, taken up the pursuit with its main forces in the direction of Meseritz and Schwiebus. One infantry division has been put in motion towards Züllichau, with orders to seek out the enemy's forces which retreated through Bomst, to inflict on them the utmost possible damage and to prevent their rejoining the main army.

At 4 p. m. on August 2d, the 18th Division, after a severe march in extremely hot weather, has reached, with its main body, the forest west of Klemzig, with its advance guard, Züllichau, and with its right flank guard, Kallzig.

NOTE.—The Blue army is operating in hostile country.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

ORGANIZATION

of the 18th Infantry Division.

36th Inf. Brig.

31st Inf. Reg.

85th Inf. Reg.

35th Inf. Brig.

84th Inf. Reg.

86th Inf. Reg.

1st M. G. D. 9th Jäger Bn.

16th Hussars.

18th F. A. Brig.

45th F. A. Reg. II. I.

Lt. Am. Col.

9th F. A. Reg. II. I.

Lt. Am. Col.

---

1 Plat. Corps Tel. Det.

3d Sanitary Co.

Div Br. Train.

1st Co. 9th Eng. Bn.

Ammunition Columns.

4 3 2 1 Art. 2 1 Inf

Trains.

1-6 F Hosp 3 2 1 Supply Columns 3 2 1 Subsistence Columns.

Attached: 17th Cav. Brig.

17th Dragoons.

18th Dragoons.

1st Horse Battery.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

SOLUTION.

Discussion of the Problem.

(*a*) Its Formal Elements.

The first requirement for anyone who has to solve a problem such as the foregoing is thorough familiarity with its general conditions. The strategic situation, which forms the background of the problem, should be followed out on the guide map; on the larger map the location of the troops with which the problem deals should be carefully determined. In this connection it is recommended to underline on the map names of places concerned in the problem, indicating the troops by means of broad strokes (red for the enemy's, blue for our own troops).*

The next step is to scrutinize closely the materials with which we are to deal, that is to say the troops, with respect to their organization, their strength, and the dispositions already ordered.

General and Special Situations.

The object of the general and special situations is to transplant the solver of the problem into the actual theater of operations and to acquaint him

*Columns on the march are indicated by a line and arrow-head ——▶, the latter showing the location of the head of the column, according to the situation.

Digitized by Google

with his mission. The general situation is, in a sense, a mere guide map: it portrays the situation in its entirety and furnishes a background for particular events. The special situation describes the exact situation of the troops with which the problem deals, and mentions the special tasks of their commanders. Ordinarily the general situation gives such information as, in time of war, is known to the commander from his own previous experience, while the special situation gives such as he might receive in an order or letter of instructions. The more concisely and forcefully the situations are stated, the easier will become a ready understanding and correct solving of the problem.

Organization.

The organization of the Blue division has already been shown in tabular form. As a rule, an infantry division is composed as follows:

Division Headquarters, with military and field-administrative staffs;

2 Infantry Brigades, each composed of 2 regiments, each regiment having 3 battalions (a brigade may also have attached to it a Jäger-battalion and to that may be attached a machine-gun detachment);

The Divisional Cavalry;

Digitized by Google

1 Field Artillery Brigade. of 2 regiments, each regiment consisting of 2 battalions of 3 batteries each and a light ammunition column;
1 Field Engineer Company, with divisional bridge train;
1 or 2 Sanitary Companies.

The Blue division has, in this instance, been rendered more efficient for independent action by having had attached to it a cavalry brigade, reinforced by a horse battery, and by the addition of the necessary ammunition columns and trains.

The organization determines the status of the various units with respect to the administration and the distribution of orders throughout the entire campaign. It has been approved by His Majesty the Emperor and is therefore permanent.

Besides the organization, there is to be considered the distribution of troops, in accordance with which subordinate commanders, in addition to their ordinary functions, derived from the regular organization, command special bodies of troops for particular operations, such as, for instance, advance guards, rear guards, or flank guards. The distribution of troops is therefore variable.

Distribution of Troops.

In this problem the distribution of troops of the division is not stated; it has to be figured out from the notations given. The problem clearly distin-

Digitized by Google

guishes three parts: main body, advance guard, and right flank guard.

This distribution indicates that the division follows the retreating enemy in the usual march formation. The detachment of a right flank guard shows the effort to protect the right flank, which seems to be exposed to the enemy in a southwesterly direction; furthermore it shows a desire to follow the enemy on as broad a front as practicable. This is of advantage in a pursuit. The advance on several roads increases the rate of march and the readiness for battle, and, in addition, furnishes opportunity for an indirect pursuit by threatening the flanks of the retreating enemy and thereby compelling him to continue his retreat. It may also enable some part of the pursuing force to get ahead of the enemy at defiles and to cut off his retreat. In this way such parts of the enemy's forces as have become separated from the main body may be found and cut off more quickly, and the whole pursuit will thus give richer results.

Concerning the strength of the three parts of the division, we should consider that the question here is of a pursuit, which indicates clearly an offensive purpose. In this case, therefore, the advance guard ought to be made as strong as practicable. The flank guard ought also to be made sufficiently strong to give it a certain independent fighting strength. According to circumstances the main body may

Digitized by Google

then support the engagement of the advance guard or of the flank guard. We shall get at the correct proportion by making the combined strength of the advance guard and the flank guard approximately equal to that of the main body, and by making the flank guard approximately equal in strength to the advance guard. The infantry should accordingly be distributed so that the 84th Infantry Regiment and the 9th Jäger-Battalion are assigned to the advance guard, the 86th Fusileer Regiment to the flank guard, and the 36th Infantry Brigade to the main body.

What disposition should the division commander have made of his remaining troops?

Considering the task of the division, the cavalry is an especially important factor and the division has a strong force of cavalry on that account. Only through the efforts of the cavalry can the trail of the enemy be found and taken up. The division commander will therefore have sent the 17th Cavalry Brigade on ahead as an independent cavalry command and will have added to it the machine-gun detachment. We should imagine this cavalry in the form of a cavalry division, advancing with an extended front towards the Griesel brook, reconnoitering. The divisional cavalry must be so employed that the reconnaissance for battle is absolutely certain and that there is sufficient cavalry left for nearby reconnaissance with the separate marching

Digitized by Google

bodies of troops. One and three-fourths troops of the 16th Hussar Regiment will therefore be assigned to the advance guard, one troop to the flank guard and one platoon to the main body of the division. The advance guard cavalry and the cavalry attached to the flank guard will reconnoiter towards the river Oder in the direction of Tschicherzig and Pommerzig and beyond.

The disposition of the artillery during the march is at the discretion of the division commander. Artillery which is attached to the advance guard is not under the control of the division commander, but is for the most part utilized in accordance with the orders of the advance guard commander. It materially strengthens the advance guard for combat and enables it, for instance, to gain immediate superiority over an enemy in a meeting engagement. On the other hand, in all other cases where success depends upon the effect of the combined artillery, it is recommended that the artillery be assigned in its entirety to the main body in order to place this strong, often decisive factor wherever it may prove itself of greatest value in accordance with the general plan. Artillery is as indispensable as cavalry for the leading troops in a pursuit. The main consideration is to gather the fruits of victory by utilizing all advantages at hand. The artillery can damage the enemy long after he has gotten beyond the range of infantry fire.

Digitized by Google

It alone is able to break quickly the enemy's resistance in new positions and in occupied villages, to open up defiles, and so forth. In a pursuit we must count on the enemy's rear guard also having artillery. In the case in hand it is recommended to attach some artillery to both the advance guard (1 battalion) and the flank guard (1 battalion).

The engineers, in most cases, ought to be attached to the advance guard, and even to the vanguard, being of especial use there. In a pursuit their main duties will consist in the removal of obstructions placed in the way.

The divisional bridge train may be attached to the advance guard if it is thought necessary; otherwise to the main body, to the regimental baggage, or to the trains. In this case there seemed to be no necessity for its use, considering the distance of the division from the Oder on the 2d of August; it was, however, necessary that it be at hand during the next few days and it was best therefore for it to follow in rear of the main body.

The sanitary company follows in close order either the advance guard or the main body, or it may be divided and a part assigned to each. When an engagement is looked for, it should be attached to the advance guard; this is not improbable here, and it might therefore be desirable to attach one platoon of the sanitary company to the advance guard and one to the main body. The remaining trains and

Digitized by Google

columns attached to the division need not be considered for the present.

It is of importance in arranging the distribution of troops for a march to break or mix organizations as little as possible. It would be a grave error to assign to the advance guard and to the flank guard infantry regiments of both brigades.

This should also be kept in mind in the assignment of the commanders of the several subdivisions or detachments. The commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade, the bulk of whose troops are with the advance guard, should be designated as the commander of the advance guard. The commander of the 86th Fusileer Regiment will, as a matter of course, become the commander of the flank guard. Only exceptionally will a commander be detailed for the main body; as a rule, the commanding general will be its commanding officer and will be replaced (in case of absence) by the ranking officer present (here the commander of the 36th Infantry Brigade).

Based on this maxim, we direct the order of march of the troops composing the main body by adding to our order, under the distribution of troops, the words, "in order of march." The troops composing the advance guard and the flank guard, whose commanders regulate the order of march independently, are noted, in the march order, in their proper sequence according to the original organization.

Digitized by Google

Considering all this, the distribution of troops of the Blue division for the 2d of August will be as follows:

1. Independent cavalry:
   17th Cavalry Brigade, with horse battery and machine-gun detachment.
2. Advance guard:
   Major-General 35th Inf. Brig.
   84th Inf. Reg.
   9th Jäger Bn.
   1st and ¾ 3d Tps., 16th Hussar Reg.
   1st Bn. 9th F. A. Reg.
   Eng. Co.
   ½ Sanitary Co.
3. Main body, in order of march:
   ¼ 3d Tp. 16th Hussar Reg.
   31st Inf. Reg.
   45th F. A. Reg.
   85th Inf. Reg.
   ½ Sanitary Co.
   Div. Bridge Train.
4. Right flank guard:
   Colonel 86th Fus. Reg.
   86th Fus. Reg.
   2d Tp. 16th Hussar Reg.
   2d Bn. 9th F. A. Reg.

Digitized by Google

(b) Its Inner Elements.

The Psychological Process in Solving a Tactical Problem.

After we have gained in the above manner a correct insight into the details of the problem, we get to the main task, which is, to think ourselves completely into the the spirit of the problem and to arrive at an estimate and decision for our future course.

By repeatedly and quietly reading the problem, paying due regard to the map in front of us, we gain, just as in focusing a telescope, a clearer and clearer conception of the situation. The more we succeed in placing ourselves mentally in the given situation and in recognizing all the details in their relation to the general problem, the more we succeed in thinking ourselves into the soul of the leader, in conceiving the magnitude of his task, and in sharing his responsibility, the more eager we shall become to take over his duties and play an active part in the operations.

The longer we "brood" over the map, the clearer will be our conception of the measures which the situation demands. And in this it is important to hold and consider carefully; that is, to follow out, to their furthest effects, all the thoughts and ideas which come to us, often passing like lightning through our brains and suggesting various lines of

Digitized by Google

action. Often it is precisely these fleeting thoughts which lead us to the right path. But ideas which are not fully thought out and thoroughly weighed can not have a decisive influence on our judgment and decision. A head which has a hundred thoughts, but which can neither hold fast nor think out a single one, will always remain undecided and irresolute in tactics.

Only by intensive reflection is found, in the confusion, the Ariadne thread which will lead us from the maze. However, although attention to details is to be recommended, yet the larger points of view which we have gained must not be lost in the consideration of minor details—a mistake often made and naturally often leading to false conclusions. It is rather our chief duty to find just these main points, and the attention to minor details is but a means to this end.

Character and intuition unconsciously weave their thread into this labor of comprehension. To that which our brain devises is added, with good or bad effect, that which our intuition presents; and from the combined activity of both come as a product judgment and decision.

It is a delicate psychological process which takes place in the head and breast of the tactician, and without doubt this inner effort is one of the most stimulating and interesting of activities.

A tactical question awakens all our spiritual

Digitized by Google

and mental powers. It demands keenness and understanding, common sense and imagination, firmness and patience, caution and daring, sense of locality and memory, judgment and power of decision. The whole character, the whole disposition, the whole individuality of a man finds its expression here. Thus the solution of a tactical problem reflects the spirit of its author, since it is based on the peculiarities of his own individual character. A hesitating character will, in doubtful cases, prefer the defensive to the offensive. Kindred natures will follow similar trains of thought and in the majority of cases reach similar solutions.

Marks of Sound Tactical Procedure.

If the question arises, What are the marks of sound tactical procedure? the answer is, simplicity and firm adherence to a line of action adopted. Whoever succeeds in finding, among the many possibilities which often present themselves, the simplest and most natural way, and in following it out consistently, has gained the essentials of success. While artificiality is dangerous everywhere in the military profession, in tactics it is deadly. Every tactical procedure ought to be simple, clear, and easily understood, like a true work of art, which anyone might believe himself able to imitate. Here also the highest perfection lies in the greatest simplicity. One thing must be added, however, for the

Digitized by Google

carrying out of tactical decisions; that is, firmness. The decision, once reached, must be unwaveringly carried out with our whole energy. This condition is of so great importance in tactical affairs that the best course of action, if carried out half-heartedly, will come to naught, while a mistake in the choice of courses can often be entirely offset by decided and confident action.

DETERMINATION OF THE MISSION OF THE DIVISION.

The main point of the mission with which the division is charged is the pursuit; that is, the pursuit of an enemy who has succeeded in evading all contact.

Pursuit requires an unusual amount of energy on the part of the victor. An energetic pursuit avoids the necessity of battles. The fact that touch with the enemy has been lost calls on the division for increased efforts. Men and horses must be utilized to their last breath to again acquire touch with the enemy. And only when this first part of the mission has been achieved can the division proceed to the second part; namely, to inflict on the enemy the utmost possible damage and to prevent its uniting with the hostile main army. This can be most effectually accomplished by a new victory. The seeking of the enemy calls for the utmost efforts on the part of the cavalry; the establishment of con-

Digitized by Google

tact with him demands hard marching by all the troops.

On August 2d the division has almost reached its objective. However, the division commander is completely in the dark on the afternoon of that day as regards the enemy, and just as the doubt must be arising in his mind as to whether further pursuit will not be a blow in the air, he receives in Züllichau, at 4 p. m., the following report from the 17th Cavalry Brigade:

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

1st Report.

LEITERSDORF, 2-8, 2.10 p. m.

The bridges over the Griesel brook at Crämersborn and the Leitersdorfer Mühle are occupied by hostile Ulans. We have captured two provision wagons and a field forge, without horses, on the Züllichau-Krossen highway. That road is deeply rutted. Scattered sabers, Hussar caps and equipments indicate a very hasty retreat. For the present I remain in observation as our horses are very tired. C.,

Major-General.

ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT.

This report takes us right into the situation.

It is the first report received by the division commander after waiting in vain the entire day for some kind of information regarding the enemy. For this very reason the effect which such a message

Digitized by Google

has is so much the greater. In fact, there is some danger of giving it too much credence, or attaching too much importance to it, or reading into it more than it actually contains, and in consequence hastily arriving at erroneous decisions. The first report, therefore, should always be carefully and calmly considered.

Of each message we must ask: What does it tell directly, what indirectly, and what does it conceal?

This report assures the division commander that touch with the enemy has been regained. The cavalry brigade is watching the hostile Ulans. In addition the report states that trains have retreated on the Züllichau-Krossen highway. The Hussar caps found indicate that Hussars have marched along that road.

More facts the report does not contain, but in an indirect way it may be assumed that probably no infantry has retreated on that road towards Krossen, else the report would have contained some mention of the fact. No matter how valuable this assumption—which can be read only between the lines—may be to the division commander, it would be erroneous to conclude absolutely from it that the hostile infantry had marched in another direction—for instance, towards Grünberg.

It still remains an open question as to whether or not infantry also has retreated towards Krossen.

Digitized by Google

In favor of this assumption it may be argued that the enemy, whose main object must have been to rejoin his main army, and that as soon as possible, would naturally take the shortest road for his retreat. In any case the retreat of the trains and cavalry detachments towards Krossen indicates that the opponent, with the rest of his troops, has turned to the west either north or south of the Oder and intends to establish his base at Krossen.

DECISION.

All these considerations culminate, for the division commander, in the question: Shall I go ahead on the road to Krossen with the division, or shall I march on Grünberg?

If the opponent with his combatant troops has marched on Krossen, then we, if we advance on Grünberg, should thereby be making such a detour that we should hardly be able to carry out our mission, as in that case the enemy might easily succeed in gaining the direct road Berg–Tammendorf–Ziebingen–Frankfurt-on-Oder, or in effecting the entrainment of a large part of his troops on the Krossen–Guben–Frankfurt-on-Oder railroad.

If, on the other hand, we go ahead on the road to Krossen, and if the enemy with his main forces has taken the Grünberg road, we should, it is true, be enabled to solve our task in so far as breaking his communications with Frankfurt and cutting him off

Digitized by Google

from that place are concerned. The main part of our mission, however, which is to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy, would not be carried out.

On the contrary, the carrying on of the operations would be made more difficult by reason of the fact that the Oder would lie between us and the enemy.

Either method of procedure might, under certain circumstances, result in serious disadvantages. It is therefore incorrect for the commander to determine, from this one incomplete message, upon a course of action which is of decisive moment for the further operations of the division.

He must preferably await other reports; whether he halts his command temporarily until additional messages arrive, or whether he takes into consideration the following:

The division is approaching the line of the Oder at 4 p. m., after an exhausting march on a hot day. Not much more can be done to-day. If we cross the Oder this afternoon or advance in the direction of Krossen, the difficulties of finding quarters for the night will be increased. It appears judicious, therefore, only to draw near to the Oder, to take possession of its crossings with the advanced troops and to let the main body go into quarters at Züllichau and the surrounding villages to give it the necessary rest. This course of action possesses the further advantage that we shall be free to-morrow

Digitized by Google

to march in either direction, and that we can await further reports concerning the enemy, and on them as a basis can arrive at a more correct decision.

The Division Commander decides, therefore, to continue the march today only as far as the line of the Oder, and to halt there. He orders the advance guard, however, to march on Tschicherzig.

As the division commander, in case he decided to continue the march toward Krossen, had to start his advance guard in that direction from Züllichau, or at the latest from Krauschow, he had but ten minutes after the receipt of the first report to reach a decision. This is frequently the case in war. Intricate crises arise suddenly and demand instant solution.

The commander has need of calmness and a cool head, in order not to allow his perception to be dimmed, as well as of mental readiness in order to recognize quickly the issue at stake and what needs to be done. At such moments the commander shows all his ability or his weakness.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

While still in Züllichau, the division commander receives a second report:

Digitized by Google

2nd Report.

NEUE WELT, south of ZÜLLICHAU, 2-8, 3.40 p. m.

Found the bridge at Tschicherzig intact. According to reports of inhabitants, strong forces of hostile infantry and artillery crossed that bridge last night and early this morning and marched towards Grünberg. At Neue Welt, where I have halted temporarily, a hostile picket is reported to have been stationed as late as last night. An officer's patrol reports finding the remains of an abandoned infantry bivouac at the *Krug* south of the Oder bridge. A patrol sent on ahead by Mohsau has found the railroad bridge on the Rothenburg–Züllichau line obstructed. Nothing has been seen of the enemy in the direction of Trebschen.

A,
Colonel, 16th Hussars.

And immediately thereafter a third report is received from an officer's patrol of the advance guard cavalry:

3rd Report.

KÜHNAU, south of TSCHICHERZIG, 2-8, 3 p. m.

At Sawade encountered a troop of hostile (Red) Ulans, which retreated first on Grünberg and from there in a westerly direction. At the present time Grünberg is free of the enemy. Found shoulder-straps bearing the numbers 14, 20, 60. At the railroad crossing north of Grünberg found a caisson full of ammunition.

B,
Lieutenant.

These two reports complete the picture. They agree in proving what the first report caused us to assume—namely, that the main forces of the enemy

Digitized by Google

retreated by Grünberg. At the same time they uphold the soundness of the decision to halt at the Oder and to await there more complete reports.

EXAMINATION OF THE THREE REPORTS.

In order to gain a firm basis for further decisions and measures it is necessary to form a clear picture of the enemy's situation from these reports. A thorough examination of these reports is a task by itself, and is imperative for success. Primarily, every report should be carefully scrutinized as to its correctness, since errors, inaccuracies, and misconceptions are often brought out by comparison, and must be cleared up; only when that has been done can we begin to build a whole out of the different details.

The reports received thus far do not contain any apparent errors; their contents seem to correspond. We may, therefore, judge of the enemy's condition as follows:

The enemy has retreated with his main forces, consisting of at least three infantry regiments (see Report 2 concerning the shoulder-straps found); field artillery (see Report 3, concerning the caisson found); and some cavalry (see Report 3, concerning the troop at Sawade), by way of Tschicherzig and Grünberg (Reports 2 and 3). Apparently, he has sent back his columns and trains on the direct road Züllichau–Krossen, and their retreat is covered by

Digitized by Google

cavalry detachments (Ulans and Hussars) at the Griesel brook (Report 1). It is possible that hostile detachments have retreated over the bridge on the line of the Züllichau–Rothenburg railroad—doubtless engineers or cavalry, who have undertaken its demolition (Report 3). The hostile main column, after crossing the Oder yesterday, halted and probably went into quarters in Sawade, Krampe, and Kühnau, with outposts on the Oder (Report 2, concerning picket, infantry bivouac, outpost reserve). Early this morning the enemy has continued his retreat by Grünberg (Report 2), and probably turned from there towards Krossen. This seems to be confirmed by the direction of the retreat of his trains (Report 1), and the presence of his Ulan troop at Sawade (Report 3). The obstructing of the railroad bridge across the Oder seems to indicate that the enemy is endeavoring to protect his left flank.

Considering all these points, the main question, Where is the enemy at the present time? may be answered with some confidence:

After an unfavorable engagement on the first of August, the enemy has made an exceedingly hard march during the night following to the further side of the Oder, and there made a short halt. During the forenoon of the 2d of August he has resumed his retreat westward on the left bank of the Oder. It is scarcely probable, therefore, that he can make a full day's march to-day. He is unlikely to have gone far beyond Gross–Lessen with his main body.

Digitized by Google

ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION; DECISION AND ORDERS OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER ON AUGUST 2d.

After it has been ascertained that the enemy has crossed with his main forces to the left bank of the Oder and retreated in a westerly direction, the operations can only be continued by our also crossing to the left bank with the division, and following the enemy. Should we decide to remain on the right bank of the river and advance in a westerly direction for the purpose of cutting in between the enemy's main forces and his scattered parts, and thus, to a certain extent, operating on the strategic inner line, we should be maneuvering, it is true, but we should not be acting according to the old tactical maxim, which, in an offensive mission, recommends marching directly on the line of the enemy in order to defeat him.

By gaining the line of the Oder and by regaining touch with the enemy through our cavalry, our operation has been favorably begun.

The division is now separated from the enemy by only a short day's march. By a forced march tomorrow we can approach so closely to the Bober and to Krossen that the enemy will be prevented from entraining there. Touch with the enemy has been taken up by our cavalry at two points and on both banks of the Oder. By this means we have gained knowledge of all the enemy's undertakings; these

Digitized by Google

can no longer remain hidden from us. The enemy feels himself watched and obstructed in his measures. The closer the contact becomes, the more burdensome will become his situation. To avoid a complete envelopment, he has the choice of two courses: immediate separation or immediate concentration. In other words, two opposing forces, even though they are in contact with one another only through their cavalry, are already, to a large extent, in a relation of mutual dependence. Everything which is undertaken must be done with due regard to the enemy; everything which occurs seems to urge decision by battle. Even he who desires to avoid combat will but seldom find safety in a secret retreat (like the Red Army, on August 1st), but in nearly all cases will see in a battle the *ultima ratio* to put an end to the situation of uncertainty and dependence.

The commander of the Blue division has made, therefore, a material approach to his objective on August 2d. Touch with the enemy has been regained, and the opportunity thereby presented to contain him and defeat him anew.

The division commander acts entirely in accordance with existing conditions in allowing the division, which has been in battle yesterday and has made a forced march to-day, the necessary rest now, in order to require more of it on the following day.

A strong defensive line, such as the course of a stream, is especially suited for a halt, as it offers

Digitized by Google

natural protection and measures for security can be reduced to a minimum, thus giving the troops more complete rest. The city of Züllichau and the surrounding villages offer good opportunity for quarters and subsistence for the troops. At the same time arrangements must be made for replenishment of used-up provisions and ammunition.

While the division commander may allow the main body of the division absolute rest, he must, nevertheless, to-day make additional demands on other parts of his forces. In such cases, the utmost must be demanded from the cavalry. It must be the means of gaining the most detailed information concerning the enemy, and must endeavor to hold him fast in every possible way. Therefore, the cavalry brigade, in spite of the tired condition of the horses (Report 2), must to-day be pushed ahead to Krossen. A part of the Hussar regiment has to be sent with an independent mission by Grünberg toward the Bober. As the advance is to be resumed to-morrow, the crossings over the Oder, the highway bridge at Tschicherzig, and the railroad bridge east of Pommerzig, must be occupied; the latter must be restored.

The division commander accordingly issues the following orders:

1. Orders to the cavalry brigade and to the Hussar regiment;
2. Rest-order for the division;

Digitized by Google

3. Orders for subsistence and the replenishment of ammunition;
4. Instructions for communications to the rear.

CONCERNING TACTICAL ORDERS.

It is not only the commander's will which is decisive in war, but also his manner of expressing that will. *The order which is to transform decision into action is of the utmost importance.* The art of commanding is exceptionally difficult, but is indispensable for a leader of troops. A plan, promising success, may fail if it does not find correct expression in an order. Often a faulty expression, a word too much or too little, or an omission, may become the source of serious consequences.

In general, however, it must be said that the ability to give orders goes hand in hand with tactical knowledge. Whoever has arrived at a definite and sure decision will be able to give clear and decisive orders. A natural facility for issuing decisive orders will find its characteristic expression in the wording of the order. Thus a certain peculiar mode of expressing orders, by which his personality may be recognized, is developed by every general. Yet a formal system in giving orders is not advantageous. The commander must individualize—that is, he must speak an especial language to accord with the personality of him to whom he directs the order.

Digitized by Google

The order must define exactly if the one who is to carry it out is of an over-adventurous nature; it may leave a larger discretion to a subordinate who may be expected to find the right way for himself. The order speaks a very positive language when it is a question of urging on or of emphasizing responsibility; it needs only to hint if the exercise of proper initiative by the subordinate may be depended upon.

Field Service Regulations demand of an order that it contain that, but only that, which the subordinate must know in order to be able to act independently in the attainment of the object. Accordingly, the order must be short, clear, and definite, as well as adapted to the intellectual horizon of the one who receives it.

The written order is usually the means by which the commander makes known his intentions to the troops. There is a difference between operation orders and day orders. The former deal directly with the operations, the latter with conditions of a general or personal nature, such as are brought about by the requirements of internal administration.

The discretionary order is a particular form of order. It is used when the carrying out of an order may have to be accomplished under conditions which the commander cannot foresee. It emphasizes only the objective to be attained, and leaves the means to be employed to the one receiving the order.

Field Service Regulations prescribe the general

Digitized by Google

forms for tactical orders. The order begins with the designation of the command, location, and date of issue; then follows the title of the order—as, for example, corps division, advance guard, outpost or quartering order, in accordance with the authority of the officer by whom it is issued. The paragraphs of the order are numbered, generally in the following sequence:

1. Information regarding the army and our own troops.
2. Our own intention.
3. Missions for the separate parts of the command.
4. Orders for the regimental baggage.
5. Orders for the ammunition columns and trains.
6. Location of the commander.

The signature of the commander follows, as well as a notation of the manner of distributing the order to the troops.

DISCRETIONARY ORDER TO THE CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Explicit orders cannot be issued to the cavalry brigade. The division commander is not well enough informed concerning the situation of the cavalry, and even though he were, conditions might easily be entirely changed before his orders could be received by the brigade, so that entirely different measures

Digitized by Google

would be demanded. The cavalry should, therefore, be given a free hand and should not be bound down by explicit orders. It is necessary to give the cavalry the most accurate information of the main objective; ways and means to reach that objective ought to be left to its own discretion. The most practical form of order for the independent cavalry is therefore the discretionary order.

A discretionary order ought to be as short and clear as possible. It contains, like all other orders, information regarding the enemy and our own troops, gives clearly the intention of the commander, and specifies the mission. It is directed to the subordinate, in order to be more emphatic and to accentuate his responsibility.

Of what shall the task of the cavalry brigade here consist? It must to-day press on and try to reach Krossen. We may assume that it will there be possible for it to cross the Oder.

The occupation of Krossen, with its resources and its position of strategic importance, will necessarily be of great value for further operations. The cavalry brigade will there have reached a point almost in the enemy's rear, and can have a disturbing and hindering effect upon him and his communications. It will be in a position to interrupt the Krossen–Guben railroad, upon the maintenance of which the enemy naturally lays great stress on account of its possible use for retreat or reinforcement.

Digitized by Google

The discretionary order sent to the commander of the cavalry brigade will, therefore, read as follows:

Div. Hdqrs., Züllichau, 2.8, 4.10 P. M.

To Major-General C:

The enemy appears* to have retreated with his main body by way of Grünberg toward the Bober. The Hussar regiment is following him on the left bank of the Oder. It is desired that you try to reach Krossen to-day with the cavalry brigade, and cross over to the left bank of the Oder. From Krossen, as a base, the enemy is to be harassed in every possible way, and more definite information is to be sought, especially as to the location of his main body.

The railroad line as well as the telegraph between Krossen and Guben are to be interrupted as soon as possible.

A line of relay posts† is to be established with division headquarters in Züllichau. Constant communication is to be maintained with the main army.

The division remains for the night in Züllichau and vicinity, the right-flank guard‡ in Lochow and Kay.

*We must not say the enemy *has* retreated. What is only probable must not be asserted as a fact, since this might lead to a wrong comprehension and incorrect measures.

†This direction seems to be called for by the necessity of communicating orders and messages, since there is no telegraphic or telephonic communication between the division and the cavalry brigade—40 kilometers away.

‡The commander of the cavalry brigade must have information as to the location of the flank guard, since this may, under certain conditions, serve him as a support.

Digitized by Google

I intend to-morrow to cross the Oder at Tschicherzig with the division, march on the enemy, and force an engagement, if possible.

N,
Lieutenant-General.

DESTRUCTION OF RAILROADS AND TELEGRAPH LINES.

The interruption of communication by railroad and telegraph is directed in the above orders. This measure is a serious one and must be well weighed in advance, since under certain conditions it may prove disadvantageous to us.

Field Service Regulations give definite rules in regard to this: "The destruction of a railroad or telegraph system for weeks or months through continued interruption of the service ought only to occur in pursuance of the orders of the commander-in-chief or the commander of a separate army or force operating independently. For this purpose railroad troops or engineers are usually employed. The obstructing of a railroad for a few hours or days is a measure which may be adopted independently by subordinate commanders as well. They bear the responsibility for carrying out or failing to carry out the above measure. Such obstructions are to be avoided in our own sphere of operations during an advance; they are permissible when operations are at a standstill; they are imperative in a retreat, and

Digitized by Google

are always to be undertaken within the enemy's sphere of operations. Such duties appertain particularly to the cavalry."

The more temporary interruption of telegraph lines takes place according to the same general principles. Independent commanders of troops are only justified in ordering such interruptions during advances or while operations are at a standstill when it is a question of interrupting the communications between separate bodies of the enemy or between hostile inhabitants of different sections.

In this instance, where it is a question of a railroad and telegraph line in the enemy's sphere of operations, the division commander is not only warranted in ordering the temporary interruption, but is in duty bound to do so, and the cavalry can readily carry out the order. As preparation for this sort of work, the cavalry is provided with explosives and other material for destroying railways.

DISCRETIONARY ORDER TO THE HUSSAR REGIMENT.

Div. Hdqrs., Züllichau, 2.8, 4.15 P. M.

To Colonel A:

The enemy appears to have retreated with his main forces by way of Grünberg in a westerly direction. The cavalry brigade has encountered hostile cavalry on the right bank of the Oder at the Griesel brook. It has been assigned the mission of occu-

Digitized by Google

pying Krossen to-day and of harassing the enemy from there.

Advance immediately with the Hussar regiment* on the left bank of the Oder, leaving one platoon each for the advance guard, main body, and flank guard, and reconnoiter in the direction of the Bober. It is desired† that reliable news be obtained as soon as possible concerning the direction of the enemy's retreat and the location of his main body.

The division will go into quarters in Züllichau and the neighboring villages with outposts on the Oder on the line railroad bridge–Tschicherzig.

Your regimental baggage will advance to Tschicherzig, from which place you may order it brought up to you.‡

The issuing of orders will take place at 10 P. M. at division headquarters, in Züllichau, where you will report the location of your regiment for the night.¶

N,

Lieutenant-General.

---

*The regiment is made as strong as possible for reconnaisance, and only what is necessary for nearby reconnaissance and immediate protection has been kept back.

†This expression makes the order especially emphatic.

‡The regimental baggage ought to be sent to the troops whenever practicable. It contains better supplies and provides better comfort and the troops resent having to do without it. To keep the regimental baggage away from the troops is the exception rather than the rule.

¶The division commander must know where orders will reach the Hussar regiment.

Digitized by Google

REST ORDER FOR THE DIVISION ON AUGUST 2d.

While brevity is a virtue in all orders, it is particularly so in a rest-order for quartering troops. The main point is to direct the troops to their quarters without loss of time. The ease with which the various columns proceed to their respective quarters marks the skillfulness of the order. The assignment to quarters depends upon the order of march and must at the same time have in mind the operations intended for the day following. It has a bad effect upon the *morale* of the troops to make transfers of troops involving counter-marches. As a rule, therefore, that part of the force which is nearest the enemy—that is, the advance guard—takes over the duty of security. All special directions are omitted in such an order; these are given in a special order of the day or verbally, in connection with the general order. In the latter case, the officers sent to receive the general order are told what must or may be done in addition thereto.

To shorten the general order, the assignment of troops to quarters in the various villages is best added to the order by means of a billeting sketch in tabular form.

The rest-order is intended to prepare the way for subsequent advance-guard and outpost orders.

Therefore, a short orientation is necessary, containing neither more nor less than the sub-

Digitized by Google

ordinate commander ought to know. The order must next give information in regard to the whereabouts of the advance guard, main body, and flank guard.

With respect to the advance guard, it gives explicit directions for the placing of the reserve and gives a clue, but nothing more, to the intended location of the outposts by indicating a line to which they may be advanced, a village to be occupied, or some similar direction.

Finally, the order contains instructions in regard to the baggage, columns, and trains.

Div. Hdqrs., Züllichau, 2.8, 4.20 P. M.

Divisional Order.

1. It appears that the enemy's main forces have retreated through Grünberg towards the Bober. Weaker hostile forces have retreated on Krossen, pursued by our cavalry brigade.

2. The Hussar regiment, detaching one platoon each to the advance guard, main body, and flank guard, is reconnoitering through Grünberg towards the Bober.

3. The advance guard will halt this side of the Oder; its reserve will be quartered in Krauschow and Langegasse. The main bridge at Tschicherzig and the railroad bridge east of Pommerzig will be se-

Digitized by Google

cured; the latter will be repaired, and the line of the Oder between the two crossings carefully watched.

4. The main body will go into quarters in Züllichau, Krummendorf, and Klemzig. (*Verbal Direction:* The 36th Infantry Brigade will furnish the guard in Züllichau.)

5. The right-flank guard will take quarters in Kay, Guren, and Lochow, providing for security in the direction of Krossen and Pommerzig.

6. The regimental baggage will be conducted to the troops. (*Note:* That of the Huzzar regiment will be sent as far as the bridge at Tschicherzig.)

7. Columns and trains will be quartered in Goltzen and Neu-Kramzig.

8. Orders will be issued at 10 P. M., in Züllichau.

N,
Lieutenant-General.

Dictated to officers detailed to receive orders; in writing to the flank guard; extracts to the regimental baggage as well as to the columns and trains.

GENERAL STAFF OFFICER,
18th Infantry Division.

Digitized by Google

Billeting Sketch for Troops of the Main Body.

Headquarters and Troops	Billeting	Village Bivouac	Bivouac	Remarks
Hdqrs. 36th Inf. Brig.....	Züllichau			Alarm assembly-place: Southern exit of Züllichau.
31st Inf. Reg...	"			
½ 3d Tp. 16th Hus. Reg....	"			
Hdqrs. 18th F. A. Brig.....	"			Distributing-place for ammunition and supplies: Northeastern exit of Züllichau.
45th F. A. Reg..	"			
Light Columns .	"			
85th Inf. Reg...	Krummendorf			
Div. Br. Train .	Klemzig			
½ Sanitary Co. .	"			

TRANSMISSION OF THE ORDER TO THE TROOPS.

The following principles may be laid down for the transmission of an order:

The order must be sent to organizations early enough so that they may fulfill their mission and avoid unnecessary marches, especially countermarches.

In the present case the General Staff officer will have written the order after consultation with the division commander. He summons the officers of separate organizations designated to receive orders (the adjutants) and dictates the order to them. The latter betake themselves at once to their re-

Digitized by Google

spective organizations, and take the necessary steps for carrying out the order. Written copies of the order are carried by orderly officers, cyclists, or mounted messengers to detached parts of the division—for instance, to the flank guard and the Hussar regiment.*

The issuing and transmission of the divisional order take place during the march, if possible. The command to halt may, however, sometimes be given first.

REPLENISHMENT OF RATIONS AND AMMUNITION.

To the rest-order for quartering is added a divisional *order of the day*, which contains all such directions as concern the ordinary routine and have a direct bearing on the operations.

Here belong:

1. Directions concerning the provisions to be distributed on the 2d of August;
2. Measures for replenishing food supplies and ammunition.

Concerning Subsistence in General.

The responsibility for the maintenance of reserve subsistence supplies and for the replenishment of ammunition devolves, to be sure, on every higher

*For the transmission of orders and messages on good roads, automobiles may be advantageously used for medium distances (10 kilometers); for greater distances, the heliograph or telegraph may be employed.

Digitized by Google

commander,* but rests primarily on the commanding general. The question of subsistence demands systematic regulation.

Only the commanding general can determine what kind of subsistence is best adapted to the moment and what measures must be taken for future subsistence. It is his duty accordingly to indicate each day what kind of subsistence supplies are to be used.

Subsistence may be drawn from the resources of the surrounding country or from the supplies carried. In the first case, provisions are obtained either from the houses in which troops are quartered or by requisitions; in the latter case, by utilizing the emergency ration, the supplies carried in the trains, or supplies from magazines.

Subsisting the men in the houses in which they are quartered is the simplest method, but is only possible in friendly country. In the enemy's country this method must often give place to requisitioning, which is undertaken either by the troops themselves or by designated officers; the latter method is to be preferred, since it preserves discipline and is less fatiguing to the troops.

In case the troops reach their destination too late, or do not find an adequate supply of provisions, they are forced to fall back on their own resources. In that case, whenever possible, the provisions car-

*His assistants in this work are the supply officers and their subordinates.

Digitized by Google

ried in the ration and forage wagons are to be used first; these form a part of the regimental baggage, and are replenished by requisitioning or from the subsistence and supply columns. They carry two days' supplies.

Each company, troop, and battery has one ration-wagon; in addition, the battalion and the cavalry regiment have a canteen-wagon. Each troop and each battery has a forage-wagon, which carries oats.

Subsistence and supply columns form a mobile supply reserve at the disposal of the higher commanders; they follow the troops as trains, usually at a considerable distance, and are replenished, the former from the magazines on the line of communications, the latter by requisitions.

A subsistence column carries one day's rations and one-third of a day's forage for an infantry division; a supply column carries one day's rations and one day's forage. If the subsistence and supply columns are to replenish the company ration-wagons, it is best to advance part of them to the troops, except during a retreat when the necessary supplies are deposited at suitable points.

Magazines along the line of communications are permanent, and as a general rule are established along railroads and in places which, by their location and resources, are favorable for the procuring and distribution of supplies. The replenishment of the

Digitized by Google

magazines is accomplished by new supplies from home, by requisitioning in the enemy's country, or by purchase in open market. It is the duty of every independent commander to arrange for the establishment of such magazines. The provisioning of troops directly from magazines is not feasible during shifting operations by reason of their immobility, and can be done only during pauses in the operations or in siege warfare.

The emergency ration is to be used only in case of necessity and when there is absolutely no other ration available. Men in the infantry, field artillery, and trains carry three emergency rations; men in the cavalry, two. As a rule, emergency rations for animals are carried as follows: For each saddle-horse of cavalry, $\frac{1}{3}$; of field batteries, 2; of horse batteries and ammunition columns, $1\frac{1}{2}$; of the foot troops and trains, 1; for each draft-horse in general, 3; of the wheeled batteries, 2; of the horse batteries and ammunition columns, $1\frac{1}{2}$. "It is the duty of each and every officer to strive to keep on hand at all times the regulation allowance of emergency rations."

The above are the means for subsistence and the regulations concerning their use. It is the duty of the General Staff officer to consult with the supply officer of the division concerning this matter and to submit to the division commander a recommendation as to the kind of subsistence to be employed.

Digitized by Google

Regulation of the Distribution of Subsistence Supplies.

In Züllichau and the surrounding larger villages there will be found sufficient supplies for subsistence of men and animals. The troops should, therefore, make use of requisitioned supplies. The company ration- and forage-wagons, the contents of which, after yesterday's battle, have been partly used and not yet replenished, must be refilled. How is this to be done?

The best plan would be to order all emptied ration- and forage-wagons of the division to a certain place, where they can be filled by the trains.

Either a subsistence or a supply column is to be preferred, as necessity demands; the former is more mobile, and will suffice for mere replenishing. What place should be selected for this? The replenishment of the wagons ought not to take place on the open highway, as that would not insure orderly procedure. Higher officers would not be at hand, and the entire matter would be left to subordinates. It would, therefore, be preferable to undertake the replenishment in Züllichau, where the local commander can supervise and regulate the time and place of receiving supplies and the order in which the company wagons are to be filled.

With due regard to the continuation of the operations, the division commander will, before this, have thought over the advisability of establishing a

Digitized by Google

supply dépôt in Zŭllichau, and will have issued the necessary instructions to the supply department.

This department will then take immediate steps to establish the necessary bakeries, slaughter-houses, and store-houses for the collecting of leather and shoe material. It will also requisition supplies and contract for purchases throughout the entire neighborhood. The General Staff officer of the division will give written orders, specifying which section of the country and what towns, etc., are to be utilized for this purpose, so that the measures taken by the supply department will not run counter to the interests of the troops, and so that villages which are to be occupied by troops will not be divested of supplies. In addition, a point is designated for the parking of the supply columns, both in order to bring up the supplies from the rear to the advanced magazines, and also to fill the supply columns from the latter as they advance.

Replenishment of Ammunition.

The responsibility for the replenishment of ammunition goes hand in hand with that of providing food supplies. "Officers of every grade are charged with exercising due supervision over the expenditure of ammunition as well as its timely replenishment."

The division has had as yet since the battle no opportunity to replenish its ammunition. It is important to restore the troops, as soon as possible, to

Digitized by Google

a condition of complete preparedness for further operations.

The ammunition supply consists of what the troops carry with them and of the supplies carried in the ammunition columns. The latter are replenished from the field ammunition parks, and these in turn from the general ammunition parks at home. Communication between field ammunition parks and ammunition columns is had by means of ammunition dépôts and sub-dépôts, which are established at various places along the line of communications.

The ammunition supply of infantry consists of:

(*a*) Belt ammunition (120 rounds per man);

(*b*) Cartridge-wagons (one to each company, with the light train, 72 rounds per rifle);

(*c*) The four infantry ammunition columns of an army corps (124 rounds per rifle).

This makes a total of about 300 rounds per rifle.

The artillery carries its ammunition:

(*a*) In limbers and caissons (three) of the fighting battery;

(*b*) In the second-line wagons (each battery has three; they follow—in a march by battalion—as a rule, behind the battalion);

Digitized by Google

(*c*) In light ammunition columns. (Each regiment has one light ammunition column, consisting of two shrapnel sections of three platoons each and of one shell section, or otherwise, according to the composition of the regiment; they are attached to the division, and, as a rule, march in rear of the combatant troops);

(*d*) In artillery ammunition columns.

Utilizing the ammunition carried in limbers and caissons of the batteries and in the second-line wagons and light ammunition columns, the artillery is enabled to keep up its fire about four and one-half hours under ordinary circumstances; by calling up an artillery ammunition column, this time can be extended about three and one-half hours.

Regulations require that a fresh supply of both small-arms and artillery ammunition shall be brought up as soon as possible after an engagement.

This refers to the replenishment from the ammunition columns of the cartridge- and ammunition-wagons accompanying the troops. For this purpose, as many wagons as are required will be called up from the ammunition columns; these had best march at the same time with the supply trains to Zŭllichau, where the replenishment takes place.

The trains and columns so advanced can remain for the night in Zŭllichau. Their *personnel* will be

Digitized by Google

quartered in houses there or can bivouac with the wagons. On the succeeding day the emptied wagons of the subsistence column will be refilled either by purchase or requisition. The emptied ammunition wagons return to the ammunition sub-dépôt.

The trains and columns should receive detailed and exact orders, since neither such careful leadership nor such strict discipline may be looked for in its *personnel* as in that of the troops.

In the special order to be sent to them, definite directions must be given as to how many wagons are to advance, where the replenishment is take place, the road to be taken, and where the wagons are to remain after replenishment.

ORDER FOR AMMUNITION COLUMNS AND TRAINS.

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order, columns and trains will proceed as follows, for the purpose of replenishing rations, forage, and ammunition:

The 1st Infantry ammunition column, the 1st Artillery ammunition column, and the 1st subsistence column by Goltzen and Klemzig to the north-eastern exit of Züllichau (road to Krummendorf), and report to the commanding officer.

2. The following will go into bivouac as indicated:

The 2d Infantry ammunition column, the 2d, 3d, and 4th Artillery ammunition columns, and the 1st,

Digitized by Google

2d and 3d Field Hospitals in Goltzen; the 2d and 3d subsistence columns, the 1st, 2d, and 3d supply columns, and the 4th, 5th, and 6th Field Hospitals, in Neu-Kramzig.

GENERAL STAFF OFFICER,
18th Infantry Division.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR TELEGRAPHIC CONNECTION.

During the advance on the 2d of August, or at the latest when the command to halt has been given, measures should have been taken by the division commander for the establishment of lines of communication with army headquarters.

The war-telegraph organizations are utilized to connect separated parts of an army. The army-telegraph detachment (consisting of three platoons) connects the army with the telegraph of the line of communications; the corps-telegraph detachment (4 platoons), connects the various army corps with army headquarters.

The Blue division, on being detached, received one platoon of the corps telegraph detachment; this platoon is commanded by an officer, and can put up and operate a system of about 20 km. It will be the duty of this platoon to repair the destroyed telegraph line between Bentschen and Züllichau, or to use parts of that line and material to open a new line, and thus establish connection with the headquarters telegraph system. The sooner the platoon receives informa-

Digitized by Google

tion as to the march objective and location of new headquarters, the sooner will connection be established. Thus telegraph construction follows on the heels of the advancing troops.

It must also be mentioned that, in addition to the above-named organizations, there is attached to a reserve division, when acting as an independent army corps, a reserve division telegraph detachment, and that the cavalry is equipped with the necessary telegraph material to enable each regiment to lay 10 km. of wire. The cavalry telegraph is used to connect the advance cavalry with the army in rear and also to gather at a central point messages from the contact cavalry operating on a broad front. In this case the cavalry brigade might establish telegraphic connection with the division, instead of establishing relays.

THE COMMANDING OFFICER.

In each locality occupied by troops, the ranking officer present is the commanding officer. The commanding general, however, to keep himself entirely free for the higher duties of command, will delegate this function at his own station or camp to some other officer of rank. All general officers and regimental commanders have authority to detail a field officer for that duty. The commanding officer takes full charge of the quartering of the troops, he assigns various organizations to various localities, and de-

Digitized by Google

termines the interior and exterior guards to be established and the degree of readiness to be maintained.

He further determines the places of assembly in case of alarm; the strength and location of interior guards; the strength, position, and shelter of exterior guards, and the part of the command which shall furnish them; the time of closing the inns; the time of taps; the burning of lights in quarters and stables; the location of wagon-trains; the putting up of guide-posts; the issuing of rations, forage, and ammunition as regards the time, place, and order of distribution.

He is charged in general with taking possession of post-offices, railroad stations, telegraph and revenue offices, with the seizure of arms, ammunition, and supplies, and with the requisitioning of supplies and hostages.

The commanding officer is assisted, first of all, by the officer of the day (with larger bodies of troops, a field officer), who is his mouthpiece, and who looks after the carrying out of all orders in regard to the exterior and interior guards. All officers and non-commissioned officers of the guard are under his orders. Officers may also be detailed to assist the officer of the day in going the rounds.

Especially when operating in hostile country, it would be well for the commanding officer to have a permanent infantry detachment (one platoon or company, as the case may be, with a few mounted order-

Digitized by Google

lies) at his disposal, with which to occupy important public buildings and search the locality.

When quarters have not been prepared in advance, the commanding officer proceeds ahead with the billeting parties of the troops (mounted officers, cyclists, sometimes also supply officers), puts himself in communication with the local officials, and issues his directions.

The order for the quartering of the troops in Züllichau will read as follows:

Local Hdqrs., ZULLICHAU, 2.8, 4.45 P. M.

Quartering Order.

1. Hdqrs. 36th Inf. Brig., 31st Inf., and ½ 3d Tp., 16th Hussar Reg., will take quarters in the southern part of Züllichau (south of the Krummendorf–Kirche–Mohsau road); Hdqrs. 18th F. A. Brig., 45th F. A. Reg., and both Lt. Am. columns, in the northern part (Schwiebuser Street).

2. Places of assembly in case of alarm: for the 31st Inf. Reg. and the platoon of Hussars, the southern exit of Züllichau; for the 45th F. A. Reg. and the Lt. Am. columns, the northeastern exit of Züllichau at the Ulan barracks.

3. As an interior guard at the city hall, the 31st Inf. Reg. will furnish 1 n. c. o., 1 musician, and 12 privates; the 45th F. A. Reg., 1 corporal and 6 privates.

Digitized by Google

4. The 31st Inf. will furnish, as exterior guards, 1 n. c. o., 1 musician, and 6 privates at each of the following exits: to Krauschow, to Mohsau, and to Kallzig.

5. Officer of the Day: Captain V, 31st Inf.

6. The wagons of the regimental baggage may drive up to the quarters but must not block the streets.

7. The emptied ammunition- and cartridge-wagons will be in readiness for replenishment from the columns and trains at 7 P. M. at the northeastern exit of Züllichau; the emptied ration- and forage-wagons, at the same place at 8 P. M.

8. Tattoo at 9 P. M.

9. I shall take quarters in the Hotel Zur Krone, near the church.

Z,
Colonel, 31st Infantry.

ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE GUARD.

With the divisional order as a basis, the advance-guard commander issues his advance-guard order from the map. This order provides for going into camp, for security and reconnaissance; it gives directions for the placing and the conduct of outposts, and therefore serves as a basis for the outpost orders.

Advance-guard orders should never be voluminous and should contain only what it is absolutely necessary for the troops to know.

Digitized by Google

For this purpose the following are necessary: a short orientation in regard to the general situation; orders for going into quarters; the detail of an outpost commander and the troops at his disposal; mission of the outposts and special directions for them; directions for the regimental baggage; time and place of issuing orders; location of headquarters.

ZULLICHAU, 2.8, 4.30 P. M.

Advance Guard Order.

1. It appears that the enemy has retreated with his main forces by Grünberg towards the Bober and with parts on Krossen. The 16th Hussar Regiment follows him on Grünberg, the cavalry brigade on Krossen.

2. The main body of the division takes quarters in Züllichau and to the rear thereof; the right-flank guard, in Kay.

3. The reserve will go into quarters in Krauschow and Langegasse. The major, 1st Battalion, 84th Infantry, will be commanding officer.

4. The engineer company will immediately march to the railroad bridge east of Pommerzig, remove the obstructions thereon and, in addition, guard the bridge during the night. (*Note:* Six mounted orderlies.)

5. Major J will be outpost commander; the 3d Bn., 84th Inf. Reg., and 1 plat. 3d Tp., 16th Hussars,

Digitized by Google

will report to him. The outposts will guard the bridge across the Oder at Tschicherzig and also the line of the Oder from the railroad bridge at Pommerzig as far as the bend in the river east of Tschicherzig. Reconnaissance during the night towards Grünberg and Prittag.

6. The regimental baggage will join the troops.

7. Orders will be issued at 10 P. M. at division headquarters in Züllichau.

8. I shall take quarters in Krauschow at the inn "Die Sonne."

W,
Major-General, 35th Inf. Brig.

In giving information regarding the general situation, the location of the cavalry and the whereabouts of the troops in rear must be mentioned, as these points are indispensable for the outpost commander in taking his measures for security and reconnaissance.

It seems advisable to charge the engineer company, which has labors to perform on the railroad bridge, with guarding it at the same time, especially as the outpost sector to be guarded by the 3d Battalion of the 84th Infantry is already very large.

As a rule the order is issued at the reserve, at the quarters of the advance-guard commander; in this case, where Züllichau is so close at hand, it seems more practicable, for the sake of simplifying matters and saving time, to issue the order at division headquarters in Züllichau.

Digitized by Google

ORDER FOR THE OUTPOST.

Major J, the outpost commander, issues his orders in accordance with the information received from the advance guard commander. These orders may be either verbal or in writing, but are always based on the map, and ought to be issued, if practicable, during the march. The consideration that the more urgent measures must be executed promptly will often cause him to issue a number of shorter orders to the troops under his command. When however, there is plenty of time and the behavior of the enemy does not compel quick measures it is better to issue a combined order for all outpost troops.

The latter may be assumed to be the case here, and the combined order should therefore be used. The outpost order ought to contain a short orientation regarding the general situation and the missions with which each subordinate commander is charged —especially points for reconnaissance and conduct during hostile attack. The order ought to regulate the assignment of smaller cavalry detachments and of mounted orderlies and cyclists to the infantry. Moreover, directions must be given for the outpost reserve, regarding the kind of quarters to be occupied, the degree of readiness to be maintained, and the necessary measures for security, as well as the location of the outpost commander.

Concerning measures to be taken, there is no hard-and-fast rule to go by, since each situation re-

Digitized by Google

quires its own measures, and seldom will two situations be alike. We can say only this much in regard to the detailing of outposts: it is just as faulty to assign to this duty too large a force as it is to assign one too small. We should weigh carefully in each case the least expenditure of force necessary for the complete accomplishment of our purpose. In view of the great number of possible contingencies, the choice is not an easy one. The issuing of a skillful outpost order is a difficult task, even when the conditions are apparently simple, and demands careful insight into and appreciation of the requirements of the situation.

NEUE WELT, 2.8, 5 P. M.

Outpost Order.

1. The enemy appears to have retreated with his main forces by Grünberg towards the Bober and with parts on Krossen. The Hussar Regiment follows him by Grünberg, the cavalry brigade on Krossen.

2. The main body of the division goes into quarters in Züllichau and to the rear thereof; our reserve in Krauschow. The engineer company occupies the railroad bridge east of Pommerzig.

3. The platoon of Hussars, as an officer's post, will take station at Scheunen, south of Waldhäuser, will reconnoiter towards Grünberg and Prittag and keep up connection by patrolling with the engineer company on the left bank of the Oder. It will send

Digitized by Google

to the outpost company and outpost reserve 2 mounted orderlies each.

4. The 9th Company, 84th Inf. Reg., as outpost company, will guard the bridge across the Oder at Waldhäuser.

5. The outpost reserve (10th, 11th, and 12th Companies, 84th Inf. Reg.), will go into alarm quarters in Tschicherzig. The 10th Company will establish posts at Luschken and Schindel mill for observation of the bank of the Oder.

6. The regimental baggage will join the troops.

7. Reports will reach me at the outpost reserve.

J,
Major, 3d Bn., 84th Inf.

In the case in hand the simplest measures ought to be taken. The enemy has been defeated, is hastily retreating and is not in the immediate vicinity. In addition, the Oder lends good protection.

It would therefore be erroneous to develop a formal system of outposts, to send out several companies and deprive them of rest by exhausting sentry and patrolling duty.

The outpost commander proceeds with the reserve directly to the Oder and the objective especially to be guarded, the highway bridge south of Tschicherzig. The Oder bank forms the line of resistance. The outpost commander knows that in this he goes unusually far from the reserve of the advance guard, but his mission demands it. His mission

Digitized by Google

is decisive in regulating the measures to be taken. Therefore, no set rules! In war the exception often becomes the rule! The general situation requires that the Oder crossing be kept open for the next day's advance; therefore an outpost company must be sent to the left bank of the stream. One outpost company is sufficient. The guarding of the bank of the stream can be accomplished by small posts sent out from the main body.

To send the outpost cavalry farther to the front does not seem necessary, as the Hussar regiment has been sent on ahead to follow up the retreating enemy. To guard against surprise, observation of the roads leading to Grünberg and Prittag, and patrolling towards the railroad bridge at Pommerzig, is all-sufficient.

THE CONDUCT OF THE 16TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.

The conduct of the cavalry brigade, the operations of which may have a decisive influence on the operations of the division, will contain much that is instructive, and furnish an opportunity to study the reconnoitering activity of cavalry in general.

According to its report to the division, the cavalry brigade reached Leitersdorf about 2.40 P. M. It found the crossings over the Griesel brook at Crämersborn and Leitersdorf mill occupied by hostile

Digitized by Google

cavalry. The commander decided, as his horses were tired, to remain in observation for the present.

How should we view the advance of the cavalry brigade up to this point?

The larger the front which the cavalry reconnoiters, the more thorough will be the reconnaissance. But that should not induce us to split up large bodies of cavalry. In doing so the separated parts might easily encounter superior hostile forces at most important points and would thereby be prevented from further advance and from continuing their reconnaissance. The cavalry therefore ought to keep its forces together in order to gain the superiority at decisive points and penetrate forcibly the hostile screen.

It would be well therefore to advance with the main body of the cavalry, which is reinforced by horse artillery and the machine-gun detachment, along the main highway and to charge single troops (contact troops) or officers' patrols with the reconnaissance of parallel roads.

The commander of the cavalry brigade will in this case, therefore, have advanced with his main body on the Züllichau–Leitersdorf road, having taken proper measures for security. The advance-guard troop has encountered the enemy at the Leitersdorf mill and another troop, which was sent by Steinbach on Crämersborn, has encountered the enemy at the latter place.

Digitized by Google

On receipt of this information the brigade commander will not continue the march with his brigade without further consideration, for a brigade is too immobile in its entirety. We cannot feel ahead with it here and there as with a patrol. The brigade commander will, therefore, prefer to halt, await further reports concerning the enemy and send out officers' patrols to find other crossings over the brook.

This time is utilized in loosening girths and feeding in order to preserve the efficiency of his command. After a crossing has been found—and it is recommended to look for more than one, as one may easily become unserviceable—the cavalry brigade resumes the advance.

The advance-guard troop crosses the brook and advances to reconnoiter. The battery proceeds along the bank on this side of the brook. Together they cover the crossing of the brigade.

Should, however, no unoccupied crossing be found, then the cavalry brigade will be compelled to force one, which it is not always able to accomplish by dismounted fire-action alone. In such a situation the horse artillery and machine-gun detachment will prove of great value. Machine-gun detachments represent a concentrated, far-reaching and easily controlled small-arms fire and make possible the quick gaining of a superiority of fire even at considerable distances, especially when directed against large targets. But machine guns, as well as artillery,

Digitized by Google

require special protection, particularly when opposed to a mobile enemy such as cavalry.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

The cavalry brigade forces a crossing at F. Rädnitz over the Griesel brook. The hostile cavalry (three or four troops) retreats through Gross-Rädnitz on Krossen. When the brigade with its tired horses reaches Gross-Rädnitz, at 6 P. M., just as night is beginning to fall, the commander receives the division commander's order to proceed to-day to occupy Krossen.

DECISION.

For the commander of the cavalry brigade there now arises the question whether or not he will carry out this order in face of the fact that his horses are very tired. If he halts here at Gross-Rädnitz and allows his brigade to rest, he will be able to demand much more of his troops to-morrow than he will if he utilizes to-day, to reach the required goal, the last breath of man and horse.

On the other hand, he must say to himself: the occupation of Krossen is of the utmost importance for the further operations of the division. If the brigade commander succeeds in reaching Krossen at the same time as the enemy, or even in shunting him off to the west, he will be able to occupy that place to-day; to-morrow it may be occupied by the enemy in force, and a crossing of the Oder at that point be out of the question.

Digitized by Google

The commander of the cavalry brigade will, therefore, use every effort to stay at the enemy's heels and reach Krossen to-day. Every man and horse fit to travel will be taken along; the troops will leave behind in Gross-Rädnitz only such as are entirely played out, to follow up on the next day.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

When the cavalry brigade reaches that point on the road to Krossen where the road to Kelunen branches off, the brigade commander receives the following report from the advance-guard troop:

East of BERG, 6.30 P. M.

Five or six hostile troops, wagons and some artillery are retreating across the bridge at Krossen.

v. K,
Captain.

And immediately thereafter an officer's patrol reports:

PFEIFFER MUHLE, 6.20 P. M.

According to statement of reliable inhabitant strong hostile forces have been this afternoon in all villages southeast of Krossen. A hostile division headquarters is said to be in Gersdorf.

L,
Lieutenant.

Shortly thereafter a loud explosion is heard and the advance-guard troop sends the following report:

Digitized by Google

The enemy has just now blown up the bridge at Krossen. The opposite bank of the Oder seems to be occupied in force. v. K,
Captain.

DECISIONS BASED ON THESE REPORTS AND MEASURES TAKEN.

Through this information the situation, which has been so uncertain up to this time, is completely cleared up. The first report gives positive information that it has been impossible to shunt off from Krossen those parts of the enemy's forces which have retreated before the brigade.

The second report contains important information concerning the whole situation as regards the enemy and although it must be scrutinized carefully, having been given by an inhabitant, it may nevertheless prove, in connection with other reports, of the utmost importance to higher headquarters and must therefore be sent immediately to the division. The commander of the cavalry brigade learns from it that he would be in the enemy's rear upon crossing the Oder.

The third report renders impossible the carrying out of the order to occupy Krossen to-day and makes the mission of the brigade appear still more difficult on account of the destruction of the bridge across the Oder and the strong occupying force in Krossen.

The brigade commander will have to confine

Digitized by Google

himself to occupying the bank of the Oder to the north of Krossen and to allowing the battery and the machine-gun detachment to come into action against Krossen from the commanding position on the bank and continue their fire until nightfall.

He will then issue a brief rest-order which will regulate the assignment of quarters, measures for security and the means of subsistence. The two large villages Berg and Mersdorf are designated as quarters for the two dragoon regiments. The machine-gun detachment is quartered in Berg and the battery in Mersdorf.

The measures taken for security in far-advanced cavalry commands are of a special character. In order to spare the troops, all thought of a continuous outpost-line must be given up. Every village used as quarters must be secured by the troops occupying it and this is best done by employing the carbine, a weapon which lends defensive power to the cavalry. Additional security is provided by sending out patrols. When the enemy is close at hand lines well adapted for defense are occupied by pickets and sentry-posts, or the village entrances are obstructed and guarded by outlying posts. "Obstructions even of the simplest kind—especially several in succession—can, when defended by the carbine, hold for some time even a superior force of cavalry."

In the case before us the measures to be taken for security must be well weighed. Although the

Digitized by Google

Oder affords us a certain protection yet, as the enemy is very close, surprise is not impossible. Moreover, the hostile main army is located to the north, on which account it would be well to post sentries on the right bank of the Oder and to send patrols over to the left bank, as well as in the direction of Baudach and Radenickel.

Further orders of the leader of the cavalry brigade:

1. The regimental baggage will move up immediately and the ration- and forage-wagons will be refilled, if necessary, by requisitioning.

2. In accordance with the division order a line of relays will be established to Züllichau. Since this is probably to be maintained only for a short time and for temporary purposes, a relay post, consisting of one corporal and six dragoons, at Gross-Rädnitz will suffice.

3. The division order further directs: railroad and telegraphic communications between Krossen and Guben are to be interrupted as soon as possible. For this purpose two patrols with the necessary tools and materials for destruction must be sent to-day to the left bank of the Oder to interrupt as soon as possible the railroad and telegraph service at two different places. Under such conditions two patrols are a necessity in order to make success more certain.

Digitized by Google

Intentions of the Commander of the Cavalry Brigade for August 3d.

The cavalry brigade has not been able to carry out the division commander's order, namely, to reach Krossen on the 2d of August and cross to the left bank of the Oder. This must, therefore, be undertaken on the 3d of August. The occupation of the city will probably be impossible on the next day as well, as long as the enemy occupies it. However a crossing of the Oder to the west of Krossen leads to the enemy's rear and thus to the fulfillment of the most important part of the mission: the harassing of the enemy, the observation of his retreat, and the destruction of his communications to the rear.

Although bridges are lacking, the crossing of a river no longer presents any serious difficulties to cavalry. Each regiment carries a steel-boat bridge train with a ferry capable of carrying thirty men, or one gun, or a wagon with its horses and personnel.

The bridge equipage* consists of two bridge-wagons with material for bridge-laying and one telegraph-wagon.

In addition, boats and rafts may be requisitioned. But since this means of crossing consumes a great deal of time, horse and rider will often have to swim the river in expeditions requiring rapid movement.

*The collapsible-boat material, which is still occasionally used, has a somewhat less carrying capacity.

Digitized by Google

After it has crossed the Oder, the cavalry brigade will, under certain conditions, find itself in difficult situations due to the fact that it will be cut off from communication with its own forces. However, although it is exposed to serious losses, or even to a sharp reverse, yet, on the other hand, success of immeasurable importance may be obtained. It is a situation where, in war, everything must be risked and yet where we dare not admit any anxiety in regard to our own situation.

For the crossing of the Oder by the brigade on the next day an exhaustive reconnaissance must be undertaken immediately, with a view to locating suitable places for crossing (fords and islands). Provision must likewise be made for the procuring of means of crossing (boats and rafts). Separate troops or patrols are entrusted with this duty.

The brigade itself must be assembled early on the morning of August 3d and prepared for the crossing. As soon as a place for the crossing has been selected the regimental baggage must be brought up there.

The commander of the cavalry brigade reports to the division everything that has happened during the day and what the brigade has accomplished, also his personal impressions as to events, his arrangements for quartering his command, and measures for security during the night, as well as his intentions for the next day.

Digitized by Google

CONCERNING THE SITUATION OF THE DIVISION.

Meanwhile, at division headquarters at Züllichau all the reports concerning the enemy are coming in. Besides the reports from the cavalry brigade the division commander also receives the following from the Hussar regiment:

GRUNBERG, 2.8, 6.30 P. M.

Patrols ahead have encountered hostile infantry outposts at Logau and cavalry vedettes at Treppeln. A troop sent to Rothenburg found that place free of the enemy and occupied the railroad station. No railroad material was found there. No troops have entrained at that place; but hostile troops are said to have retreated from there on Wenig-Lessen. The railroad bridge at Deutsch-Netkow was found to be unharmed. Shall have communication established with the cavalry brigade over this bridge. A line of relays has been established between Grünberg and Züllichau. Shall remain for the night in Grünberg. A,

Colonel, 9th Hussars.

From the engineer company comes the report:

That the railroad bridge to the east of Pommerzig has been restored.

From general headquarters a letter is received with the following information:

The army has reached the line Meseritz-Schwiebus on the afternoon of August 2d. The hostile army has retreated in the direction of Sternberg and Zielenzig.

Digitized by Google

The cavalry commands of both armies are in touch at the lake defiles near Lagow. According to the report of a spy, preparations are being made at the railroad station at Guben for the entertainment of large bodies of troops and much railroad material has been collected there.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

The General Staff officer must, on the basis of the messages and reports received, make a report to the division commander, in which he gives an estimate of the situation and proposals for measures to be taken.

The General Staff officer will express himself as follows:

According to the reports received we must assume that the enemy, whose strength is about equal to that of the division, is still on this side of the Bober, and that he has occupied the villages southeast of Krossen.

His outposts are located along the line Treppeln–Wenig–Lessen. During the course of to-day he has retreated from 25 to 30 km. In regard to his further plans it appears that he has no immediate intention of recrossing to the right bank of the Oder. He has not made use of the crossing south of Deutsch–Netkow and has destroyed the one at Krossen.

The enemy can be contemplating but two moves for the 3d of August: either to continue his retreat across the Bober in the direction of Guben, by using

Digitized by Google

the railroad line Krossen–Guben (the information from general headquarters seems to indicate this) or to again offer battle east of the Bober in the hope of gaining a partial victory over the pursuing division.

The mission of the division is to inflict as much damage as possible upon the opposing hostile forces and to keep them from rejoining their main army.

If the enemy continues his retreat it is important to cling to his heels by making forced marches and to prevent by all means his entraining at Guben.

Should he offer battle he is thereby only acting to the advantage of the division. The latter will then attack him energetically in order to defeat him anew and drive him toward the Bober.

In any case the mission of the division for the 3d of August consists in continuing the pursuit with all its forces and in cutting off the enemy's communications to the rear. The latter part of the mission must be undertaken by the cavalry.

Accordingly the division must begin the advance on G. Lessen early in the day, either by way of Grünberg or by some more direct road to be found by reconnoitering. The cavalry brigade must cross the Oder to the west of Krossen, interrupt the Krossen–Guben railroad, keep up communication with our own main army, and continuously recon-

Digitized by Google

noiter toward the right flank of the hostile main army.*

The Hussar regiment must reconnoiter round the right flank of the enemy, toward the Bober, and determine whether or not he is continuing his retreat across the Bober.

ORDERS FOR THE THIRD OF AUGUST,

It is now necessary to issue a march order for the division and special directions for the independent cavalry.

MARCH ORDER FOR THE THIRD OF AUGUST.

Outline.

Since the activity of troops in mobile warfare consists primarily in marching, march orders are of frequent occurrence. Their importance increases with the proximity of the enemy. Under some circumstances the march order may even shape the first stages of a battle and in it may lie the germs which develop into tactical success or failure.

Therefore, the order must often be written with a view to the possibility of encountering the enemy.

*The order for continuous reconnaisance toward the right flank of the hostile main army is a measure of special importance since, under certain conditions, a very good foundation may thus be laid for the course of action of our own main army, especially if care is taken that the results of this reconnaissance are communicated in good time to headquarters by the quickest means (the telegraph detachment). In this manner the division commander shows that he not only has in mind what is directly before him and is of interest to himself alone, but that he is exerting himself primarily to promote in every way possible the success of the main cause.

Digitized by Google

Whenever possible due regard should also be given to sparing the strength of the troops.

The order, while covering all necessary points, must be kept short and simple. The directions must leave no room for doubt and must guarantee fulfillment of the mission, but, at the same time, must allow a certain degree of latitude which will make it possible to alter the dispositions during the march as the necessity arises. Here too it is a virtue to say neither too much nor too little.

What must the march order contain?

1. Information concerning the enemy and our supporting troops.
2. Purpose and objective of the march.
3. Missions of the separate bodies formed by the distribution of troops (independent cavalry, advance guard, flank guard, main body).
4. Directions for the regimental baggage.
5. Directions for ammunition columns and trains.
6. Location of the commander during the march.

To the order should be added, separately in the margin, a distribution of troops.

Remarks on 1. The information should contain only what is actually known and what it is necessary for the troops to know. In this case it would be wrong to say that the villages to the southeast of

Digitized by Google

Krossen *are* occupied, because we are indebted for that information to an inhabitant of the country. It would be better to generalize and say that the enemy *appears* still to be on the right bank of the Bober. Information regarding conditions in the main army is superfluous, since this is of no importance to the troops, although it has a bearing on the decisions of the division commander. We must carefully distinguish between that which is of importance for the commander alone and that which the troops must know.

Remarks on 2. The purpose underlying the entire operation should be plainly stated in this paragraph and given out as a sort of general watchword, as it were, for the day's operation. If we were to employ for this purpose the very common and often apt form of expression; "the division will continue its march to-morrow by way of Grünberg on Gr. Lessen," we should not completely accomplish our object.

It would be better to say: "the pursuit will be continued to-morrow with all available forces," in order to lay especial emphasis on the whole operation and to instill into everyone, down to the last baggage escort, the conviction that unusual exertions are necessary.

The distribution of troops gives in more detail the order in which the troops take up the march.

Digitized by Google

It is intended to shorten the order and is best written on the left-hand side of the sheet beside the order.

It is a question as to whether or not it will be to our advantage to have out a right-flank guard on the following day. This question should be answered in the affirmative. By an advance on two roads, the length of the march-column will be cut down as well as the time of marching and deployment.

The flank guard can cross the Oder on the railroad bridge and then march on Rothenburg, the capture of which is important on account of its being a railroad junction. Considering the fact that the character of the road is as yet unascertained it would be better to attach the artillery to the advance guard.

Remarks on 3. To include the whole order for the cavalry brigade in the march order for the division is impracticable, since the latter order would thus be made too long-winded.

Whenever a particularly complex mission falls to the lot of a special body of troops it is well not to include the instructions therefor in detail in the combined order, but only to outline therein their general purport, for the information of the rest of the troops. The detailed instructions for the commander of the cavalry brigade are sent him in the form of a discretionary order.

The mission of the Hussar regiment, however, since it can be more briefly stated, may be included

Digitized by Google

in the combined order, so as to emphasize especially the necessity for close coöperation between that regiment and the division.

The chief mission of the regiment will be to determine whether the enemy has halted or is continuing his retreat and, in the latter case, its direction. The order should therefore direct reconnaissance round the flanks of the hostile outpost line in the direction of Krossen and the crossings of the Bober. It seems advisable, in addition, to reconnoiter from Grünberg, in a southwesterly direction through Naumburg, toward Sagan and Sommerfeld, and to interrupt the Sagan–Guben railway. The reason for this is to secure early information as to whether the enemy is expecting reinforcements from the south and, in that event, to hinder these reinforcements in their march on Guben. Even though no instructions for this have been received from army headquarters, the division commander must, nevertheless, proceed in the matter on his own initiative and charge the Hussar regiment with the necessary measures.

As a rule the regiment of divisional cavalry will be attached to the advance guard according to the principle in the Field Service Regulations which reads: "The reconnaissance of the divisional cavalry is confined to narrower limits but is sufficient for all battle purposes. Among its standing duties are: the reconnaissance on our own flanks and to-

Digitized by Google

wards the flanks of the enemy and the protection of the other arms against surprise." But in the above case the broad mission assigned the Hussar regiment, namely, the reconnoitering of the left bank of the Oder—makes it necessary to give this regiment a greater degree of independence and freedom of movement. It should, therefore, not be tied down to the advance guard, and only the least requisite number of men should be detached for reconnoitering duty in the immediate vicinity of the division.

In issuing instructions for the rest of the troops there are four important points which must be considered in connection with every march order:

T i m e o f s t a r t i n g, s t a r t i n g - p o i n t, r o a d t o b e t a k e n, a n d o b j e c t i v e.

The t i m e o f s t a r t i n g must be so arranged that the objective may be reached in the daytime. Prolonging the march into the night should be avoided whenever possible. It is preferable in case an unusually long march is necessary to begin the march before dawn so as to end it in the daytime. But even a very early start should only take place as an exceptional measure since even that saps the strength of the troops.

We shall often find ourselves desiring to make a very early start in order to get ahead of the enemy. But we must remember that the early-starting habit, if continued, ruins the troops. This becomes evident when we consider the mounted branches of the

Digitized by Google

service, the men of which have to turn out several hours before the actual start in order to attend to their horses. For this reason it is usual not to start before 6 A. M. in summer nor before 8 A. M. in winter.

If the troops have to cover long distances to reach the place of assembly the time of departure should be correspondingly deferred.

Instead of giving the starting-time it is sometimes better to announce the t i m e o f a r r i v a l, at which the troops are expected to have reached or passed a designated point. This plan is a good one to adopt, to prevent confusion, when we are marching in several columns on different roads and have to pass through a defile, or when it is a question of hastening the march in order to reach a designated point. Against the announcing of a definite time of arrival there is to be said, that we might sometimes be prevented by the enemy from reaching the designated point and that in a march with several columns the execution of the order might be rendered impossible on account of varying conditions of the roads and other unforeseen circumstances. The designation of the time of starting is therefore in most cases to be preferred.

It is well to assign a time and point of departure to each separate part of the march-column and regulate in this manner the distances between units on the march. This method of procedure is better than merely assigning a time and point of departure for

Digitized by Google

the advance guard and directing the other parts to follow at certain distances; the latter method gives additional labor to the troops in rear, since they have to translate the distances given into intervals of time.

As regards the starting-point and the assembly of the troops for the march, it would cause an unnecessary loss of time and strength in the case of larger bodies to assemble all the troops at one point. Thus special places of assembly are assigned here for the different parts of the march-column, advance guard, main body, regimental baggage, columns and trains, so located with respect to one another that each unit, on taking up the march from its designated starting-point, will come into its proper place in the march-column. The place of assembly must be so chosen that no troops are compelled either to make a detour or to counter-march. The assembly for the march must itself be in the nature of an advance. The advance guard however is always assembled under cover of the line of outposts; never in advance of that line. The outposts then take up the march in their proper place in the column.

Preparatory to beginning the march the troops may be placed either in assembly formation or in column of march. The first method has the advantage possessed by every assembly formation: the commander keeps his troops well in hand and they are thus in immediate readiness for battle. Where, as in

Digitized by Google

this case, an encounter with the enemy is not impossible, even before beginning the march, the assembly formation should be adopted. This mode of assembling is, however, round-about: the troops arrive in column of march, have to maneuver into a mass-formation, and then back again into column of march. The nature of the country furthermore (as in the case of defiles) does not always lend itself to the change into assembly formation. Accordingly, in all cases where the taking up of the march may be counted upon with some degree of certainty, the assembly in column of march is preferable, because simpler and more natural.

The direction of the march and in most cases the road to be taken should always be stated. It is sufficient for the advance guard to receive these instructions, since the main body, etc., as a rule follows the advance guard on the same road.

In marches under war conditions the objective of the advance can only be stated in general terms, since it is impossible to know beforehand whether or not we shall be able to reach it; the enemy may prevent our carrying out our intention, or we may be forced by other circumstances to take up another direction of march. A positive command should never be given unless we are certain that it can be carried out. An expression such as "march *to* Gr. Lessen" is to be avoided. It is better to name a place which we can in all probability reach, and to base upon

Digitized by Google

this the general direction for the advance; thus, for example, we might say, "take up the advance *on* Gr. Lessen." The mention of intermediate points, in order to define more exactly the road to be taken, is only necessary when doubt might otherwise arise concerning it.

Remarks on 4. The directions for the regimental baggage are usually included in detail in the march order so that the troops may be informed of its location.

The commander of the regimental baggage, who is at division headquarters and present when the order is issued, must pay especial attention to the order of march of the troops in order to have the various regimental trains march in the same order as their respective organizations—an arrangement always to be desired.

We have much latitude in disposing of the regimental baggage. When contact with the enemy seems improbable it may follow the troops directly or remain in the same quarters in case the troops are likely to return thither. If the probable field of battle is near its present location, or if a retreat is to be feared, the regimental baggage is drawn up in column of march on a near-by road, after the departure of the troops, and there awaits further orders.

In a flank march the regimental baggage should be placed on a parallel road on the side away from the enemy. In all cases, however, where it is doubt-

Digitized by Google

ful whether we shall merely make a march or shall fight, it is best for the regimental baggage to follow the troops at a distance of from 2 to 5 km. It is then sufficiently far to the rear not to be in the way in case of battle and yet near enough to be easily available on our going into quarters or camp. We can also, in such cases, direct it to follow the troops, but only as far as some designated point or, better still, some line.

In the case in hand the regimental baggage should follow the division at some interval.

Remarks on 5. For the ammunition columns and trains special detailed directions should be given for the most part and only such extracts included in the march order as it is important for the troops to know.

Since only a part of the ammunition and supplies are needed for immediate use a division of the ammunition columns and trains into two sections is usually made. The 1st Section of the ammunition columns and trains follows the troops, as a rule, at an interval of from 10 to 12 km, so that it may be brought up to the field of battle if necessary; the 2d Section at the interval of a day's march of from 20 to 25 km.

In this matter, however, there are no fixed regulations. The disposition of columns and trains must always be made with a view to existing circumstances. We may allow them to follow as a whole in the rear when we do not need them, or we may assign to the 1st

Digitized by Google

Section the combat trains alone (making it a combat section) and to the 2d Section, the supply-wagons alone (making it a supply section)—this in case a battle is imminent and there is no need of replenishing the supply of provisions from the trains. In each case the distances between the columns and trains varies on the march according to the use to be made of them. If we are sure that we are marching into battle we shall do well to have a combat section follow directly after the troops.

In the case before us the enemy is, to be sure, still distant a day's march; but an encounter with him is nevertheless possible during the course of August 3d, if he holds his position. It appears advisable therefore to advance part of the ammunition columns and field hospitals as a 1st Section, and let them follow the division at a comparatively short distance. The regimental baggage can follow directly after this section while the rest of the columns and trains follow as a 2d Section at a greater distance. The divisional bridge-train, which will scarcely be used during the course of the 3d of August, is assigned to accompany the regimental baggage.

In assembling the columns and trains, as well as the regimental baggage, for the march especial care must be taken that they do not have to countermarch and that their respective roads do not cross. Above all, the assembling and marching of the troops

Digitized by Google

must not be interfered with. Thus the time and place of assembling must be so chosen that the approaches are free from troops and that all parts of the trains, on advancing, may come directly into their proper relative positions.

Remarks on 6. The place of the commander, in all cases where an encounter with the enemy is possible, would best be with the advance guard—either with the vanguard or the reserve. Here all reports will reach him promptly and, in case of an encounter with the enemy, he is in a position to estimate at first hand the terra in and the enemy's situation and thereby to give proper directions for the deployment of the main body. He has likewise a direct influence upon the first dispositions of the advance guard, which are often of great importance.

18th Inf. Div. Div. Hdqrs., ZULLICHAU, 2.8, 10 P. M.

Divisional Order.

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.

1. Independent Cavalry:
   (*a*) 17th Cav. Brig. with Horse Btry. and Machine-gun Det.
   (*b*) 16th Hus. Reg. (1st, 2d and ½ 3d Tps.)
2. Advance Guard: Maj.-Gen. 35th Inf. Brig.

1. The enemy appears to be still located with his main forces to the east of the Bober; he has destroyed the bridge over the Oder at Krossen. His outposts are reported to be at Logau and Treppeln.
2. The division will continue the pursuit to-morrow with all its forces, and march through Grünberg on Gr. Lessen.
3. The cavalry brigade is to cross the Oder to-morrow morning, between the mouths of the Neisse

Digitized by Google

84th Inf. Reg.
9th Jäg. Bn.
½ 3d Tp. 16th Hus. Reg.
9th F. A. Reg.
½ San. Co.

3. Right Flank Guard:
Col. 86th Fus. Reg.
86th Fus. Reg.
½ 3d Tp. 16th Hus. Reg.
Eng. Co.

4. Main Body (in order of march):
½ 3d Tp. 16th Hus. Reg.
31st Inf. Reg.
45th F. A. Reg.
85th Inf. Reg.
½ San. Co.
Light. Art. Am. Col.

and Bober, to threaten the enemy's communications to the rear and to inflict damage upon him in every possible way.

The 16th Hussar Regiment will start early to reconnoiter from Grünberg towards Krossen and the bridges over the Bober at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück. It must be determined whether the enemy is still on this side of the Bober and, if so, where he is. Reconnaissance must also be made through Naumburg and the Guben-Sommerfeld railroad must be interupted.

4. The infantry of the advance guard will start at 6.30 A. M. from Neue Welt, 2 km north of Tschicherzig, and march through Tschicherzig and Grünberg on Gr. Lessen. It will reconnoiter towards Rothenberg, Schweidnitz and Günthersdorf and will establish connection with the Hussar regiment.

5. Of the main body, the 31st Inf. Reg., ½ 3d Tp., 16th Hussars, and the 45th F. A. Reg. will be in assembly formation at the northern entrace of Krauschow at 7 A. M. to-morrow in order to to follow the advance guard at an interval of 1½ km.

The 85th Inf. Reg. and ½ San. Co. will be at the eastern entrance of Züllichau (Schmöllen road) at 7.30 A. M. to-morrow and will follow in its place in the main body without interval.

Digitized by Google

The ½ San. Co. will be followed by the light ammunition columns of the artillery from Züllichau.

6. The right-flank guard will cross the railroad bridge east of Pommerzig at 9 A. M. and march through Rothenburg on Gr. Lessen. Reconnaissance toward Krossen and Drehnow. Connection is to be maintained with the Hussar regiment and the division.
7. The 1st Section of the ammunition columns and trains (the 2d Inf. Am. Col., 2d Art. Am. Col., and Field Hospitals 1, 2 and 3) will reach Neue Welt, north of Tschicherzig, at 9.15 A. M. to morrow and will follow the division from there at 9.45 A. M.
8. The regimental baggage, to which the divisional bridge-train is attached, will assemble at 9 A. M. on the road to Tschicherzig and after the 1st Section has passed through Züllichau and Krauschow will join and follow it without distance.
9. The 2d Section of the columns and trains will start at 8.30 A. M. from Neu-Kramzig and follow the division by Züllichau.
10. I shall be with the reserve of the advance guard.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

Digitized by Google

Dictated to the officers detailed to receive orders of the advance guard, flank guard, and main body; in writing to the Hussar regiment; extracts to the cavalry brigade, columns, and trains.

GENERAL STAFF OFFICER,
18th Inf. Div.

Directions to the Ammunition Columns and Trains.

Div. Hdqrs., ZULLICHAU,
2.8, 10.15 P. M.

To form the 1st Section of the columns and trains, the 2d Infantry Ammunition Column, the 2d Artillery Ammunition Column, and the 1st, 2d, and 3d Field Hospitals will reach Neue Welt, north of Tschicherzig, to-morrow at 9.15 A. M., and will follow the division from there at 9.45 A. M. by Tschicherzig and Grünberg on Gr. Lessen.

The emptied wagons of the 1st Infantry and 1st Artillery Ammunition Columns will drive back at 3 A. M. to-morrow from Züllichau to the ammunition sub-dépôt at Bomst and, after replenishment, will immediately follow the division by Züllichau on Grünberg, in order to join the 2d Section of the ammunition columns and trains.

Digitized by Google

The 1st Subsistence Column will replenish during the day under the directions of the chief of the supply service in Züllichau and will then likewise follow the division.

The remainder of the ammunition columns and trains—the 4th, 5th, and 6th Field Hospitals, 2d and 3d Subsistence Columns, the 1st, 2d, and 3d Supply Trains—will follow the division, in the order named, as the 2d Section, starting about 8.30 A. M. from Neu-Kramzig.

GEN. STAFF OFFICER,
18th Inf. Div.

To the Commander of the Cavalry Brigade.

Div. Hdqrs., ZULLICHAU,
2.8, 10.30 P. M.

The division will proceed to-morrow in the direction of Gr. Lessen in the pursuit of the enemy who appears to be still on this side of the Bober with his main forces. The Hussar regiment will reconnoiter on the left bank of the Oder towards the Bober.

You will cross the Oder early to-morrow morning with the cavalry brigade, between the mouths of the Bober and the Neisse, interrupt the Krossen–Guben railroad, and inflict damage on the enemy in every possible way.

Digitized by Google

It is reported that extensive preparations are being made in Guben to entrain troops and that much railroad material is stored there. You should therefore reconnoiter in that direction and send me information concerning events there as soon as practicable.

You should utilize the advantage which your brigade has gained through its advanced position on the right flank of the enemy's main army by maintaining continuous reconnaissance towards that army. You should also keep in constant communication with general headquarters.

N,
Lieutenant-General.

OFFICERS' PATROLS.

In view of the high importance of reconnaissance to the success of the operations, the division commander will scarcely consider the activity of the cavalry brigade and the Hussar regiment to be alone sufficient. It is, of course, *possible* that the cavalry will gather sufficient information concerning the enemy, yet it is not at all certain that the division commander will receive *sufficiently early* information in regard to those very points which are decisive in determining his course of action.

The leader of the cavalry often fails to recognize clearly enough those things which are of importance to the leader of the whole or he allows himself to be

Digitized by Google

too much influenced by missions of minor importance. On account of the centralization of the message service most of the reports come first to the cavalry commander, and are thus often delayed in reaching the commander of the whole.

It is therefore necessary that the commander have at his disposal other reconnaissance bodies to which he may assign special tasks directly and whose duty it shall be to report to him directly.

For this purpose officers' patrols are the most suitable. The division commander either has several placed at his disposal, detailed from the Hussar regiment, or he sends, in special cases, a General Staff officer, an orderly officer, or even line officers of the other arms (mounted officers of infantry, engineers, or artillery) according to the purpose in view. These patrols are assigned their tasks on the evening before or early in the morning, on the basis of the reports last received. Such patrols are sometimes not sent out until after the march has been begun, when the situation has shaped itself and when definite questions arise the solution of which is imperative; as, for example, the determination of the extent of a hostile position.

In the case in hand it would be advantageous to find a shorter way to Gr. Lessen, practicable for the division—possibly by Krampe–Lausitz–Plothow—in order to avoid the detour by way of Grünberg. This duty should be assigned well in advance to an offi-

Digitized by Google

cer's patrol which is also charged with determining whether or not the enemy has halted at Logau and Wenig–Lessen.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

The division commander receives from the officer's patrol, sent out early to reconnoiter the road Sawade–Krampe–Lausitz–Plothow, the report that that road is only macadamized in places and is therefore difficult to traverse.

The division commander thereupon decides to march by Grünberg with the division. With larger bodies of troops we must keep on the well-kept roads and avoid marching over the poor ones which, to be sure, shorten the distance according to the map, but actually lengthen the time of march.

WHERE IS THE INFANTRY POINT OF THE ADVANCE GUARD AT 10.00 A. M.; WHERE IS THE TAIL OF THE MAIN BODY OF THE DIVISION, AND HOW HAS THE MARCH OF THE DIVISION BEEN CONDUCTED UP TO THAT TIME?

The answer to this question should show the whole interior economy of the march-column: the rate of march, march-depths, distances and the like, and should furnish proof of the correctness of

Digitized by Google

the times and places given in the march order for starting.

The infantry point of the advance guard has left Neue-Welt at 6.30 A. M. Large bodies of troops, in marching greater distances, require when weather and road conditions are favorable fifteen minutes to cover 1 km, including necessary halts. In the case of shorter distances and with shortened rests, as would be the case in a pursuit, we calculate on twelve minutes to a kilometer.

Consequently the point of the advance guard has covered 17½ km by 10 A. M. and has at this very minute left Grünberg.

To ascertain where the tail of the main body of the division is at this time, we must consider the march-depth of the division. For this purpose, and at the same time to gain a clear picture of the entire march of the division, we had best draw a marching sketch.

In accordance with the march-sketch, the tail of the advance guard at 10 A. M. is at the northeast entrance of Kühnau, the head of the main body halfway between Kühnau and Sawade, the tail of the main body 500 m northeast of See Br., the head of the 1st Section at Tschicherzig, the tail of the regimental baggage 1 km

Digitized by Google

Sketch of the Division on the March.



$\frac{25125}{}$ m = march depth of the advance guard. from the infantry point

Digitized by Google



11750 m march depth of the combatant troops of the division.

3000 m

1700 m — 1st Section of cols. and trains.

2d Inf. Amm. Col. = 650 m
2d Art. Amm. Col. = 600 m
1st, 2d, 3d Field Hosp. = 450 m

2400 m (about) — Regimental baggage.

5000 m

4650 m — 2d Section of cols. and trains.

3d and 4th Art. Amm. Cols. = 1260 m
4th, 5th, 6th Field Hosps. = 450 m
2d and 3d Subsist. Cols. = 900 m
1st, 2d and 3d Supply Cols. = 2100 m

Total: 28½ km = march depth of the division with columns and trains and regimental baggage.

NOTE.—The road space occupied by the light trains accompanying the troops, as well as the distances between units prescribed by the regulations, are included in the above sketch.

Digitized by Google

south of Krauschow. The 2d Section, which left Neu-Kramzig at 8.30 A. M., has reached the edge of the forest half-way between Klemzig and Krummendorf.

About this time the point of the flank guard is approaching Woitschke.

PROVING THE CORRECTNESS OF THE MARCH ORDERS AS TO TIMES AND POINTS OF STARTING.

If we scrutinize the times and places of starting as to their correctness on the basis of the above march-depths, we arrive at the following result:

The infantry point of the advance guard starts at 6.30 A. M. from Neue Welt. The entire advance guard has a depth of 5,125 m, and as the distances between elements (1,800 m) are gained during the advance, it can assemble on the Krauschow–Neue Welt road in column of march. The assembly of the advance guard for the march takes place to the front, to gain distance. As the troops from Krauschow will have to cover 3 km in reaching Neue Welt for the assembly and as the artillery battalion has to be brought up from the flank guard at Kay, the time of starting must be delayed until 6.30 A. M.

Considering the limited space available and the distribution of troops of the column of march, the

Digitized by Google

troops of the main body are assembled in three groups, at three different points and at different times. The 31st Infantry Regiment and the 45th Field Artillery Regiment, which are to follow the advance guard at a distance of 1½ km, are ordered to assemble in mass-formation directly behind the advance guard in the open space between Krauschow and Züllichau, but half an hour later. It would be desirable to form the artillery in column of march but there is not sufficient room.

The 85th Infantry Regiment, which has been quartered in Krummendorf, and the ½ Sanitary Company coming from Klemzig are ordered to assemble at the eastern entrance of Züllichau (on the Schmöllen road) so as to avoid marching through the northern part of Züllichau which will be filled with wagons. The assembly of these bodies may take place half an hour later than that of the leading elements of the main body as the latter will require about forty minutes to complete their movement to the front.

About the same time the light columns assemble in Züllichau, allow the 85th Infantry and the ½ Sanitary Company to pass, and then follow immediately in their rear.

The first section of the ammunition columns and trains will reach Neue Welt by 9.15 A. M. By this time it will find the road clear of the division since the latter, with a total march-depth of about 12 km,

Digitized by Google

will have passed Neue Welt by 9 A. M. The 1st Section is ordered to follow the division from Neue Welt at 9.45 A. M., and will thus gain a distance of about 3 km.

The regimental baggage will not be assembled until after the 1st Section has passed through Züllichau and Krauschow, in order to avoid confusion.

If the 2d Section of the columns and trains starts from Neu-Kramzig about 8.30 A. M., it will follow the regimental baggage at a distance of about 5 km.

From the above it will be seen that the instructions in the march order concerning times and places of starting are based on figuring out the depths of march columns and the rate of march, and that only the greatest accuracy in this calculation can ensure the smooth progress of the march.

CONCERNING THE TIME REQUIRED FOR DEPLOYMENT.

Of special importance in issuing orders for the forward march in active operations is the consideration of the deployment for battle. It must never be lost sight of by the troop leader.

By the time required for deployment we understand the time required by the very last man of the fighting troops to reach the front. This calculation must be based on the marching ability of the infantryman, as mounted troops can deploy much more quickly.

Digitized by Google

An infantryman, marching in ranks, can cover on an average 80 m per minute. We therefore get the time required for deploying, approximately, by dividing the length of column in meters by 80.

In the case in hand the advance guard can deploy in $5{,}200 \div 80 = 1$ hour and 5 minutes; the combatant troops of the division in $12{,}000 \div 80 =$ 2 hours and 30 minutes.

Consequently, it will be $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours from the time that the point of the advance guard enters upon an engagement before the whole force of the division reaches the first line. The formation of the division for battle, the deployment of the separate organizations, and their entrance upon their assigned battle function can, however, take place in a much shorter time—that is, in about $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours. These especially favorable conditions have been brought about by the sending out of a flank guard by which the march-depth is shortened. The starting-time of the right-flank guard should be so calculated that, after it has crossed the bridge over the Oder, it will move opposite the advance guard. The lines of march of the flank guard and of the division converge on Gr. Lessen, so that united tactical action is assured. Thus, in considering the march organization, the flank guard is to be regarded as a part of the division which has already deployed. The division in this case appears equally well formed for marching or for battle.

Digitized by Google

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

Reports During the March.

During the advance the division commander receives the following reports:

1. From the Hussar regiment:

LIPPEN, 8 A. M.

At Stern Vw., southeast of Liebthal, we encountered superior hostile cavalry and were driven back by it towards Lippen. Since circling the enemy's right flank is impossible, I turn with the regiment towards Drehnow. A troop sent by me ahead towards Gr. Lessen reports that the hostile infantry outposts have retired on Grunow and Sch., 1½ km north of Grunow.

A,
Colonel.

2. From the cavalry brigade:

Hill West of BERG, 7 A. M.

According to statements of inhabitants, no troops were transported on the Krossen–Guben railroad yesterday. Much noise and the beating of drums was heard in Krossen early this morning. The garrison seems to have evacuated the place. Guards are still posted at the Oder bridge. Near the railroad bridge at Rehfeld numerous laborers are seen. I shall cross the Oder at Polenzig with the brigade. Sent out patrols early this morning to destroy the Krossen–Guben railroad.

C,
Major-General.

Digitized by Google

3. From the officer's patrol sent toward Logau:

Hill 87, 1½ km south of THIEMENDORF,
9 A. M.

The enemy has evacuated Logau and Wenig-Lessen. Grunow is still weakly occupied. At Sch., 1½ km north of Grunow, entrenchments are being thrown up. Received fire from hostile infantry posts in the grove north of Sch.

v. L,
Lieutenant.

4. From the Hussar regiment:

TREPPLER VW., 10 A. M.

Hostile cavalry, strength about three troops, moving from Treppeln to Cossar. I follow in that direction. A patrol, sent on ahead by Zerbings B., reports that troops of all arms (at least one regiment of infantry and artillery) are concentrated west of Plau. No enemy has been encountered in the woods south of Plau.

A,
Colonel.

The division commander receives the first report while with the reserve of the advance guard, during the advance between Sawade and Kühnau. The reports of the cavalry brigade and officer's patrol reach him at Kühnau. He receives the last report from the Hussar regiment at 11 A. M. in Grünberg, while halted there for half an hour.

Digitized by Google

WHAT IMPRESSIONS DOES THE DIVISION COMMANDER GAIN FROM THESE REPORTS?

The first report contains information that the enemy has drawn in his outposts very early. This fact, as well as the attempt on the part of the hostile cavalry to prevent our cavalry from gaining an insight into the conditions in his rear, and from advancing towards the crossings of the Bober, lends color to the supposition that the enemy intends to continue his retreat.

The second report confirms the correctness of the inference drawn from a previous message, that no troops have been entrained in Krossen on the preceding day and that the entire hostile forces have remained in Krossen and villages southeast thereof until early this morning. The early departure of the troops which had occupied Krossen leads us to the conclusion that the enemy is concentrating his forces, possibly for the purpose of a general retreat. The beating of drums indicates that infantry also has been quartered there.

The fact that laborers were seen at the Rehfeld railroad bridge seems to indicate either preparations for destruction, or flooring the bridge to make it passable for all arms. Report No. 3 contains an entirely new element which must be considered in the analysis of the enemy's intentions. The report was

Digitized by Google

despatched at 9 A. M. from the observation-point of the patrol on Hill 87, 1½ km south of Thiemendorf. At this time the enemy still occupied Grunow and was throwing up trenches at Sch., 1½ km north of Grunow. If the enemy had intended to continue the retreat in haste with all his forces, as on the two preceding days, he could, having drawn in his outposts at 6 A. M., have reached the Bober with his rear guard by 9 A. M. The enemy has remained in position either with all or a part of his forces. The throwing up of trenches seems to indicate that he intends to make a stand at Plau.

It is an open question whether the enemy intends to offer battle there with all his forces, or whether he has left behind merely a rear guard, to cover the crossing of the main body over the Bober, or its entraining at Krossen.

The fourth report confirms the statement in the preceding one to the effect that the enemy has not retired. It also gives us information concerning the distribution of the hostile forces — namely, that troops of all arms are concentrated at Plau. As the woods south of Plau have been found free of the enemy, we may suppose that the enemy's right flank is in Plau with advanced troops at Grunow. According to the third report, the enemy's left flank appears to extend to the grove at Sch., 1½ km north of Grunow.

This much is gleaned from the reports so far re-

Digitized by Google

ceived. These reports give but a general guide in arriving at an estimate of the enemy's intentions, position and strength. We cannot as yet draw decided conclusions as to whether or not an engagement is to be looked for to-day. It is evident, however, from the course of events up to this time, that it will be advantageous to advance the whole strength of the division as near as possible to the enemy to-day. It seems feasible to allow the advance guard to proceed as far as Gr. Lessen or Logau and the flank guard as far as Wenig–Lessen.

The division commander will therefore continue the march without delay in that direction.

It would seem desirable to send forward immediately an officer's patrol with instructions to gain more definite information concerning the position and strength of the enemy and especially to ascertain whether his main body, or only his rear guard, is at Plau.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

The division commander receives at Ch.H., at 11.30 A. M., the following report from the right-flank guard:

ROTHENBURG, 11 A. M.

The cavalry troop reports that it has encountered hostile infantry posts on the Mühlfliess, 2 km southwest of Thiemendorf, in rear of which troops of all arms

Digitized by Google

were being massed. Weak hostile cavalry was seen east of Tschausdorf.

COLONEL 86TH FUS. REG.

This report adds materially to the information contained in previous reports. According to it the hostile left flank may be looked for on the Mühlfliess. No hostile infantry seems to have been observed in the terrain north of the Mühlfliess, and the cavalry reported to be there seems to be merely a covering force for the left flank.

The extent of the hostile position from Plau to the Mühlfliess is thus from 2 to 3 km.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND DECISION.

The extent of front covered by his deployment gives a general basis for estimating the enemy's numerical strength.

When reconnaissance fails to gain accurate information concerning the enemy's strength, the determination of the lateral extent of his position will often be the only means of estimating the opposing forces with any degree of accuracy.

A position of about 3 km in extent requires for its effective defense about the strength of a division.

In this case the position of the opponent and the disposition of his forces make it improbable that we have to deal here with only a rear guard. We may rather reckon with confidence, especially

Digitized by Google

since an advance of his troops in the rear from Krossen seems to have taken place, that the enemy will accept decisive battle with all his forces in the position Plau–Mühlfliess. This knowledge is of the utmost importance to the division commander in arriving at his subsequent decisions. If we were to encounter at Plau only decidedly weaker forces who had orders to arrest the advance of the division, then it would be advisable to attack immediately with all forces at our disposal (advance guard, flank guard and artillery of the main body). We ought in that case to make full use of the opportunity to give the enemy another blow and to interfere thereby with his retreat either on foot or by train, whichever he might attempt. It is however a different matter when it is a question of attacking a prepared defensive position in which the enemy seeks for a decision with his combined forces. In this case the commanding general must weigh earnestly whether he shall go into action directly from the march, or whether the attack will require advance preparation and should on that account be deferred. To decide this question all matters bearing on it must be carefully considered: the enemy's situation, the condition of our own troops, the time of day, terrain and weather conditions, etc.

The numerical strength of the enemy seems to be about equal in this case to that of our division. The enemy, however, will have lost in morale, having been

Digitized by Google

beaten but two days ago and compelled to retreat hastily. On the other hand, his troops, which have made no hard marches to speak of to reach their present position, are fresh and ready for battle.

The Plau–Mühlfliess position is well adapted for defense and its strength has been materially increased by entrenchments. The front of the position appears especially well suited for offering strong resistance and to carry it will require an attack resulting in large losses, or at any rate require extensive enveloping movements.

The troops of our division have a long day's march behind them. Parts of the main body will have marched 40 km when they enter into battle. The troops are therefore in a very tired condition. Of course, in spite of a long march, we must always bring our troops into action when it is important to gain the decision in a battle which other troops have been waging for an entire day without reaching a decision. But to enter upon a new and extensive battle in the afternoon, with troops tired out by a long march, is justifiable only under especially favorable conditions.

In this case the terrain to be traversed in attacking is difficult and the intervening forests require reconnaissance and are unfavorable for flank movements such as envelopments make necessary. To direct the battle properly will not be easy and we must also consider the late hour of the day. The

Digitized by Google

advance guard will reach Logau only after 2 P. M. and will not be ready for the attack until towards 3 P. M. Thus the active participation of the main body in the battle cannot be looked for before 4 P. M.

It appears doubtful whether the artillery, which plays the most important role in attacking a defensive position, will succeed, in the few remaining hours of daylight, in gaining the fire superiority and thus be able to support effectively the infantry attack.

In any case, a decision can scarcely be reached before dark. Therefore to gather the fruits of victory by an energetic pursuit, which is especially desirable under the present conditions, is almost out of the question.

On the basis of these considerations the division commander decides: To refrain from attack to-day, but to halt his division in front of the enemy's position, to close it up and prepare it for the attack on the following day.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

Before the division commander issues his orders for the halt he receives a letter from army headquarters, stating:

> It appears that the enemy's forces retreating in front of the 18th Infantry Division are composed of parts of his V and XII Corps. It looks as though his 9th Infantry Division and all of his army trains have retreated on Krossen.

Digitized by Google

At the same time the division commander is informed that during the course of August 3d three Landwehr battalions will be advanced from Bomst to Züllichau as a guard for the line of communications and to secure the Oder crossings at Tschicherzig and Pommerzig.

Preparations are being made to establish telegraphic and railroad connection between Züllichau and the rear.

This information from general headquarters proves to the division commander the correctness of his conclusions. It will only confirm him in his decision not to attack to-day his opponent, who is at least equal in strength to himself.

The division commander will then issue a combined order for the halt and for going into quarters.

ORDER FOR HALTING AND GOING INTO QUARTERS ON AUGUST 3D.

Outline.

The following questions have to be considered in connection with this order:

1. When is the order to be issued?
2. How far should the division continue its advance?
3. Where are the different parts of the division to take quarters and in what manner?
4. What degree of readiness should be maintained and what should be the measures for security?

Digitized by Google

5. Should the baggage be sent to the troops?
6. What kind of rations should be used?

Remarks on 1. The order for the halt should be issued and reach the troops sufficiently early to prevent too close contact with the enemy which might involve the division in a battle contrary to the wish of the division commander. The advance guard and flank guard especially should be halted in time, as experience teaches that advanced troops are particularly inclined to hasten deployment for battle and to push too far ahead. This same consideration must decide the question: how far should the division continue its march?

Remarks on 2. The leading troops should advance only so far as will not risk their bringing on an engagement or suffering a reverse. Grunow and the small clumps of woods on the Mühlfliess are occupied by the enemy. If the leading elements of the division are advanced as far as Wenig-Lessen and Logau—that is, within 2 or 3 km of the hostile position—then their detachments sent ahead for security will come into touch with the enemy. These two places therefore form the extreme limit for the advance. The position of Logau on account of its peculiarities must be specially considered; it is near the forest, difficult to defend and easily surprised.

Remarks on 3. We must, accordingly, consider with care whether to push the entire advance guard

Digitized by Google

that far to the front, or whether it would not be better to occupy Logau by outposts alone and keep the reserve of the advance guard in Gr. Lessen. The latter course is more conservative with regard to security. It is very desirable, on the other hand, to concentrate as strong a force as practicable at Logau to-day in order to strike a strong offensive blow at Grunow early to-morrow morning. We may also be justified in assuming that a defeated enemy has a less degree of initiative.

The right-flank guard had best be quartered for the night in Wenig–Lessen.

For the main body, accordingly, Gr. Lessen seems to be the place to be reached; for the 1st Section of the columns and trains, Meileiche; and for the 2d Section, Grünberg.

Remarks on 4. In regard to the kind of quarters, the proximity of the enemy and the accommodations of the villages will be the deciding factors. Thus the manner of quartering will differ essentially from that of the preceding day. Field Service Regulations (I, 171) govern this question so far as the advance guard and right-flank guard are concerned:

"If the enemy is in the immediate vicinity and a serious engagement is expected, we must always be ready for battle, even while at rest. Space is lacking for advance guards and at times even for outposts. We should bivouac in deployed battle formation, governed by purely tactical considerations and pro-

Digitized by Google

tected only by sentry posts. The line of security and the line of battle coincide under these conditions. No special security detachments will be sent out. The entire position will be one of readiness for battle."

According to this, the advance guard and flank guard would take up a formation corresponding to deployment for battle:

The battalions of the first line bivouac and send companies forward to important points and on the roads leading towards the enemy. Reserves and artillery are in Logau and in Wenig–Lessen respectively, in alarm quarters. The main body will go into village bivouac in Gr. Lessen, but in consideration of the critical situation a higher degree of preparedness will be maintained.

Remarks on 5. Under the existing circumstances, where a large part of the division is held in readiness for battle, the regimental baggage should not be sent to the troops. Emergency rations should therefore be depended upon for subsistence if the troops cannot find sufficient food otherwise in the villages.

GR. LESSEN, 3.8, 2 P. M.

Divisional Order.

1. The enemy is still this side of the Bober and has occupied Plau, Sch., 1½ km north of Grunow, and Grunow; hostile cavalry is at Cossar.

Digitized by Google

2. The division will halt.

3. The Hussar regiment will remain on the enemy's right flank, will reconnoiter uninterruptedly towards the Grunow – Krossen road as well as towards Boberberg and Naumburg and will report here its whereabouts for the night.

4. The advance guard will occupy Logau and provide security along the line Logau – Treppeln road—Lagau – Thiemendorf road, inclusive.

5. The right-flank guard will occupy Wenig–Lessen and provide security in prolongation of the line held by the advance guard from the road Logau–Thiemendorf, exclusive, to the road Wenig–Lessen–Thiemendorf; reconnaissance toward the hostile left flank and toward the Oder.

6. All troops of the advance and flank guards will remain in readiness for battle during the night. All contact with the enemy is to be avoided as far as possible.

7. The main body will go into village bivouac in Gr. Lessen, being held in readiness for a call to arms. The colonel, 31st Infantry Regiment, will be commanding officer.

8. The 1st Section of the columns and trains as well as the regimental baggage will bivouac at Meileiche.

Digitized by Google

9. The 2d Section will go into quarters in Grünberg.

10. Emergency rations will be used in so far as the troops cannot find food in their respective villages.

11. Orders will be issued at 11.30 P. M. at division headquarters in Gr. Lessen.

N,
Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

Dictated to the staff officers of separate organizations of the advance guard and main body; in writing to the flank guard and Hussar regiment by orderly officers; extracts by orderlies to the 1st and 2d Sections of the columns and trains and to the regimental baggage.

GEN. STAFF OFFICER,
18*th Inf. Div.*

This divisional order forms the basis for:

1. The order of the advance-guard commander;
2. The order of the flank-guard commander;
3. The order of the commanding officer in Gr. Lessen.

Digitized by Google

ATTACK ON A PREPARED POSITION.

After issuing the orders for halting to the division, the commander will have to begin to consider his plan of attack. The question here is one of an attack on a prepared position:

"The defender is lying bound on the operating-table of the attacker. The latter must choose a proper place for his incision before beginning the operation."

While in a meeting engagement victory is often the consequence of a bold, fortunate attack and the instant grasping of opportunities, in this case it is a question of a systematic procedure which has weighed with care all advantages and disadvantages and only adopted its measures after the utmost deliberation. In this way alone can the superiority of the well-prepared enemy be, to some extent, offset.

By halting the advance and postponing the attack until the next day, the division commander has gained time to make careful preparation for the attack. He is able to issue a combined order for attack to all the troops of the division and can thus depend upon the united action of all parts. He is consequently in a far more favorable situation than the commander who leads his troops into battle deploying directly from the march.

In the latter case, decisions must be made at a moment's notice; the sum of the separate decisions made will not always result in a harmonious whole,

Digitized by Google

and errors, committed in the hurry and confusion, can seldom be rectified.

A carefully arranged attack on the deployed defensive front should be planned by the commander in all its details. Nothing is left to chance and but little to the initiative of subordinate commanders. The deployment precedes entrance into battle. The attack is entered upon with combined force and with the utmost vigor.

Advance Preparation.

Of what does the advance preparation of the division commander consist?

Before all, in a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position and the terrain. The more exact knowledge we gain of the enemy's dispositions and strength, the more assurance shall we feel in making our own dispositions.

The terrain in front of the enemy's position as well as on both flanks needs thorough reconnaissance. The whole stretch of forest between Logau and Grunow and between Wenig–Lessen and Thiemendorf must be reconnoitered with regard to its passability It is of great importance to ascertain the condition of the entire western edge of the forest and to gain an insight into the terrain between it and the enemy's position, as to whether or not it affords cover which may make the advance easier.

Of the greatest importance is the reconnaissance

Digitized by Google

for a position for the artillery, which plays a leading role in the attack on prepared positions.

The terrain on the flanks of the hostile position must be reconnoitered with a view to a possible enveloping or turning movement. In this connection the following must be considered: the passability of roads, covered approaches, the possibility of deployment for battle, and fire-effect.

This reconnaissance will be carried on partly by officers' patrols (sent out under the General Staff officer, aides, etc.), partly by the commander of the artillery, with a view to the selection of an artillery position, and partly by the division commander himself.

It is desirable that the division commander should become acquainted beforehand with the most important part of the terrain on which the battle will be fought by viewing it himself. But, in spite of all efforts in this direction, we should not look for too great results from such reconnaissance, for it is not to be supposed that the enemy will remain quiescent as regards these attempts. His measures taken for security will surround him like a thick veil.

He too will keep up an active patrol service, in order to gain information on his side. We shall therefore often gain the desired insight only in a few instances and all reports will often be silent on just those points which are of the utmost importance. Here also it will be a question of forming a correct idea of the whole from scattered observations.

Digitized by Google

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

Reports Concerning the Enemy and the Terrain.

The following information concerning the enemy and the terrain comes to the division commander in the course of the afternoon:

> Grunow is occupied by hostile infantry, apparently outposts. An infantry detachment, apparently half a platoon, is in the grove at Sch., 1½ km north of Grunow. Further entrenching is going on, on the hills east of Plau. Hostile cavalry patrols have been encountered in the woods between Logau and Grunow, north of Wenig–Lessen, as well as south of Plau near the Plauschensee. The forest between Logau and Grunow consists of young copsewood with rather dense underbrush and scarcely passable for troops in close order. The forest roads are, however, well kept and broad enough for the passage of artillery. North of the road from Logau to Sch. the forest becomes clearer and good progress can be made by troops through it, even off the roads. The smaller clumps of woods north of the Mühlfliess have a dense undergrowth. North of the Wenig–Lessen–Tschausdorf road the forest becomes clearer and passable off the roads.
>
> In the forests south of Plau and Grunow there are lakes and water-courses, making progress difficult. The Mühlfliess presents no obstacle to the movement of infantry. Like Logau, Wenig–Lessen is little suited to defense on account of its low situation and cannot be utilized as a point of support.

Digitized by Google

Northeast of Grunow there is a rise in the ground in front of the western edge of the forest, well suited for an artillery position for one regiment. The hill east of Sch. commands the entire terrain as far as Plau. It seems little suited for an artillery position, however, because it lies too near to Sch. and too far from Plau for good fire-effect. Hill 87, 1½ km southeast of Thiemendorf, is reported as a favorable artillery position, but only for the battle against the woods on the Mühlfliess. The artillery would not be in a position at this point to support an attack on Plau. For the rest, the entire field of attack towards Plau is ascertained to be a level stretch of about 2 km breadth with few depressions, open, slightly rising towards the hostile position, with but little cover, and affording supporting points only in Grunow and the toll-house lying to the west thereof.

THE ORDER FOR ATTACK.

Outline.

(*a*) Form of attack. To arrive at a correct estimate of the situation and the proper form of attack, it is advisable not to take a narrow view of the attack, that is, to look at it only from our own side, but also to consider it from the point of view of the enemy.

In accordance with the maxim that just that measure is the correct one which is the most disagreeable to the enemy, we should imagine ourselves in the enemy's place, in order to search out his vul-

Digitized by Google

nerable point, and afterwards "apply the knife" there.

The position Plau–Mühlfliess shows a frontal strength which can offer effective resistance to considerably superior numbers. Plau is a strong point of support which commands the country for a thousand meters on the right flank and thus renders that flank thoroughly secure. Moreover, the forest terrain lying to the south of Plau, being cut up and almost destitute of roads, is especially unfavorable to attempts at turning the enemy's position in this direction.

Conditions are otherwise on the left flank: the attacker here finds cuts and small clumps of woods which afford him cover and admit of an advance by sections. Furthermore, the entire deployment for attack is covered by the forest from the view and fire of the defender until it comes within 2 km of the hostile position.

Here on the left wing lies the defender's weakness. It is here that the attacker must seek the decision.

Another tactical reason why the main attack should be made on the enemy's left flank is the possibility of thereby throwing the enemy directly back against the Bober and thus making his defeat the costlier in loss of men. This will also be of strategical importance, as the division commander will, in

Digitized by Google

accordance with his instructions, be forcing the enemy still further towards the south.

The decision will therefore be: to attack and contain the enemy's front, but to direct the main enveloping attack against his left flank.

(*b*) Utilization of the forces. For the advance the division was divided into advance guard, flank guard and main body. This formation ceases with the order for battle. The troops then have to be used according to arm of service. The orders are therefore directed to the several separate commands, the two infantry brigades, the artillery brigade, the Hussar regiment, etc.

The utilization of the infantry forces gives the entire battle its character; we must therefore first reach a decision in regard to the infantry. As a result of the march of the advance guard and the flank guard on Logau and Wenig–Lessen the 35th Infantry Brigade has reached the hostile position with an extended front. The frontal attack, consequently, will naturally fall to this brigade. This attack will require a front of 2 km in order to cover the front of the hostile position. As a rule, the fighting breadth of a brigade is some 1,200 meters. The character of a containing or holding attack, however, allows a broad deployment. Reinforced by the Jäger battalion and engineer company, the brigade will be fully equal to carrying out its task.

Digitized by Google

The decisive attack on the hostile left flank will fall to the 36th Infantry Brigade, of which the division commander will, at the start, have to keep back a part as a reserve.

As for the artillery, this arm is a decisive factor in just this form of engagement, that is, in an attack on a prepared position. The utilization of the artillery stands in such close relation to the commander's intentions that it ought to be under his immediate direction. He will, in most cases, decide on the place for the first artillery operations as well as on the force of artillery to be brought into action at the start. The assignment of a position to the artillery will often be so difficult that the commander of the whole will have to content himself with giving the artillery commander a mere general outline of his mission in the impending battle. In the case in hand, where the preparations for attack can be made with all thoroughness, and where an artillery position can be reconnoitered on the day previous to the attack, the commander will be able to give detailed instructions for the employment of the artillery. The two main questions which have to be considered in this connection are:

1. The artillery must silence the fire of the opposing artillery.

2. The artillery must support effectively the infantry attack in all its phases and especially the main attack.

Digitized by Google

The ideal plan is to concentrate the whole artillery in the center of the line of battle. Very often the terrain will afford no opportunity for this, and more often the broad extent of the field of battle will render impossible the command of all its parts from a single artillery position in the center. In such a case we must either dispense with the coöperation of the artillery for one part of the battle or divide the artillery from the start. Although the concentration of the artillery in a united battery is given the preference, still its division into several groups of batteries has the advantage that such groups can mutually support one another and better command the whole field of battle. Nevertheless, the division of the artillery is a measure to be taken only under compulsion; in such a case we make a virtue of a necessity, as we often have to do, in taking tactical measures.

In this particular case the division commander finds himself in just this situation. The line of battle of the division will cover so broad an extent that it cannot be effectively supported in all its parts from a central artillery position. The position northeast of Grunow affords room for one regiment; but from here the main attack cannot be supported at all. From a position on Hill 87, 1½ km southeast of Thiemendorf, we cannot operate against Plau. Therefore the division commander must divide his artillery. One regiment will have to support the frontal

Digitized by Google

attack of the 35th Infantry Brigade while the other regiment prepares the way for and accompanies the main attack of the 36th Infantry Brigade against the enemy's left flank.

The c a v a l r y also should be called up to the field of battle, whenever possible, in accordance with the maxim that we can never be strong enough for battle. We must do without the immediate coöperation of the cavalry brigade on account of its being so widely separated from the division. Its presence in the enemy's rear will, however, not be without influence on the course of the battle. In case of the enemy's retreat a wide field of activity will be opened to the cavalry brigade and the fruits of victory must fall into its lap.

The division commander will issue an order to the Hussar regiment, which ensures its coöperation in the battle. The divisional cavalry, the first duty of which is reconnaissance, should be spared a tactical sacrifice as long as possible; however, in minor situations, it may advantageously be assigned an active part in the battle, and must therefore be held in readiness, at any rate, to be thrown in at the right moment. But, even during the course of a battle, reconnaissance will remain its chief duty; this must extend to both flanks. The main strength of the divisional cavalry will therefore be used, for the most part, to provide protection and reconnaissance on the more exposed flank; a lesser force (in some

Digitized by Google

cases only patrols) will be used for reconnaissance on the less threatened flank.

The Hussar regiment (2¼ troops) is already on the left flank of the division and will naturally find its sphere of activity there during the battle, especially as protection is necessary against the enemy's cavalry now at Cossar. There still remains at our disposal for reconnaissance and security on our right flank ¾ of the 3d troop of the Hussar regiment, which has been retained with the division during the advance.

The 1st Section of the ammunition columns and trains must be brought up to field of battle in time to be on hand soon after the opening of the battle.

We should also bring up parts of the ammunition columns and field hospitals of the 2d Section, according to need, while the supply-trains and regimental baggage are held at a distance from the field of battle since they might become a hindrance. They ought, however, to be assembled at their respective quartering-places, so that they can immediately take up the march in one direction or the other, according to the outcome of the battle.

(*c*) Course of the attack. It is not advisable to begin the attack against front and flank at the same time. The attack against the front must prepare the way for the main attack, clear up the situation, force the enemy to deploy, and so en-

Digitized by Google

gage his forces that the decisive attack against the flank will find its task less difficult. We must also, in the beginning of an engagement, exercise great care with respect to battle distances, in order to be able to support, if necessary, the troops fighting at the front, or to oppose a movement by the enemy against our own flank.

The 35th Infantry Brigade must accordingly open the battle, while the 36th Infantry Brigade must be held in readiness to take part at any moment—according to conditions—but if possible in the manner planned. For the latter brigade, Wenig–Lessen seems to be the most suitable point of assembly.

Whenever possible, the attack should advance from one point of support to another. The 35th Infantry Brigade will be able to utilize, as such points, the woods situated between Logau, Grunow and Wenig–Lessen, and Grunow itself. The brigade must gain possession of these points of support before attempting to carry the attack forward.

When shall the attack be begun? The question arises in this connection, whether we should not make a dash forward to gain Grunow and the woods mentioned above late this evening or during the night, in order to gain possession of these points of support without delay.

The advantage of night engagements consists mainly in the fact that we may gain, with compara-

Digitized by Google

tively small sacrifices, important isolated successes which may turn the scale for the whole operation. But night engagements are dependent upon chance circumstances and, where success seems doubtful, they should be avoided.

It will be advisable, however, to begin the attack as early as possible on the next day, that is at dawn, in order to anticipate the enemy in any offensive intention which he may have formed, and to assemble the troops under cover of darkness as well as advance those of the first line to within suitable range for bringing an effective fire to bear on the enemy's position.

In Section 82, Part II, Infantry Drill Regulations, which treats of an attack on a prepared defensive position, it is stated:

"The difficulty of passing over open ground swept by the enemy's fire may compel us to make use of darkness for the approach. Ordinarily, in such a case, we should approach the boundary of the enemy's fire-zone the day before and toward morning, while it is still dark, so advance the troops of the first line that firing begins at dawn."

This is applicable in this case. The sun rises at 4.30 A. M. during the first days of August. The attack of the 35th Infantry Brigade must therefore be set for 3.30 A. M. The directions for the other parts of the division are to be arranged accordingly.

(*d*) Composition of the order for

Digitized by Google

attack. After the commander has come to a decision concerning the method of attack and the special missions of the various battle units, he has still to consider how far these may be expressed in the first order for the attack—what commands shall be given immediately and what shall be reserved for a future order.

A mistake, which is often made in attack orders is that of disposing too far in advance. In our problem an order which definitely prescribed for the troops the hour and method of deploying for battle, and for the artillery the position in which it was first to come into action, would commit us too far ahead with respect to both time and events; for, if the enemy anticipated our designs and himself assumed the offensive at dawn or, on the other hand, vacated his position during the night, then the whole order would come to naught and the confidence of the troops in the ability of the commander would be shaken.

Only in those cases where the execution is to follow the order immediately is it advisable therefore to issue detailed orders. Where a space of time, during which conditions may change, intervenes between the issuing and the execution of an order, we shall do well in the order of the evening before to give merely the intention for the next day and directions for the concentration or deployment of the troops, as the case may be, in accordance with our

Digitized by Google

purpose. While this is being carried out the subordinate commanders should be assembled at a designated place which permits, if possible, a view over the whole battle-field, and should then receive more complete orders for the attack.

In this instance, where the attack is to begin as early as possible and where we are in such close touch with the enemy that a battle may be begun spontaneously at any moment, it will be advantageous to assemble the brigade and regimental commanders during the evening and supplement the divisional order by communicating to them informally the further intentions and assignments for the following day.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

Before the division commander issues his orders, he receives the following reports:

1. From the cavalry brigade:

MERZWIESE, 3.8, 3 P. M.

Crossed the Oder at Polenzig with the brigade at 10 A. M., and advanced by Niemaschkleba to Merzwiese. There encountered numerous hostile trains marching from Rehfeld to Merzwiese. Captured a number of ammunition-wagons. The remainder retreated on Rehfeld. *Met the enemy nowhere else on the left bank of the Bober.* I continue the reconnaissance. Have sent one troop towards Guben. Intend to take quarters for the night in Merzwiese and Neuendorf.

C,
Major-General.

Digitized by Google

2. From the Hussar regiment:

> **The officer's patrol sent by Sommerfeld has succeeded in destroying the Sommerfeld–Guben railroad at Seebigau. It is reported that Landsturm organizations are being assembled in the vicinity of Sommerfeld.**

The report from the cavalry brigade proves to the division commander the correctness of the information received from general headquarters (which was expressed as a rumor) that trains had retreated in the direction of Krossen. The enemy intended to send these trains ahead for safety in the course of the afternoon and in carrying out these intentions they fell into the hands of the cavalry brigade.

The most important information, however, which the report contains is that the enemy has not been met on the left bank of the Bober. The previous supposition of the division commander, that the entire fighting force of the enemy was directly opposed to him and that the enemy would again look for a decision, thereby becomes a certainty.

The report from the Hussar regiment brings a new piece of information: the concentration of Landsturm organizations at Sommerfeld. This is a matter which urges us to deal with the enemy in our front as soon as practicable and then to pay special attention to the protection of our left flank.

After these last reports have been considered, no further important information regarding the enemy

Digitized by Google

having been received in the meantime, the order for the division for August 4th is issued at Gr. Lessen at 11.30 P. M.

Div. Hdqrs., Gr. Lessen,
18th Inf. Div. 3.8, 11.30 P. M.

Divisional Order.

1. The enemy* has remained in his position Plau – Mühlfliess. His advance troops occupy Grunow. Hostile cavalry is in Cossar.

The 17th Cavalry Brigade has crossed the Oder below Krossen and is in the enemy's rear.

2. The division will attack the enemy early to-morrow morning, enveloping his left flank, and throw him back across the Bober.

3. The Hussar regiment (1st, 2d and ¼ 3d troops) will secure the left flank of the division and reconnoiter towards the enemy's right flank. ¾ of the 3d troop will take over the security and reconnaissance on the right flank.

4. The 35th Infantry Brigade, reinforced by the Jäger battalion and the en-

*The placing first and underlining of the name of the person or organisation of which the corresponding paragraph in the order treats is very common as it enables the meaning to be quickly grasped and adds to the clearness of the order.

Digitized by Google

gineer company, will be deployed at 3 A. M. to-morrow, ready to take up the attack on the line Plau–Mühlfliess.

5. The 36th Infantry Brigade will be formed in position of assembly at 3.30 A. M., immediately west of Wenig–Lessen, with security detachments sent forward in the direction of Thiemendorf and Tschausdorf.

6. The 18th Field Artillery Brigade will have one regiment at Logau at 3 A. M. to support the 35th Infantry Brigade, the other regiment in readiness at Wenig–Lessen at 3.30 A. M. The light ammunition columns will be at the disposal of the brigade.

7. The 1st Section of the columns and trains will be at the eastern entrance of Gr. Lessen by 4.30 A. M.

8. The regimental baggage will be in readiness to take up the march at Meileiche at 4.30 A. M., and the 2d Section at the western exit of Grünberg (its leading elements at Ch. W.) at the same time.

9. I shall be at Logau at 3 A. M.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

Digitized by Google

Dictated to the officers detailed to receive orders of the 35th and 36th Infantry Brigades, the 18th F. A. Brigade, and the engineer company; in writing to the Hussar regiment; extracts to the cavalry brigade, columns and trains, and regimental baggage.

GEN. STAFF OFFICER,
18th Inf. Div.

In this order the deployment for attack is indicated. The troops are placed in readiness in the manner in which the commander intends to utilize them. If there is no change in the situation during the night, the 35th Infantry Brigade will receive orders to advance shortly after 3 A. M., which advance will inaugurate the entire attack.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

At 3.30 A. M. the division commander sends orders to the commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade to seize Grunow and the forest northeast thereof and to deploy from there for a containing battle against the line Plau–Mühlfliess.

The 84th Infantry Regiment takes possession of Grunow at about 4.30 A. M. and shortly thereafter the Ch. W. on the road to Plau. The hostile advanced troops are retiring with heavy losses on Plau. Further efforts to advance on Plau miscarry on account of the superior hostile fire coming from there and the hot fire of the hostile batteries which have entered the battle from

Digitized by Google

the hill 1 km northeast of Plau. The 9th Field Artillery Regiment has gone into position northeast of Grunow and has become engaged with the hostile batteries. The 86th Fusileer Regiment, which has deployed to the north of the artillery and advanced out of the forest towards Sch. at Hill 86, is unable to gain any success.

Shortly after the capture of Grunow the division commander issues orders to the 36th Infantry Brigade to begin its attack, enveloping the left flank of the enemy in the clumps of woods on the Mühlfliess. At the same time he orders the 45th Field Artillery Regiment to take position on the hills on the edge of the forest, 1½ km northwest of Wenig–Lessen.

The 31st Infantry Regiment, which next advances, establishes itself firmly in the clumps of woods near Hill 87, ½ km west of Wenig–Lessen.

Further advances against the woods on the Mühlfliess, which is strongly occupied, miscarry, and the battle rages fiercely there for a long time without either side gaining the advantage. The enemy meets the attempt to envelop his left flank by occupying the hill north of the Mühlfliess towards Tschausdorf. The 85th Regiment, which had been formed in echelon northwest of Hill 87 and held there as a reserve, is deployed against the fresh forces of the enemy which have just appeared. After a fierce engagement this regiment succeeds in defeating the enemy and gaining the decision.

Towards 11 A. M. the enemy begins the retreat: the forces which had occupied the Tschausdorf Hill are the first to fall back, in the direction of Gersdorf; those occupying the clumps of woods on the Mühlfliess next give way, in the same direction; last of all the hostile forces vacate Plau and the hill northeast of Plau (which are taken possession of by parts of the 35th Infantry

Digitized by Google

Brigade) and retreat through the forest in the direction of Briesenitz.

Just as the retreat is beginning the cavalry forces of both sides become engaged south of Plau, the Hussar regiment being victorious.

Further tactical problems confronting the subordinate commanders may be worked out from the divisional order and the course of the battle. For example:

1. Order of the commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade, based on the divisional order.

2. Order of the same for the attack by the brigade.

3. Deployment of the 84th Infantry Regiment for attack on Grunow.

4. Advance and taking up of a position northeast of Grunow by the 9th F. A. Regiment.

5. Assembly order of the commander of the 36th Infantry Brigade.

6. Orders of the same for the attack by the brigade.

7. Deployment of the 31st and 85th Regiments for attack.

8. Line of action and deployment for attack of the Hussar regiment.

We shall mention but two points to which the division commander should especially give his attention during the battle:

Digitized by Google

1. Replenishment of ammunition.
2. Sanitary service.

REPLENISHMENT OF AMMUNITION DURING THE BATTLE.

The main rule is: "No means must be overlooked for bringing up ammunition to the troops during the battle and for feeding the fire, as on its continuance or cessation the fate of the day may depend."

In a planned attack the commander has ample opportunity to take timely measures for the replenishment of ammunition. After the replenishment on the 2d of August of the ammunition carried by the troops, infantry and artillery will both be able to continue in action for some time with the cartridge- and ammunition-wagons of the light train and battery reserve respectively.

The division commander has the disposal of the light ammunition columns of the artillery; at the beginning of the battle, however, he will place them at the disposal of the artillery brigade commander who will employ them as occasion demands.

The division commander has ordered the infantry and artillery ammunition columns of the 1st Section to Gr. Lessen, from which place they are advanced to the field of battle, either entirely or in part as circumstances demand. The time and

Digitized by Google

place of arrival of these columns is communicated to the subordinate commanders so that they can send back their emptied wagons to be refilled. If necessary, the wagons of the ammunition columns advance to the troops.

SANITARY SERVICE.

The troops possess in the medical officers and men, as well as in the company litter-bearers, the necessary personnel, and, in the medical supply-wagons (of the infantry and cavalry), and the medical supply-chests (of the artillery and engineers), the necessary material to give first aid to the wounded.

With these means each unit provides its own dressing-station, which must be outside the zone of rifle-fire and, if possible, beyond the range of artillery-fire.

The dressing-stations of the troops, which are located directly in rear of the line of battle, should be combined as much as possible, but, on account of their primitive arrangements, are not alone sufficient in case of a long-continued action.

The commander therefore has, in the sanitary companies and field hospitals, supplemental means to assist him in solving the weighty problem of caring for the wounded.

With the aid of the sanitary company, which can be divided into two platoons, the main dressing-station is erected near the field of battle but always

Digitized by Google

outside the zone of rifle-fire. For this, covered rooms of some size, near a road and having a good water-supply, are desirable.

The main dressing-station is combined with the dressing-stations of the troops whenever possible; it often replaces a dressing-station previously established by the troops.

The field hospital with two hundred cots, which is also divisible into two platoons, receives the wounded who come from the dressing-stations. It should be located as near as possible to the field of battle, but outside the fire-zone and in a village or at its outskirts.

In the erection of field hospitals moderation is advisable and all our means should not be exhausted at first. We must always bear in mind their possible employment for further operations. The field hospitals should, therefore, be emptied as soon as possible and kept free for a further movement, as well as maintained at their full efficiency by a prompt transference of personnel and material with the stations along the line of communications.

The ordering authority under which they are placed has full control over the sanitary company and the field hospitals. In this case, the division commander will decide as to their disposition. A main dressing-station should be established in both wings of the field of battle. Accordingly, half the sanitary company should be used at Grunow and

Digitized by Google

half at Wenig–Lessen. Logau seems to be the most suitable place for erecting the 1st, 2d and 3d Field Hospitals.

THE PURSUIT.

As soon as the enemy retreats the pursuit must be taken up and for it the division commander must issue the necessary order. In this connection the following points should be considered:

1. *When should the orders for pursuit be issued?*

When the enemy abandons his position, the attacking troops occupy it and fire upon him as he retreats. The attack, for the moment, ceases. As the enemy gets farther and farther beyond the range of fire, the subordinate commanders (that is, regimental and battalion commanders) designate as a rule on their own initiative parts of their commands for the pursuit, while they assemble the remainder, and at the same time give their attention to restoring order among the organizations. Thus the initiative for pursuit is often taken by the subordinate commanders. But to lend to the pursuit unity and system, without which it will never reap the full fruits of victory as it should, the division commander must gather together these individual efforts on the part of the different organizations into a systematized course of action by promptly issuing an order for the pursuit.

Digitized by Google

2. *To whom shall the pursuit be entrusted?*

The division commander must decide whether he will follow the enemy with his whole division, and thus stake the last breath of man and horse, or whether he shall detail only a part—a sort of advance guard—to undertake the pursuit.

If the enemy has been decisively beaten it is best to follow with all our forces in battle formation. The pursuit in this form is more effective.

But if the enemy is still in condition to take up the retreat in an orderly manner and if the battle has resulted in greatly weakening the victor, it is advisable rather to entrust with the pursuit only a part of the troops—that part, namely, which has suffered the least in action—while the rest are assembled and reörganized as soon as possible in order to be ready to meet a possible offensive return on the part of the enemy.

The order is addressed to the commander entrusted with the pursuit and names the troops assigned to him for this purpose. It indicates the general direction of the pursuit and the general lines on which it is to be carried out.

3. *Composition and mission of the force detailed for the pursuit.*

The main principle for the pursuit is to stay at the enemy's heels. We dare not under any circumstances lose contact with the enemy. Speed and energy are therefore imperative in a pursuit.

Digitized by Google

Cavalry and artillery on account of their mobility (the latter, in addition, on account of its far-carrying arm) are especially suitable for pursuit, and should therefore be used here as a matter of principle. The cavalry is particularly fitted for this purpose since there is scarcely any further necessity for issuing a special pursuing order to these troops.

The pursuit is intended to break completely the enemy's power of resistance. The enemy should be made to suffer the greatest losses possible, both materially and in morale; therefore the pursuing force must be made strong in both infantry and artillery.

In the pursuit we must strive to gain lines and positions from which an effective fire can be brought to bear on the retreating enemy. Furthermore, it will be well to give the pursuing force more lateral extension than depth since in this formation we are better placed for enveloping the enemy, cutting him off and driving him back on his line of retreat.

ORDER FOR THE PURSUIT.

Under the assumption that the division has bought its victory with great losses and that the 36th Infantry Brigade which made the main attack, has suffered especially, the division commander decides to charge the 35th Infantry Brigade with the pursuit of the enemy and to attach to it the entire artillery and the Hussar regiment, while he assembles the 36th Infantry Brigade and soon after leads it to

Digitized by Google

Gersdorf. The commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade receives the following order:

Advance as soon as possible with your brigade and the Hussar regiment and Field Artillery Brigade (which have been placed under your orders and directly notified of the same) and take up the pursuit of the enemy in the direction of Gersdorf and Briesenitz; force the enemy back on the Bober and seek to inflict the utmost possible damage on him while he is crossing. Gain possession of the crossings of the Bober and do not give up the pursuit until you receive orders to that effect. The 36th Infantry Brigade will follow you by Gersdorf.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

FURTHER MEASURES TAKEN AFTER THE BATTLE.

After issuing the orders for the pursuit the division commander will have to turn his attention to bringing up the columns and trains as well as the regimental baggage and to issue the necessary instructions for this purpose.

The combat section receives orders to proceed immediately to Gersdorf, since, in case of a renewal of the combat, the ammunition columns might be needed. The regimental baggage and the divisional bridge-train should also be set in motion towards Gersdorf. The former must be at hand when the

Digitized by Google

troops go into quarters for the night; the latter might be required in crossing the Bober. The 2d Section of the columns and trains is directed to proceed to Gr. Lessen.

In addition, a detachment should be designated (from the 36th Infantry Brigade) to take charge of the transport of the prisoners and of the policing of the battle-field.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

The 86th Fusileer Regiment pursues the enemy towards Gersdorf; the 84th Infantry Regiment and the Jäger battalion, towards Briesenitz; the Hussar regiment pursues the hostile cavalry towards Bothendorf.

The 86th Fusileer Regiment encounters the enemy in a strong position on the hills between Gersdorf and Deutsch-Sagar, at the edge of the forest, against which position the 84th Infantry Regiment, advancing from Briesenitz, is also unable to make any headway. Not until the field artillery brigade, which goes into position south of Gersdorf, has been in action for some time does the enemy evacuate this position and retreat on Deutsch-Sagar.

This strong and well-chosen position has given the enemy a great advantage in point of time and made it possible for him to cross the Bober at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück with his entire forces without material interruption. He also succeeds in destroying the Bober bridges in time and in placing thereby a serious obstacle between himself and his pursuer. The Bober bridges at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück are totally destroyed and the railroad bridge at Alt-Rehfeld is so in-

Digitized by Google

jured that it is impassable and that even its provisional reconstruction will require several hours.

The 35th Infantry Brigade now advances to the Bober and there keeps up a long-continued fire engagement with the enemy, who is occupying the opposite bank of the river and especially the destroyed bridges.

The Hussar regiment crosses the Bober between Guhlow and Crume and establishes the fact that the enemy has occupied Deichow and Gr. Braschen.

The main body of the division reaches the Bober about 5 P. M.

The question now is: what is the division commander's estimate of the situation and what does he decide to do?

DECISION OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER.

In carrying out the pursuit of the defeated enemy the division is forced to halt at the Bober. For nearly the entire day the troops have been engaged in battle and after heavy losses have conquered an enemy who has offered strong resistance and whose fighting strength is not yet sufficiently broken to prevent his carrying out an orderly retreat. The troops have probably suffered a great deal by battle, marching and bivouac.

Much has already been accomplished to-day. The division has fulfilled a large part of its mission. It has found the enemy, defeated him afresh, shunted him off from Krossen towards the south, and increased the difficulty of his reüniting with his main army.

Digitized by Google

But consideration for the troops and satisfaction with what has been accomplished furnish no reason for as yet discontinuing the day's activity.

The categorical imperative after a battle has been won rather is: pursuit! There is no doubt, therefore, that the division commander would, under other conditions, continue the pursuit as far as his strength allowed. But the Bober and the late time of day call halt to this eager desire.

The crossing of the course of a stream in the face of the enemy is in itself a difficult and costly operation; in this case much more so since a crossing has first to be constructed. The bridges at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück have been destroyed. The reconstruction of the bridge at Rehfeld would be a matter of several hours. It would take just as long for the divisional bridge-train to be brought up and a pontoon bridge to be laid. It would be evening before a means of crossing could be constructed. A crossing at dusk would have to be regarded as an especially daring undertaking, even in the face of a defeated enemy, and might again hazard the success of the day's operations.

Therefore the division commander decides to discontinue the pursuit and to go into quarters with the division on the right bank of the Bober. At the same time he will take thought for the reörganization of his troops and make suitable preparations for continuing the operations.

Digitized by Google

QUARTERING OF THE DIVISION.

In quartering, the following points must be considered:

1. The enemy is defeated. The Bober protects the division from an offensive return by the enemy. Measures for security may therefore be reduced to a minimum. The division may give itself up entirely to the rest which it so greatly needs. In order to provide village quarters for all the troops the division may be widely spread out for the night.

2. In quartering, an effort must be made to reünite the organizations broken up during the engagement, and to so group the troops that their assembly and the continuation of the operations on the following day may be anticipated and made easier. Accordingly, it will be advisable to form the brigades in line so that the 35th Infantry Brigade will occupy the villages south of Deutsch-Sagar on the left wing, while the 36th Infantry Brigade will constitute the right wing and be quartered in Krossen and the villages on the Krossen road.

The occupation of the city of Krossen with its resources, etc., as well as the reconstruction and security of the railroad bridge at Alt-Rehfeld, is of especial importance.

Digitized by Google

REST ORDER ON AUGUST 4TH.

Hill west of FRITSCHENDORF, 4.8, 5 P. M.

Divisonal Order.

1. The defeated enemy has retreated to the left bank of the Bober at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück and has left detachments at the destroyed bridges.

2. The division will discontinue the pursuit and go into quarters on the right bank of the Bober.

3. The 36th Inf. Brig., to which is attached ½ of the 3d Tp., 16th Hus. Reg., will occupy Krossen and Alt-Rehfeld. It will secure the line of the Bober from Krossen to the grove 1 km. south of the Rehfeld bridge (incl.). It will guard that bridge, and reconnoiter without interruption towards Merzwiese and Gr. Braschen.

4. The 35th Inf. Brig., to which is attached ¼ of the 3d Tp., 16th Hus. Reg., and the Eng. Co. with the divisional bridge-train, will occupy Deutsch-Sagar, Fritschendorf, Wendisch-Sagar, and Briesenitz. It will secure the line of the Bober from the grove 1 km. south of the Rehfeld bridge (excl.) to Wendisch-Sagar.

Digitized by Google

5. The field artillery brigade and the light ammunition columns will take quarters in Gersdorf and Rusdorf.

6. The Hussar regiment will remain on the left bank of the Bober, keeping constantly in touch with the enemy, and report here its quarters for the night.

7. The regimental baggage has been ordered up to Gersdorf, where the various organizations will send for their wagons.

8. Ammunition will be issued in Gersdorf at 8 P. M.

9. The country will be drawn on for subsistence supplies. In case of necessity ration-wagons will be made use of. The latter will return to Plau after the troops have been supplied and will replenish there from the trains at 10 P. M.

10. I shall take quarters in Gersdorf. Orders will be issued there at 10 P. M.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

Verbally to the assembled commanding officers of the 35th and 36th Infantry Brigades and 18th Field Artillery Brigade; in writing to the Hussar regiment.

Digitized by Google

The following organizations receive special orders:

1. The *regimental baggage* is ordered to advance to Gersdorf; the divisional bridge-train to Deutsch-Sagar, there to report to the commanding general, 35th Infantry Brigade.

2. The *1st Section* of the columns and trains will at once take up the march on Gersdorf where ammunition is to be issued at 8 P. M. The emptied wagons will return at 4 A. M., August 5, to Rothenburg, to the ammunition sub-depot to be established there in the meantime. Field Hospitals 1, 2 and 3 will for the present remain in Logau.

3. The *sanitary company* will proceed as soon as practicable to Gersdorf and go into quarters there.

4. The *2d Section* of the columns and trains will proceed to Plau and there take quarters. Replenishment of the ration-wagons will take place there at 10 P. M. from the 2d Subsistence Column.

THE DEFENSE.

Having considered the attack and pursuit, let us now turn to the defense and retreat. For this pur-

Digitized by Google

pose we must go over to the side of the Red Army and examine conditions in the Red division on the 3d and 4th of August, assuming the same force here which we have heretofore considered as constituting the Blue.

SITUATION.

On August 2d the Red force had retired on Krossen and taken quarters there for the night as well as in the villages east thereof—Rusdorf, Tschausdorf, Gersdorf and Plau. The Hussar regiment, which had drawn off to the south, remained in Cossar. The cavalry brigade, which had retreated along the right bank of the Oder, had crossed the Oder towards evening at Krossen and there taken quarters.

The commanding general of the Red division has decided to oppose with all of his forces the pursuing enemy in a position at Plau and Mühlfliess and to again seek for a decision.

His intentions for the 3d of August are: to assemble the division in rear of the position to be defended and hold it in readiness for battle, while he charges the Hussar regiment with reconnoitering the enemy's approach and the cavalry brigade with the protection of his communications to the rear, in the direction of the hostile cavalry.

The question here is of the preparation of an order for defense.

Digitized by Google

ORDER FOR DEFENSE.

Outline.

As a rule the defender has the advantage over the attacker at the start in that he can adopt his measures with a greater degree of deliberation and system. In most cases it will be practicable to issue a combined written order for defense which assigns to each organization a particular mission.

When a defensive stand has been determined upon and a position has been chosen, the main measures to be taken are governed by the following considerations:

1. Conduct of the defense.
2. Utilization of the forces.
3. Replenishment of ammunition and sanitary service.
4. Disposition of the regimental baggage and trains.
5. Measures to be taken for a possible retreat.

Remarks on 1. We must make a clear distinction between a purely defensive fight which is but a means to an end and in which it is important to gain time or to guard a certain object, and that fight which seeks the decision and only takes the form of a defensive fight in order to accomplish with more

Digitized by Google

certainty the real purpose, which is the defeat of the hostile forces. In the former case the idea of defense and resistance is more pronounced; in the latter the policy of the defender must correspond to that of a fighter who, conscious of his strength, conceals it at the start, merely parrying the attacks of his opponent, in order to emerge from his reserve as soon as his opponent begins to show signs of weakness and thus defeat him the more thoroughly.

The defensive, which seeks to gain the decision must be coupled with the offensive, for the offensive alone is the key to victory.

The commander of the Red division is in the situation just described. He is seeking a decisive engagement and intends therefore to remain on the defensive only for the present and to proceed later on to the offensive. This consideration must therefore be uppermost in his mind; it furnishes the keynote for the disposition of his forces.

Remarks on 2. In carrying out the intensions of the commander the forces must be utilized in such a manner that one part of the troops takes over the defensive role, while another part is assigned and held in readiness to take up the offensive; in other words, the former is assigned for the occupation of the position, the latter kept back as a main reserve.

Whoever seeks the decision in the defense will best place his entire force in the main position. The value of advanced positions is doubtful. Such meas-

Digitized by Google

ures easily lead to a frittering away of the forces and to final defeat, and besides expose the advanced organizations to annihilation.

At the same time it will often be advantageous to place an outpost screen in front of the main position.

By this means the enemy will be forced to make an early deployment of his forces in a certain direction and in any case will be prevented from approaching the position directly without fighting, for instance, under cover of darkness.

In this particular case it would be justifiable to occupy Grunow with advanced troops, especially as we should thereby keep the enemy from occupying a favorably situated point of support.

The front of the position is divided into sections. The terrain and the probable intentions of the enemy are the determining factors in this as well as in the assignment of troops for the defense of the various sections.

The right of the position, resting on Plau and the hills north thereof, is naturally so strong that it can easily be held against greatly superior forces. It needs therefore but a small force for its defense.

The same reasons, previously mentioned, which decided the attacker to envelop the left flank must induce the defender of the position Plau–Mühlfliess to place there his main strength. Furthermore the defender is impelled thereto by strategic considera-

Digitized by Google

tions which demand that he should not allow himself to be forced away from the Oder, as he would thus lose all chance of rejoining the main army. Therefore the hills and clumps of woods along the Mühlfliess form the section in which the main forces of the division will presumably come into action. Here the opponent will attempt his enveloping movement and here also the counter-attack must be made and the decision sought.

Considering the above we arrive at the following plan for the division into sections and the distribution of the *infantry:*

1st Section, Plau and the hill north thereof; 35th Infantry Brigade.

2d Section, Sch. and the woods on the Mühlfliess; 36th Infantry Brigade.

Of the 35th Infantry Brigade, at least three battalions should be detached as a main reserve and placed in readiness behind the center of the position until the attacker's intentions become known.

Next to the grouping of the infantry, the utilization of the *artillery* is the most important question to be considered. By being able to open up with a sudden and overwhelming artillery fire, the defender has the advantage over the attacker from the start. But when this important auxiliary means of combat is played out it is difficult for it to undertake a change of position. The selection of an artillery position must therefore be well considered.

Digitized by Google

A position in the center of the line of battle is, for the most part, preferable to one on the flanks. From the center the artillery will command, in most cases, a larger part of the battle-field and its own flanks will be protected. In the case before us the hill between Plau and Sch., 1½ kms. north of Grunow, appears to be an excellent position. But in case the enemy envelops our left flank it will be difficult for the artillery in that position to support the counter-attack effectively on account of the distance. This consideration creates the desire to have at least a part of the artillery on the left flank in order to be able to utilize it on the hills at Tschausdorf. A separation of the artillery or a temporary holding back of part of it would, in such a case, be justifiable. But as long as the direction of the attack is not yet known it would be best to hold back the entire artillery at first, in a concealed position as near as possible to the chosen position, so that it can at once proceed to occupy it when ordered. The field artillery brigade will best assume this position of readiness behind the hill north of Plau.

The *engineers* will be of especial use in the defense; they assist the infantry and artillery in the preparation of the position.

As concerns the utilization of the *cavalry*, the cavalry brigade will have to protect the communications to the rear, the columns and trains and the regimental baggage, against the operations of the

Digitized by Google

hostile cavalry which threatens to cross the Oder below Krossen. Reconnaissance in front of the position towards the approaching enemy will therefore be the task of the Hussar regiment. Of special value in the defense will be the sending out of standing patrols under officers to points which command a view of the roads along which the enemy is expected to approach. As such points, Meileiche, on the main road to Grunberg, and Seedorf and Rothenburg, seem especially well adapted.

Remarks on 3. The combat section of the ammunition columns and trains must be brought up to the vicinity of the battle-field to be at hand in case of need.

The sanitary company should be placed at some point where it may be expected te find useful employment during the battle.

Remarks on 4. The remaining columns and trains, as well as the regimental baggage, which are not required during the battle and which, in case of an unfavorable outcome necessitating a retreat across the Bober, would prove a great hindrance, should be assembled on the left bank of the Bober. The divisional bridge-train will have to construct a crossing over the Bober in case the existing bridges at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück are found inadequate.

Remarks on 5. As a matter of principle, written orders for a possible retreat are never issued. Should it be thought necessary to make provision for such a

Digitized by Google

contingency the necessary directions will be given verbally to subordinate commanders, but such directions must always be kept from the knowledge of the troops. Where the outcome of the battle seems doubtful certain directions for retreat may often not only be advisable but absolutely necessary. In some cases the neglect to make provision for a possible retreat would be a grave error on the part of the commander and might, in case of an unfavorable outcome of the battle, lead to a disastrous defeat. Among precautions which are necessary, for example, in case of a difficult terrain in our rear, are the reconnaissance of roads for retreat, river-crossings, etc.

This is the case here. The defeated Red division intends to face the pursuer again. In its rear lies the Bober and to the south the difficult forest and lake country between Plau and Briesenitz. It is not at all improbable that the Red division may be forced from the Plau–Gersdorf road in a southerly direction if the enemy succeeds in completely defeating the left wing. It is therefore very necessary to reconnoiter thoroughly the Bober between Bensch-Bude and Kuckädel as regards approaches, bridges, fords, and suitable points for bridge-building and for the employment of boats and ferries. The flats and defiles between the Gr. Gersdorfer Lake, the Kl. Plausche Lake and the mill at Kossar will especially require reconnoitering.

Digitized by Google

18th Inf. Div. PLAU, 3.8, 9 A. M.

Divisional Order.

1. The enemy is advancing from Züllichau by way of Tschicherzig. His cavalry is on the right bank of the Oder, north of Krossen.

2. The division will oppose the enemy in the position Plau–Mühlfliess.

3. The cavalry brigade will secure the communications to the rear and will endeavor to prevent the hostile cavalry from crossing the Oder. The Hussar regiment will observe without interruption the enemy's advance and, later on, take over the protection of the right flank of the division.

4. The 35th Inf. Brig. will occupy Plau and the hill northeast of that place. It will occupy Grunow with outposts and will detach three battalions, to be at my disposal at the Mühlfliess crossing on the Plau–Tschausdorf road.

5. The 36th Inf. Brig. will defend that part of the line extending from the hill northeast of Plau by Sch. to the Mühlfliess.

6. The field artillery brigade will take up a position in readiness behind the hill northeast of Plau.

7. All troops will prepare the posi-

Digitized by Google

tions assigned to them for stubborn defense and be held in readiness to occupy them. The 35th and 36th Inf. Brigs., as well as the F. A. Brigade, will each be assigned a platoon of engineers.

8. The Sanitary Company will await further orders at the western exit of Plau.

9. The 1st Section of the columns and trains will advance to Gersdorf (eastern exit).

10. The regimental baggage and the 2d Section of the columns and trains will be in readiness to take up the march, facing eastward, on the Bensch-Bude–Guben road, head of column at Bensch-Bude.

11. I shall go to the hill 1 km northeast of Plau.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

Verbally to the assembled commanders; in writing to the cavalry brigade and to the Hussar regiment; extracts to the columns and trains and to the regimental baggage.

FIELD FORTIFICATIONS.

The following points should be taken into consideration in the planning and construction of the necessary field fortifications:

Digitized by Google

Infantry, cavalry and engineers carry portable entrenching tools. Additional entrenching tools are carried for the infantry and engineers in the supply-wagons of the light train (the tool- and implement-wagons).

The artillery carries entrenching tools and implements in its own battery wagons.

The divisional bridge-train is equipped with a special supply of entrenching tools and material; its wagons must therefore be brought up for all important works.

Spades, mattocks and pickaxes are for earth-work; hatchets and axes for wood-cutting.

The total number of tools for an infantry division is approximately half its numerical strength, of which some 7,600 are tools for earth-work and 1,400 for wood-cutting.

The infantry is able, without assistance, to carry out the construction of trenches, according to time and terrain, to decide upon profiles, to measure distances, to construct platforms in trenches, bomb-proofs and obstructions. The engineers will, however, be called upon to guide and assist the infantry in the construction of stronger and more permanent field fortifications and points of support, and in the preparation of villages for defense.

The artillery constructs cover for its own guns, if possible at a distance of from 600 to 700 meters behind the firing-line of the infantry.

Digitized by Google

As a rule the engineers should not be split up in working. They can be used to better advantage at important points and in the execution of difficult tasks by companies, platoons, or sections.

In throwing up field fortifications we compute the garrison at one defender per pace, and, in their construction, we assign one workman to each three paces.

For working-time we may allow:

For a rifle-trench: kneeling, 1 to 2 hours; standing, 1½ to 3 hours; reinforced standing, 3 to 6 hours; according to the soil.

For artillery: protection for one gun, ⅔ to 2½ hours; according to the strength.

The object in view and the time available will regulate the kind of fortifications to be constructed. The rule is that only so much shall be undertaken as can be completed with certainty, and that later on, if time permits, the works may be further extended.

CONDUCT OF A DEFENSIVE ENGAGEMENT.

The engagement is opened by cavalry reconnaissance. The Hussar regiment will try to harass the hostile movement, or at least to reconnoiter it. If outnumbered it will retire on the right flank of the position.

The occupation of the position by the toops in readiness behind it is carried out as soon as the di-

Digitized by Google

rection of the hostile attack becomes known, so as to anticipate the attack; the latter applies especially to the utilization of the artillery. It should compel the enemy to make an early deployment and it must have assumed a firing position by the time the artillery of the attacker comes into position. The commanding general will, in most cases, give the signal for the first shot, which should not be directed on points of minor tactical importance, lest it betray the position prematurely.

In the further course of the battle the artillery should, as a rule, first take up the combat with the attacker's artillery and later direct its fire on the infantry advancing to make the decisive attack.

The infantry, in the sections assigned to it, will preserve a proper depth-formation, so that the foremost line may be fully manned in time, especially at the decisive points, and that the organizations which have been held in reserve may be at hand for support. Therefore all formations should be reduced in depth.

The salvation of the defense lies in the stubborn holding fast of the foremost line. It should open fire in good time and be promptly reinforced in order to keep the enemy at a distance, if possible. The troops should be plentifully supplied with ammunition which may even be taken beforehand from the ammunition-wagons and laid ready on the firing-line.

The reserve of each section of the line may be used in some cases for offensive sallies—for instance,

Digitized by Google

to drive back the attacker at any point where he has broken through.

Therefore the conduct of the defense lies, to a certain extent, in the hands of the subordinate commanders.

The commander will retain his influence on the final outcome of the battle by employing the general reserve at the right place. That place will generally be the flank which is endangered by a hostile enveloping movement, or wherever the commander himself desires to seek the decision.

In this particular case, after considering the situation and conditions of the terrain, the division commander decides to place the main reserve in echelon behind the left flank and to oppose the hostile enveloping movement by a counter offensive attack.

With reference to the placing of the main reserve for such a purpose, Infantry Drill Regulations (II–85) suggest: "The larger the body of troops in defense, the greater must be the interval between the flank and the main reserve; for thereby sufficient room is gained for deployment and for starting the attack; the enemy's flank is threatened and greater protection against the envelopment of our own flank is afforded."

In accordance with this princple the main reserve (the 86th Fusileer Regiment) should be set in motion towards Tschausdorf as soon as the direction

Digitized by Google

of the hostile deployment for attack has been definitely determined, and will there take up a position in readiness at the ponds 600 m southwest of that village. The time for counter-attack will have arrived when the hostile enveloping movement has begun its deployment.

If the counter-attack is inaugurated too soon it will not strike the hostile flank but will give the opponent every chance for successfully carrying out his enveloping movement.

Among the duties which devolve upon the subordinate commanders in the defense are:

1. Order of the commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade for the occupation and strengthening of his assigned section.

2. Order of the commander of the 36th Infantry Brigade to the same effect.

3. Order of the commander of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade for taking up a position in readiness.

4. Orders of the commander of the 86th Fusileer Regiment (the main reserve) for the counter-attack.

THE RETREAT.

General Considerations.

We shall now consider the conditions under which the retreat is carried out, assuming that the enemy, by making an enveloping attack on the left

Digitized by Google

flank of the position, has forced the Red division to give way.

The main points to be considered in a retreat may be summed up as follows:

1. Direction of the retreat.
2. Conduct of the retreat.
3. Taking up a position.
4. Care for columns and trains.

Remarks on 1. As a rule the direction of the retreat will be at right angles to the defensive front. This means that the defender yields to the pressure of the attacker and falls back in the direction in which the main attack of the enemy has taken place. The defender will have his choice of direction only when his retreat is a voluntary one, that is, only when his defeat has not been decisive. The defender should always strive to retreat in the direction which, from a strategical standpoint, is the most advantageous to him. The conduct of the retreat is materially facilitated if there are several roads available. An eccentric retreat, that is, a retreat carried out in several diverging directions, is to be avoided, since it often leads to a scattering of the troops. The retreat should rather lead to a concentration of the forces as soon as practicable.

The Red division should, in this instance, retreat by way of Deutsch-Sagar and Wendisch–Sagar in order to gain the main road to Guben. It should

Digitized by Google

avoid as far as possible being shunted off into the cut-up forest terrain between Plau and Bothendorf.

Remarks on 2. For the conduct of the retreat the main rule is that those troops should be first taken from the position which can be most easily disengaged from the enemy, while the stoutest resistance should be made at the point where the enemy presses the hardest. We may, however, be forced by conditions to act otherwise. In this case, if we attempted to draw back the defenders of Plau, and the hill to the north thereof, in advance of the troops engaged in the woods on the Mühlfliess, disaster might overtake the latter. Therefore we must keep up the fight at Plau, and especially at the hill north of Plau, where the artillery is in position, until the retreat of the left wing towards Gersdorf seems assured.

Furthermore, we must strive in the retreat to bring the troops as soon as practicable from battle formation into an orderly column of march with a well-disposed rear guard. This is possible only in case we succeed in gaining a liberal distance from the pursuing force, either by taking up a good position or by putting an obstacle between ourselves and the enemy. The Bober furnishes us with the welcome means of accomplishing this. The Bober makes the retreat more difficult, it is true, but if we succeed in crossing it without great losses, it will become a strong ally to us in our retreat. This thought should

Digitized by Google

lead us to have the existing bridges across the Bober at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück cleared as soon as possible and prepared in advance for demolition. For this purpose the engineers should be sent ahead, if possible in wagons.

The necessary time for crossing the Bober can only be gained by the aid of a strong position which will bring the pursuing enemy to a halt.

Remarks on 3. The selection of such a position is one of the first measures to be taken in a retreat. It should preferably lie to the rear and flank, should have a good field of fire, and should not be masked by the retreating troops. It should not be so near the position just vacated that the body of troops designated to defend it will become implicated in the retreat. On the other hand it should not lie so far away that the retreating troops will suffer great losses before reaching its protection.

For the occupation of such a position any reserves which we may still have on hand will be especially suitable. If there should be none this duty will then fall to the troops which have first taken up the retreat. It will often be necessary for different parts of the line to fall back successively until we are able to free ourselves from contact with the enemy and form column of march.

The hill between Deutsch-Sagar and Gersdorf at the eastern edge of the forest seems especially suitable for a stand. Here part of the troops retreat-

Digitized by Google

ing from the woods north of Plau, as well as the artillery, will take position and attempt to maintain it until the remaining troops of the division have crossed the Bober. For those troops which have to retreat in a southwesterly direction there are suitable positions at the lake defiles of the Gersdorfer and Plauschen lakes as well as on the Fliess between the Kossar Mill and Bothendorf.

Remarks on 4. It must be our endeavor in a retreat to bring the columns and trains and regimental baggage into a position of safety. For this purpose, and also to keep the roads clear for the retreating troops, the trains should be started first. They should be given a definite march objective which they should in no case go beyond. In a retreat we often have to get along for the time being without the regimental baggage. Of the field hospitals and dressing-stations, everything that can be moved should be taken along. All the rest falls in the hands of the enemy, but comes under the protection of the Geneva Convention.

ORDERS FOR THE RETREAT.

A combined order for a retreat can be issued only when we are still independent of the enemy, that is when we have already decided on retreat before the battle. In case we are compelled to retreat after a decisive engagement, the commander must confine

Digitized by Google

himself to issuing successive instructions from time to time as the situation demands.

In this instance the division commander will issue the following orders which are delivered verbally by aides, orderly officers or mounted messengers:

1. *To the commander of the 35th Infantry Brigade:*

To try to hold Plau and the hills north of that village as long as may be necessary to enable the 36th Infantry Brigade to secure its retreat on Gersdorf; thereafter to retire by way of Briesenitz on Wendisch-Sagar and to cross the Bober at Neubrück.

2. *To the commander of the 36th Infantry Brigade:*

To take up the retreat by way of Gersdorf on Deutsch-Sagar; to make a stand on the hill between Gersdorf and Deutsch-Sagar and to hold that position until the 35th Infantry Brigade has crossed the Bober at Neubrück.

3. *To the commander of the artillery:*

To fall back and take a new position on the hill between Gersdorf and Deutsch-Sagar to cover the retreat of the infantry.

4. *To the Hussar regiment:*

To support the division in its retreat over the

Digitized by Google

Bober, and to delay the enemy in every possible manner.

5. The combat section of the ammunition columns and trains to start at once by Deutsch-Sagar for Gross-Braschen; the 2d Section of the columns and trains and the regimental baggage to be put in march at once towards Guben.

Digitized by Google

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE BLUE DIVISION.

Situation.

The division commander has reported his success to army headquarters by wire and receives the following reply on the evening of August 4th:

"The army has advanced to-day as far as the line Zielenzig–Sternberg. The rear troops of the enemy have halted at Drossen and Reppen.

"Your division should continue the pursuit in such manner that it will be able, if necessary, to oppose the Landsturm organizations reported to be at Sommerfeld and Sagan. For the protection of your line of communications there will be placed at your disposal a Landwehr brigade which will reach Krossen on August 6th. An etappen depot will be established in Züllichau and Grünberg, an ammunition sub-depot in Rothenberg, and a supply magazine in Krossen."

In addition, the division commander receives, during the course of the afternoon, various reports from the cavalry brigade, which give him the following information:

At 10 A. M. the cavalry brigade had a victorious engagement with hostile cavalry (about three troops) at Gr. Braschen; the hostile cavalry retreated in a southerly direction. Shortly thereafter the cavalry brigade encountered hostile trains at Gr. Braschen, coming from Bensch-Bude under a strong infantry guard which repulsed the attacks of the cavalry brigade; the trains continued their march towards Heidekrug.

Digitized by Google

Between 3 and 4 P. M. strong hostile columns of all arms retreated on the Neubrück–Schegeln road. Attacks of the cavalry brigade on these columns in the vicinity of Bloch Lake were repulsed.

About 5 P. M. the enemy discontinued his movements to the rear and occupied Brankow, Blochbude, and Scheegeln.

A troop, sent by the brigade to Guben, found the Neisse bridges occupied; it reported that extensive preparations were being made for the entraining of troops at the Guben railroad station.

The brigade has left one troop on the right bank of the Oder to continue the reconnaissance against the right flank of the enemy's main army and to keep up communication with our own main army.

For the night, the cavalry brigade will go into quarters in Preichow and Wellmitz.

The Hussar regiment reports:

Deichow and Brankow are strongly occupied by the enemy; a further advance through the difficult forest country is impossible. The regiment takes quarters in Bobersberg.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND DECISION.

(Report made by the General Staff Officer to the Division Commander.)

The division has orders to continue the pursuit of the enemy and in such manner that it will be able to oppose a possible advance of the Landsturm forces being organized in Sommerfeld and Sagan.

Digitized by Google

The farther the division pursues the enemy to the west, the more its left flank and its communications to the rear will be exposed to attack by the enemy to be expected from the south. This threatened danger should, however, not be exaggerated. The enemy to be looked for from Sommerfeld does not seem very strong numerically, according to the reports received, and the quality of the troops (Landsturm) is to be regarded as inferior. It is doubtful whether such an enemy possesses sufficient initiative and power to undertake independent systematized operations.

Judging from the reports in hand, there is scarcely any reason for apprehension from this side on August 5th. The Blue Landwehr brigade will reach Krossen on August 6th and may be considered sufficient protection for the line of communications of the division from any danger which threatens from the south. Nevertheless the division, whose right flank is now better protected by the Oder, will have to give increased attention, during the remainder of the advance, to its left flank. This is to be accomplished by thorough reconnaissance and a proper distribution of troops on the march.

Our chief thought, for the operations on August 5th, must be to stay at the enemy's heels; first, to gather completely the fruits of to-day's victory; and second, to reach the Neisse at the same time as the

Digitized by Google

enemy and thus thwart his apparent intention of utilizing the railroad at Guben.

It appears from his widespread dispositions for the night in Neubrück and Scheegeln—his trains having retreated as far as O. F. Heidekrug—that the enemy intends to continue his retreat to-morrow on Guben. There would be nothing gained by his defending any longer the line of the Bober. Only a weak rear guard is now occupying the left bank of the Bober for the protection of his forces in quarters for the night.

The operations of the division should begin with forcing the crossings of the Bober early in the morning; this would be best accomplished by sending the 35th Infantry Brigade to make a demonstration against the hostile positions at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück, while the 36th Infantry Brigade crosses the Bober on the bridge at Rehfeld and attacks the enemy in flank.

For the 35th Brigade, a new crossing must be established by the divisional bridge-train at a suitable place a little below Bensch-Bude.

The conduct of the enemy will regulate our further advance. Should the enemy—as may be taken for granted from his dispositions for the night—utilize the Kanig–Pohlo–Bösitz road for his retreat, then the advance of the division must be continued in two columns. The 35th Infantry Brigade will follow as the left column on the road above mentioned while

Digitized by Google

the 36th Infantry Brigade and the artillery will advance as the right column on the high road through Heidekrug to Guben.

This distribution of the forces, considering the proximity of the roads, renders possible the mutual support of the columns. The 36th Infantry Brigade takes the shortest road to Guben; the 35th Infantry Brigade forms, at the same time, a left-flank guard.

The cavalry brigade, in the position which it has taken up in the meantime, is advantageously situated to accompany the retreating enemy on his flank and also to protect the flank of the division and to reconnoiter towards Guben and Sommerfeld. The Hussar regiment will also, at the start, operate against the enemy's flank, but later on must take up the pursuit directly in front of the division.

ORDER FOR THE OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 5TH.

Div. Hdqrs., GERSDORF, 4.8, 10 P. M.

Divisional Order.

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.

1. Independent Cavalry:
   (*a*) 17th Cav. Brig. with Horse Btry. and Machine gun Det.
   (*b*) 16th Hus. Reg. (1, 2 & ½ 3d Tps.)

1. The enemy has gone into quarters in the villages on the left bank of the Bober. His outposts occupy Bensch-Bude and Deichow.
2. The division will cross the Bober early to-morrow morning and again take up the pursuit of the enemy in the direction of Guben.
3. The cavalry will remain in close touch with the enemy and resume operations against his right flank

Digitized by Google

2. Right Column:
   Maj.-Gen. 36th Inf. Brig.
   36th Inf. Brig.
   ½ 3d Tp. 16th Hus. Reg.
   18th F. A. Brig.
   ½ San. Co.
3. Left Column:
   Maj.-Gen. 35th Inf. Brig.
   35th Inf. Brig.
   ½ 3d Tp. 16th Hus. Reg.
   Eng. Co. & Div. Br. Train.
   ½ San. Co.

as early as possible in order to force him to retreat.

4. The Major-General, 35th Infantry Brigade, will endeavor to force a crossing with his troops at Bensch-Bude at 5 A. M., and drive the enemy from the further bank of the Bober.
5. The right column will at the same time cross the Bober bridge at Alt-Rehfeld and march by Neu-Rehfeld on Braschen.
6. The field artillery brigade will be ready at 4.45 A. M. at Deutsch-Sagar to support the 35th Infantry Brigade. It will not join the right column until it has crossed the Bober.
7. The 1st Section of the columns and trains will be composed of the 1st Inf. Am. Col., the 3d and 4th Art. Am. Cols., and 4th, 5th and 6th Field Hospitals, and will be in readiness to take up the march, in the order named, at 6 A. M., on the Gersdorf-Krossen road; head of column at the Krug, west of Rusdorf.
8. The remainder of the columns and trains will, for the present, remain at Plau.
9. The regimental baggage will be assembled after the division has crossed the Bober; that of the right column at Alt-Rehfeld, that of the left column at Deutsch-Sagar.

Digitized by Google

10. After 5 A. M. I shall be with the left column on the hill west of Fritschendof.

N,
Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

Dictated to the officers detailed to receive orders; in writing to the cavalry brigade and the Hussar regiment; extracts to the columns and trains.

GENERAL STAFF OFFICER,
18th Inf. Div.

DISCRETIONARY ORDER TO THE COMMANDER OF THE CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Div. Hdqrs., GERSDORF, 4.8, 10 P. M.

To Major-General C:

The division will cross the Bober early to-morrow morning and resume the pursuit of the enemy in force. I desire that you, in conjunction with the Hussar regiment now at Bobersberg, harass the enemy as much as possible on his flank, starting very early in the morning, and support the advance of the division. Should the enemy resume his retreat, your brigade should keep in close touch with his flank and at the same time reconnoiter towards Guben.

As the enemy expects reinforcements from the south in the shape of Landsturm organizations, which are now being organized at Sagan and Sommerfeld, your brigade will have the additional task of protecting the left flank of the division. I desire

Digitized by Google

early and definite information as to the strength, composition and whereabouts of those organizations.

The Sagar–Guben railroad has been interrupted by the Hussar regiment at Seebigau; it would be well for you to destroy that railroad at other places as well, and to keep a close watch on the road and railroad connections to Sommerfeld and Sagan.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

DISCRETIONARY ORDER TO THE COMMANDER OF THE HUSSAR REGIMENT.

Div. Hdqrs., GERSDORF, 4.8, 10 P. M.

To Colonel A:

Your regiment is charged with harassing the right flank of the enemy as much as possible early tomorrow morning and with supporting the advance of the division. If the enemy resumes his retreat take up the pursuit at once and reconnoiter directly in front of the division.

The cavalry brigade has also been directed to operate against the enemy's right flank. It will accompany the enemy's retreat on his flank and at the same time will reconnoiter towards Guben, Sommerfeld and Sagan.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

Digitized by Google

THROWING A BRIDGE AND CROSSING A RIVER IN FACE OF THE ENEMY.

The operation treated of here is the crossing of a stream in face of the enemy. The underlying principle for this is: to make a demonstration at one place and effect a crossing at another.

The 35th Infantry Brigade, by trying to force a crossing of the Bober at 5 A. M., attracts the enemy's attention, or the attention of part of his forces. It thereby facilitates the crossing at Alt-Rehfeld of the 36th Infantry Brigade, and the latter, in turn, by attacking the enemy on his flank, then assists the 35th Infantry Brigade.

The task of the 35th Infantry Brigade is made more difficult by the necessity of constructing a new bridge. The terrain features are, however, not unfavorable for its accomplishment. The hills on the right bank of the Bober afford an artillery position which completely commands the opposite bank. These hills also afford a covered approach and concealment for maneuvering the troops in rear of the fighting-line. The enemy has on the opposite bank no position for his artillery in which it can successfully offer resistance. The covered terrain on that bank, reaching almost to the river, favors his retreat, but also affords the attacker secure positions for firmly establishing organizations as they cross.

The map shows a suitable place for the throwing of a bridge, about 1 km below Bensch-Bude.

Digitized by Google

It is somewhat out of the line of direct fire. The grove there affords cover for the preparatory work and also material for the bridge. The bridge-train can be brought up entirely under cover. There is an island at that point and the river there is somewhat narrower.

The material carried by the divisional bridge-train will, however, be found insufficient; it carries material for a bridge 36½ meters in length, which can be thrown by the engineer company in about an hour. In the case in hand part of the bridge will have to be constructed with material carried by the field bridge-train, and we must allow several hours therefore for the construction of the entire bridge.

Advance preparations for laying the bridge, as well as the construction of the bridge itself, will have to be begun during the night, in order to have a crossing ready immediately after the opening of the engagement.

THE MARCH IN TWO COLUMNS.

The divisional order separates the division into two columns. The march in several parallel columns is the rule for the army corps, but the exception for the division.

The division represents that troop-unit which possesses independent fighting power and which, although marching on one road, can put all of its troops into action on the same day. In most cases the very

Digitized by Google

fact of marching on one road will favor the deployment for battle of an independent division. As a rule there will be plenty of time for marching up but we must take into consideration the depth of our deployment. Separating a division into two or more columns for an advance may be justified in the following cases:

1. In the pursuit of a defeated enemy, which demands a readiness for battle and which does not require reserves.

2. In the crossing of defiles (the Bober and the Guben forest), where one column opens the road for the other.

3. In case one flank is threatened (Landsturm organizations at Sommerfeld).

4. As an introductory measure to deployment for battle when the object is to envelop the hostile flank.

EVENTS ON AUGUST 5TH.*

After a short resistance on the Bober the enemy is forced to retreat by the right column which has crossed the Bober at Alt-Rehfeld. Part of his forces fall back by the high road through Braschen and Heidekrug; other parts turn to the south through Scheegeln, Kanig, and Pohlo. The division pursues in two columns in the directions named.

The hostile retreat is continued without interruption as far as Guben. East of that place the enemy's rear

*Events from August 5th to 9th are treated of only in so far as they offer new material for tactical instruction.

Digitized by Google

guard offers a short resistance by occupying Vw. Kiekebusch, the brickyard on the main road, and Mückenberg, and forces the deployment of the leading elements of both columns of the division, which have arrived before Guben at almost the same time, at about 2 P. M.

Shortly thereafter the enemy retreats through Guben. The division finds Guben free of the enemy and the bridge across the Neisse still intact. It occupies Guben and Klostervorstadt.

At 6 P. M. the pursuing cavalry reports that the enemy has halted on the line Schenkendöbern–Deulowitz and occupied these villages with infantry, and that hostile cavalry is at Kaltenborn.

In addition, the division commander receives the following information:

1. During the night of August 4–5 and in the course of the forenoon numerous troop-trains, loaded, have left for Frankfurt on the Oder. Trains have also been put in march by way of Pinnow for the depot at Jamlitz.

2. The bridges across the Neisse at Gubinchen and west of Schenkendorf are destroyed.

3. A dragoon troop, sent ahead towards Sommerfeld, reported that when it approached that place hostile infantry—two to three companies—retired on Gassen.

Problems.

1. Divisional order for quartering on August 5th.
2. Outpost orders.
3. Duties of the commanding officer at Guben.

Digitized by Google

4. Report of operations of the Blue division from August 2d to 5th.

Remarks on 4. Such reports are to be submitted by independent commanders to the commander-in-chief upon completion of a certain phase of the operations. They should contain a short description of events and mention the general conditions prevailing, what intentions the enemy has shown, with what forces we had to deal, and through what tactical decisions the problem has been solved. The report must further contain a statement of the losses suffered, and must give the general condition of the troops and the independent commander's further intentions. Accordingly, the report would read about as follows:

REPORT OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER.

Div. Hdqrs., GUBEN, 5.8.

Report

of operations of the Blue division from August 2d to 5th.

Pursuant to its orders, to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy's forces retreating by Bomst, and to prevent them from rejoining their main army, the advance guard of the division reached Züllichau at 4 P. M., August 2d, after an exhausting march.

Digitized by Google

From the reports of the cavalry received at Züllichau (the cavalry brigade was advanced on the right bank of the Oder, toward Crämersborn and Leitersdorfer Mühle, while the 16th Hussar Regiment reconnoitered towards Grünberg), it was inferred that the enemy had retreated by way of Leitersdorfer Mühle on Krossen with his cavalry and a part of his trains, but with his main forces through Grünberg and Rothenburg and on in a westerly direction.

I decided therefore to halt for that day with the main body of the division at the line of the Oder, charging the Hussar regiment with the reconnaissance on the left bank of the Oder towards the Bober and with the duty of ascertaining the direction of the enemy's retreat, and directing the cavalry brigade to reach Krossen on the same day, to occupy the Oder crossing at that place and to threaten the retreat of the enemy as much as possible. At the same time the cavalry brigade was directed to interrupt the Krossen–Guben and Guben–Frankfurt a. O. railroads.

The division went into quarters in Züllichau and surrounding villages on the night of August 2d–3d. Outposts were placed on the bank of the Oder on the line railroad bridge (east of Pommerzig)–Tschicherzig. The reconstruction of the railroad bridge was directed.

During the evening of August 2d reports reached me indicating that the enemy had occupied Krossen

Digitized by Google

and villages to the southeast thereof, with advanced troops at Logau and Treppeln. The bridge across the Oder at Krossen had been destroyed. It looked as if the enemy intended to continue his retreat on the left bank of the Oder and was not seeking to rejoin his main army by way of Krossen.

In the belief that my best course was now to attack the forces of the enemy, still east of the Bober, and to beat them anew, I ordered for August 3d a continuation of the pursuit in full force. The Hussar regiment received orders to reconnoiter early in the morning round the flank of the hostile advanced troops towards Krossen and towards the bridges over the Bober at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück, and to interrupt the Sommerfeld–Guben railroad. The cavalry brigade received orders to cross the Oder between the mouths of the Neisse and the Bober and to reconnoiter towards Guben.

At 6.30 A. M. the division began the march on Grünberg—the right-flank guard over the repaired bridge at Pommerzig towards Rothenburg. During the advance the Hussar regiment ascertained that the enemy occupied with his main forces the line Plau–Mühlfliess and that he had advanced troops at Grunow. The advance guard of the division reached Logau at about 3 P. M., having marched by Grünberg; the flank guard reached Wenig–Lessen about the same time.

In consideration of the late hour and the tired

Digitized by Google

condition of the troops, I decided not to attack the enemy on that day in his strong position at Plau–Mühlfliess, since I regarded his strength as about equal to my own. The division remained during the night of August 3d–4th in the vicinity of Gr. Lessen, Wenig–Lessen, and Logau, in readiness for battle.

During the evening the cavalry brigade reported that it had succeeded in crossing the Oder at Polenzig and that it had destroyed the Krossen–Guben railroad at Merzwiese. A Hussar patrol, sent ahead towards and beyond Naumburg, reported that the destruction of the Sommerfeld–Guben railroad had been successfully accomplished at Seebigau, and that Landsturm organizations were being organized at Sommerfeld.

Three Landwehr companies arrived in Züllichau on August 3d to take over the protection of the line of communications.

My intention to attack the enemy early on August 4th was strengthened by the information received from general headquarters as to the strength of the hostile forces in my front and the preparations being made at Guben for the entrainment of large bodies of troops. After a personal reconnaissance of the ground in my front and the hostile position Plau–Mühlfliess, I decided to attack the position frontally with the 35th Infantry Brigade and to make the decisive attack with the 36th Infantry Brigade on the hostile left flank.

Digitized by Google

On August 4th, at dawn, the 35th Infantry Brigade took possession of Grunow and carried on a containing engagement against the line Plau–Sch. (1½ km north of Grunow). The 9th Field Artillery Regiment went into position northeast of Grunow. Thereupon I led the 36th Infantry Brigade from its assembly position at Wenig–Lessen to the decisive attack against the hostile left flank on the hills north of the Mühlfliess, supported by the fire of the 45th Field Artillery Regiment, which had taken a position on the hill 1½ km northwest of Wenig–Lessen. The enemy resisted stubbornly and was only forced to give way after I had called up my reserves. About 11 A. M. the enemy evacuated his position on the Mühlfliess and retreated on Gersdorf. Shortly thereafter his troops holding Plau fell back towards Briesenitz.

The division then pursued the enemy who retreated by Deutsch-Sagar and Wendisch–Sagar towards the Bober. Under the protection of a strong position at Deutsch-Sagar he succeeded in crossing the river. The 35th Infantry Brigade, entrusted with the pursuit, advanced to the Bober but found the bridges at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück and Alt-Rehfeld destroyed. The enemy held possession of the opposite bank.

On account of the lateness of the hour—it was then 5 P. M.—I decided to discontinue the pursuit for the day. The division went into quarters in the vil-

Digitized by Google

lages along the right bank of the Bober from Krossen to Briesenitz, with outposts on the Bober.

The cavalry brigade had operated with some success in the enemy's rear and found itself in the evening on his right flank at Preichow and Wellmitz; the Hussar regiment, which had also crossed the Bober, remained for the night in Bobersberg.

During the evening the cavalry brigade reported that they had found Guben occupied by the enemy, and that preparations were being made there for entraining troops.

I determined therefore, for August 5th, to cross the Bober and to push towards Guben with all my forces in order to prevent if possible the entraining of troops at that place.

The 35th Infantry Brigade received orders to attack the hostile position at Bensch-Bude and Neubrück at 5 A. M., and thereafter to cross the Bober on a bridge to be constructed in the meantime. The 36th Infantry Brigade crossed the Bober at the same time on the repaired railroad bridge at Alt-Rehfeld and, after a short encounter at Neu-Rehfeld, forced the enemy back in the direction of Braschen.

By this pressure on his left flank the enemy was compelled to evacuate his position at Deichow, and thus opened up the Bober crossing for the 35th Infantry Brigade. After the cavalry had ascertained that the main forces of the enemy had started to retreat on the Scheegeln–Kanig–Pohlo road, I decided

Digitized by Google

to advance with the division in two columns, on that road and on the high road by O. F. Heidekrug toward Guben.

The enemy retreated on Guben and, after a short resistance by his rear guard, immediately east of Guben, crossed to the left bank of the Neisse. The division then took possession of Guben and went into quarters here, placing outposts on the line Reichenbach–Spruke–Neisse. The enemy has continued his retreat by Schenkendöbern and Deulowitz and has occupied those villages with outposts.

A large amount of railroad material, ammunition, and supplies of all kinds were captured in Guben.

The enemy has succeeded in getting off a few loaded troop trains to Frankfurt and has also started some troops in that direction, by marching, by way of Pinnow. I have, so far, no definite information concerning the formation of Landsturm organzations at Sommerfeld. When one of our dragoon troops approached that place two or three hostile companies retired towards Gassen.

I estimate the enemy opposed to me at about a division. He has suffered heavy losses. We have taken about 1,000 prisoners, and much material has fallen into our hands.

In battle and marching the division has also suffered severely; but the general state of health of the troops is good.

Digitized by Google

I intend to continue the advance on the 6th in the direction of Cottbus.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

On August 5th the division commander receives the following discretionary order from general headquarters:

> The army has reached the line Drossen–Reppen today (August 5th). The hostile army has evacuated the right bank of the Oder. The army intends to cross the Oder with all forces on August 7th. You will resume the pursuit of the enemy, but will exercise proper care to protect the left flank of the army against enterprises by the new hostile organizations reported in the south. You should not advance beyond the Neisse, therefore, before August 7th.
>
> It is especially desirable that you put yourself in possession of the important railway junction, Cottbus, where new troops are also said to be in process of organization. For the reinforcement of your division the 1st Reserve Infantry Brigade (the 1st and 2d Reserve Regiments) will be sent by Krossen to Guben and will reach the latter place on August 8th in the course of the forenoon.

Problems.

1. Estimate of the situation and steps taken by the division commander on August 6th.

Digitized by Google

2. Divisional order for August 7th, under the assumption that the division remains in Guben on the 6th, while the enemy, after a brief attempt on the outpost-line of the division, resumes his retreat on Cottbus and occupies with his outposts the Malxe defiles at Peitz, F. Klein – Heide and Heinersbrück.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

On the forenoon of August 7th the division takes up the advance on Cottbus on two roads: by Bärenklau and Tauer and by Atterwasch and Wüst-Drewitz. The Hussar regiment reconnoiters through Tauer towards Cottbus and through Pinnow towards Jamlitz and interrupts the Cottbus–Müllrose railroad. The cavalry brigade advances by Taubendorf and Horno towards Heinersbrück and reconnoiters the right bank of the Neisse.

The enemy holds firmly the Malxe defiles, and the division is unable anywhere to effect a further advance. It occupies during the night of August 7–8 Wüst-Drewitz (division headquarters), Tauer, and Jaenschwalde; the Hussar regiment remains for the night in Preilack; the cavalry brigade in Horno.

At 5 A. M., August 8th, the hostile infantry outposts at Peitz and Klein-Heide are relieved by cavalry.

About the same time hostile infantry with some artillery advances from Bärenbrück to Heinersbrück. At 8 A. M. patrols of the cavalry brigade, which had been sent round the hostile right wing, report that a strong

Digitized by Google

column of all arms is marching from Cottbus by Tranitz on Mulknitz and that its head was at Vw. Klinge at 6.30 A. M.

About 9 A. M. a further report is received which states that a second hostile column is marching by Gosda towards Alt-Forst; its head at Gosda at 7.30 A. M.

Towards 10 A. M. an important report is received by the division commander from the Dragoon troop left for observation at Sommerfeld to the effect that a hostile detachment of all arms, strength about six battalions, two troops and several batteries, started early this morning from Sagan and is marching towards Gassen.

Other reports state that the hostile columns reported above have crossed over to the right bank of the Neisse at Alt-Forst and Sacro and are advancing on Pförten.

Problems.

1. Estimate of the situation and decision on the morning of August 8th.
2. Divisional order issued during the forenoon of August 8th.
3. Quartering of the division on the evening of August 8th (sketch).
4. Divisional order for August 9th.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND DECISION.

Remarks on 1. The reports received concerning the enemy's movements show that the hostile forces

Digitized by Google

which have been at Cottbus and at the Malxe defiles have marched across the Neisse towards Pförten. According to the information received from general headquarters it must be assumed that the enemy has received strong reinforcements. At the same time it is reported that a hostile detachment of all arms is advancing from Sagan towards Gassen; by its detour to the right, the hostile force evidently intends to operate against the lines of communication of the Blue army, and especially of the Blue division, and to force the latter to retire by threatening its line of retreat.

At the same time the enemy in our front wishes to unite his forces with the troops recently organized at Sagan and Gassen and, thus strengthened, to transfer his operations to the terrain on the right bank of the Neisse, which is more favorable for his offensive intentions.

In view of these conditions the position of the Blue division has become one of danger and its relation to the enemy has changed from an offensive to a defensive one. The last mission of the division was to continue the pursuit and gain possession of the important railway junction, Cottbus. This, however, in view of the changed situation, is no longer possible.

The division commander will now have to keep uppermost in his mind the protection of the left flank of the army; he must have due regard to the threat-

Digitized by Google

ening of his line of retreat and cannot expose the right bank of the Neisse and Guben to the enemy. The division will therefore have to retire to the right bank of the Neisse and the sooner the better.

As soon as the crossing has been completed, the problem will be to regain the initiative—lost for the moment—and to foil the further intentions of the enemy.

This will be best accomplished by an energetic offensive. The Blue division need not be afraid of attempting this in view of its successes on the preceding days and after having been reinforced by the reserve brigade, which reaches Guben on the 8th. This offensive movement must be begun sufficiently early to give us a chance of defeating the enemy if possible before he has effected a junction with the forces advancing on Gassen. Therefore the main point on August 8th will be to direct the march of the division to a position on the right bank of the Neisse which will be favorable for the assembling of the entire division and its proper tactical organization for the intended advance on the 9th of August.

To reach the line Pförten–Zauchel the enemy will have to make a long day's march and will probably be unable to get far beyond that line to-day. Marching the division by way of Guben might be considered, in order to take advantage of the good

Digitized by Google

roads and perfectly secure river crossing, but this road has the disadvantage of leading the division too far away from the enemy and of giving him entirely too much freedom of action, especially for the following day. It is much more important to remain as close as possible to the enemy and therefore our march should be in a direction parallel to his.

From this we get: a left-flank march in two columns; the right column marches from Jaenschwalde by Taubendorf and Sadersdorf and the left column from Tauer and Wüst–Drewitz by Grabkow and Schlagsdorf where it crosses the Neisse on a bridge to be constructed by the divisional bridge-train.

For August 8th the division will go into quarters on the right bank of the Neisse as follows:

35th Infantry Brigade: Niemitsch, Küppern, Schenkendorf;

36th Infantry Brigade: Stargardt, Tzschernowitz, Bäschen;

Reserve Brigade, columns and trains: Guben.

The cavalry (both the cavalry brigade and Hussar regiment), which can cross the Neisse at Markersdorf, must be sent far to the front, to keep close touch with the enemy and to reconnoiter; the cavalry brigade, towards the line Sommerfeld–Pförten, the Hussar regiment towards the line Pförten–Sacro, observing the left bank of the Neisse towards Cottbus.

Digitized by Google

CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION.

Up to the evening of August 8th the following reports are received concerning the enemy:

1. The enemy has not marched beyond the line Pförten–Zauchel.

2. Hostile cavalry patrols have reached Starzeddel, Kohlow and Birkenberg; stronger cavalry, Beitsch.

3. The enemy's infantry occupies Pförten, Datten and Zauchel. Marienhayn and Jähnsdorf contain hostile troops and the bridge at Sacro is held by a hostile infantry post.

4. The detachment reported to be advancing from Sagan towards Gassen has reached Gassen and gone into quarters there on the evening of August 8th.

REMARKS ON 4. OPERATION ORDER FOR AUGUST 9TH.

Outline.

The disposition of the division on August 8th has brought about a situation favorable to the continuation of the operations of the division on August 9th. The division, formed into two groups, faces the enemy's main lines of approach. These are the Guben–Birkenberg–Sacro, the Guben Caaso–Pförten and the Guben–Stargardt–Pförten or Beitsch roads.

The last reports received concerning the enemy indicate that only his advanced troops have reached the line Pförten–Zauchel. A part of his forces is still farther to the rear at Marienhayn and Jähnsdorf.

Digitized by Google

The hostile detachment reported to be advancing from the southeast has reached Gassen and from there will have but half a day's march to Pförten. The enemy may have any one of the following intentions for the 9th of August:

1. He may remain at Pförten to concentrate his forces and to await the arrival of reinforcements from Gassen.

2. He may approach the division and strive to unite the scattered parts of his army by a concentric advance to the battle-field.

3. He may, finally, continue his march to Sommerfeld to reach a hand to the detachment approaching from Gassen.

The last case is the least probable, as it is too dangerous, considering the proximity of the Blue division. In the first two cases the enemy will surely endeavor to deploy as soon as practicable from the defiles of the little Standesheide and to reach the protecting line of the Werderfliess.

The division commander will best anticipate all three possibilities by an advance in the general direction of Pförten. The opposing enemy must be beaten before the detachment from Gassen has arrived.

The advance will therefore have to be made very early and so arranged that it will lead to a quick de-

Digitized by Google

ployment. The use of all three of the roads of advance at our disposal would lead to a premature division of forces not advisable until the situation has further cleared. If we use the two westerly roads for advance, the one through Birkenberg would lead to an envelopment of the hostile left flank, but would take us into a terrain unfavorable for battle deployment. Should this operation be successful the enemy would merely be driven into the arms of his reinforcements; while, should it miscarry, the Neisse would be a serious obstacle for the division.

The following reasons may be given for the choice of the two easterly roads of advance by Küppern and Stargardt:

1. The possibility of getting ahead of the enemy should he continue his march to the right and of preventing him from joining his reinforcements.

2. More favorable terrain for deployment and envelopment.

3. In case of success the enemy is driven back to the Neisse, in a direction unfavorable to the carrying out of his further intentions.

4. In case of an unfavorable outcome of the operation, the division would only be pushed back on its natural line of retreat.

This situation, in which the division thrusts itself wedge-like between the two parts of the hostile force, has of course the disadvantage that it may be

Digitized by Google

seriously compromised by a too early approach of the hostile detachment from Gassen. This danger will be best guarded against by posting a strong reserve behind the left wing. The reserve brigade must follow the left column, so that it can either be employed in gaining the decision in the main battle or be used in driving back the hostile force advancing from Gassen.

Particularly good use can also be made of the cavalry brigade in connection with this operation. It will be able, in conjunction with the machine-gun detachment, horse battery, and engineers in wagons,* to delay seriously the enemy approaching from Gassen in the covered and cut-up terrain between Gassen and Pförten, especially on the lines of the Timmnitz and Strang. With this object in view it should be advanced towards Gassen in the course of August 8th.

In all operations entailing a change of front in difficult terrain, the directions for the regimental baggage, columns and trains should receive special attention. These must be kept near at hand, but must be able, in case of an unfavorable outcome of the operation, to take up their march to the rear in the desired direction without blocking the roads for the movement of the troops. The natural line of retreat of the division lies beyond doubt in the di-

*The engineer company needs for its transportation about 25 wagons, which must be requisitioned from the country. The attaching of infantry to the cavalry brigade might also be considered in this connection

Digitized by Google

rection of Krossen and Züllichau, for a retreat on Guben would separate the division from its line of communications. Next in importance to the advance on Pförten, therefore, is the consideration of the cross-roads, Starzeddel–Kanig or Grocho–Scheegeln–Braschen and Stargardt or Tzschernowitz – Pohlo – F. Brankower–Theerofen–Braschen, which must be immediately reconnoitered with a view to the possible retreat of the division on Krossen. The stretch of road Starzeddel–Tzschernowitz and the crossings of the Lubst there, must therefore be kept clear of all troop-wagons.

In case of retreat through Guben, the regimental baggage, columns and trains must be ordered to take the main highway towards Krossen, as they will need a reliable and secure road.

Div. Hdqrs., TZSCHERNOWITZ, 8.8, 10 P. M.

Divisional Order.

DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.

1. Independent Cavalry:
   (*a*) 17th Cav. Brig. with Horse Btry., Machine-gun Det. and Eng. Co. in wagons.
   (*b*) 16th Hus. Reg. (1st, 2d & ½ 3d Tps.)

1. The enemy has crossed to the right bank of the Neisse; his outposts are on the line Zauchel-Pförten. Weaker hostile forces are advancing from Sagan and have reached Gassen to-day.
2. Early to-morrow morning the division will begin the advance on Pförten, to drive the enemy back across the Neisse.
3. The cavalry brigade will endeavor by every means to delay the

Digitized by Google

2. Right Column:
   Maj.-Gen. 35th Inf. Brig.
   35th Inf. Brig.
   ½ 3d Tp. 16th Hus. Reg.
   ½ San. Co.
3. Left Column:
   Maj.-Gen. 36th Inf. Brig.
   36th Inf. Brig.
   ½ 3d Tp. 16th Hus. Reg.
   18th F. A. Brig.
   ½ San. Co.
4. Reserve Inf. Brig.

enemy advancing from Gassen and to prevent him from joining his main forces.

The Hussar regiment will keep the enemy at Pförten, Zauchel and Jähnsdorf under observation and will reconnoiter the left bank of the Neisse towards Cottbus.

4. The right column will begin the advance at 5 A. M. from Küppern by Jetzschkoer Schenke and Neu-Weltho towards Pförten and will keep the line of the Oder from Niemitsch as far as Strega under constant observation.
5. The left column will start at 5.15 A. M. from Stargardt and march by Kohlo towards Pförten. It will maintain connection with the right column and with the cavalry brigade.
6. Both columns will march with decreased march-depths.
7. The reserve infantry brigade will reach Tzschernowitz by 5.30 A.M. and will from there follow the left column without interval.
8. The 1st Section of the columns and trains (1st & 2d Inf. Am. Cols. and 3d & 4th Art. Am. Cols. and the 4th, 5th & 6th Field Hospitals) will reach Küppern by 6 A. M.
9. The regimental baggage of the 35th Inf. Brig. will assemble, after the troops have started, in column of march on the Guben-Niemitsch road, head at the fork

Digitized by Google

of the road 1 km northeast of Niemitsch; the regimental baggage of the 36th Inf. Brig. and 17th Cav. Brig. in the same manner on the Guben-Tzchernowitz road, head at the latter place.

10. The regimental baggage of the Res. Inf. Brig. and remaining parts of the columns and trains will be in readiness for the march at 7 A. M. on the Guben-Krossen road, head at the northeastern exit of Guben.

11. I shall be with the advance guard of the left column.

N,

Lieutenant-General and Division Commander.

Dictated to the officers detailed to receive orders of separate organizations; in writing to the cavalry brigade and Hussar regiment; extracts to the columns and trains.

GENERAL STAFF OFFICER,

18th Inf. Div.

Further measures taken: During the night the division commander sends out three officers' patrols:

1. By Beitzsch towards the Pförten–Sommerfeld road, with orders to observe this road continuously and to report if the enemy should march towards Sommerfeld or if he should receive reinforcements from Sommerfeld.

2. Towards Pförten, with orders to ascertain

Digitized by Google

as early as possible any hostile movements in a northerly direction; at the same time to reconnoiter the crossings of the Werderfliess between Kohlo and Weltho.

3. Towards Mehlen for continuous observation of the roads connecting Cottbus and Pförten and also of the crossings of the Neisse.

THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT.

General Remarks.

A meeting engagement will probably take place on August 9th and it will be well therefore to make brief mention of the principles underlying such encounters.

A meeting engagement in war is of frequent occurrence. It happens whenever both parties are advancing and meet in the course of the movement. Although both sides may be advancing with more or less offensive intentions, nevertheless, at the moment of meeting, one of the antagonists is usually placed on the defensive. As a rule, it is the one who feels himself the weaker in *morale* and numbers. At times also the nature of the terrain is the decisive factor in determining the question of offense or defense.

Measures taken at the opening of the combat are often of decisive importance in a meeting engagement and therefore a role of special responsibility devolves upon the advance guard. If the advance guard succeeds in gaining successes over the opponent at the very beginning, in placing him in an

Digitized by Google

unfavorable situation, and in seizing and holding villages until the main body has completed its necessary deployment, it may thereby become the decisive factor in determining the fate of the day.

It will readily be seen from this that in a meeting engagement the commander of the whole loses in influence and that in his stead the subordinate commanders, acting on their own initiative, step into the foreground.

But as in a battle for a prepared position the higher commander regulates all matters by orders issued in advance, so also can he influence the course of a meeting engagement, but in another way and before actual contact with the enemy. If we are well served by our cavalry, we shall in most cases be well enough informed concerning the movements of the enemy to anticipate the possibility of an encounter. In the dispositions made for the march may therefore lie the prerequisites of success. In correct choice of roads for the advance, in a proper division of the forces, in exact calculation of times of starting, in shortening the march-depths, may be found the means to ensure gaining tactical advantages upon encountering the enemy. In the case in hand the enveloping of the strategically important hostile right flank is initiated by the use of the two easterly roads for the advance and by attaching the reserve brigade to the left column. By the choice of an early hour for the start we may suc-

Digitized by Google

ceed in gaining the line of the Werderfliess ahead of the enemy and in attacking him before he has completely deployed from the difficult forest, swamp and lake defiles between Pförten and the Neisse. The shortening of the march-depths is, in case of a meeting engagement, a specially advantageous measure, since by this the time required for reaching the battle-field is shortened and an advantage may be gained over the enemy in the deployment for battle. Broad highways allow a shortening of the march-depths by permitting broader march formations: infantry in double section column; artillery in closed-up platoon column.

The nature of a meeting engagement precludes the issuing of a general written order for attack as in the case of an attack on a defensive position. Verbal orders, as the moment requires them, will have to be issued separately to individual units.

It is just this situation which makes the highest demands on the commander and calls into play all those qualities which go to make up the troop-leader: firmness of purpose, which cannot be shaken by the impressions rushing in from all sides; sane judgment, which recognizes the true conditions of affairs, even in the blurred picture presented by contradictory reports; decision, which straightway transforms knowledge gained into deeds; and the ability to give clear and consistent orders which cannot be misunderstood.

Digitized by Google

The duties of the leader are so various that they cannot be set down on paper.

For the purpose of illustrating more in detail the method of issuing orders, we shall assume the following

SITUATION.

The leading elements of both columns of the division encounter the enemy almost at the same time at Neu-Weltho and Kohlo. These villages are seized and the advanced troops of the enemy driven back across the Werderfliess. Our infantry gets a good foothold on the slopes south of the Werderfliess; the advance-guard artillery of the left column takes position on the hill northeast of Kohlo. Hostile artillery opens fire from the windmill hill east of Kummeltitz. The enemy goes into position on the line brick-kiln (north of Kummeltitz) grove– (on the Kohlo–Datten road, 1 km south of Kohlo). His reserves are north of Datten.

The division commander has ridden ahead to the hill northeast of Kohlo and there issues the following orders to the different commanders, verbally in part and partly through aides or orderly officers:

ORDERS OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER.

1. *To the 18th Field Artillery Brigade:* The 18th Field Artillery Brigade goes into position on the hill between Kohlo and Jessnitz and for the present engages the hostile artillery on the windmill hill east of Kummeltitz.
2. *To the 35th Infantry Brigade:* The 35th Infantry Brigade deploys, for a containing engagement

Digitized by Google

for the present, in the direction of the brick-kiln and windmill hill north of Kummeltitz.

3. *To the 36th Infantry Brigade:* The 36th Infantry Brigade deploys in the direction of the windmill hill east of Kummeltitz and the grove 1 km south of Kohlo, maintaining battle connection with the 35th Infantry Brigade. The grove is to be occupied but not passed for the present.
4. *To the Reserve Infantry Brigade:* The Reserve Infantry Brigade continues the advance by Jessnitz towards the Kohloer sheep-farm (Schäferei).
5. *To the Hussar Regiment:* The Hussar regiment undertakes the protection of the right flank of the division and keeps under constant observation the roads connecting Pförten and Cottbus.
6. The 1st Section of the columns and trains advances from Küppern to Wirchenblatt.

For the present the division commander can only arrange for the opening phases of the attack. The orders indicate, when taken together, the deployment of the division. The forces must first be deployed, tasks must be assigned, and the most varied aims must be reduced to a unified course of action before the attack can begin in full force along the entire line.

Those parts of the division which are the first to enter the engagement must not seek to gain victories

Digitized by Google

independently, lest they also suffer defeats independently. They should act in consonance with the other parts of the division and are therefore given combat orders which assure united action.

The enemy's position will have to be carefully reconnoitered in order that the attack may find its objective and not become a mere thrust in the air.

The artillery must have prepared the attack sufficiently, since otherwise it might be too costly or even fail entirely.

The enveloping movement of the decisive body of troops (the reserve infantry brigade) must be awaited.

Not until all these requirements are fulfilled can the order for the general advance, for pushing home the attack, be issued.

We shall not attempt here to speak of the division commander's duties during the battle, as that would require too many assumptions.

After the troops have been sent into action, the commander will have but little influence on the course of the battle. He will have almost nothing else to direct except as to when and where the reserves are to be thrown in. The ball is rolling. The leader becomes but a spectator of events until the decisive turn is reached. He who desires to direct everything in person interferes with the province of the subordinate commanders and may thereby hinder rather than aid the success of the whole.

Digitized by Google

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 36TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Concerning the duties of subordinate commanders, we shall here treat only of those of the commander of the 36th Infantry Brigade, which will at the same time serve to illustrate the principles underlying the deployment for battle of an infantry brigade.

After receiving the division commander's order, the commander of the 36th Infantry Brigade will without delay return to his brigade and to a point which will afford him a view of the enemy, his neighboring troops and the terrain. This would be the southern exit of Kohlo. Here he issues his orders to the regimental commanders for coördinating the deployment of the brigade. The nature of his orders will be governed by his assigned mission, the phase which the battle has assumed and the terrain.

The brigade has orders to seize the grove 1 km south of Kohlo and to seek connection with the 35th Infantry Brigade advancing on its right. The opening of the meeting engagement has fully occupied the attention of the leading regiment of the brigade. The 31st Regiment has driven the hostile advance troops out of Kohlo and forced them back on the grove above mentioned. The 85th Regiment, arriving later, will have reached a point immediately north of Kohlo.

According to Regulations, the brigade is best formed for battle when its regiments are fighting

Digitized by Google

side by side, sharing the front of the battle, and putting in their reserves as they are needed. It is the peculiar nature of a meeting engagement to bring about an unfavorable deployment in successive lines.* This can however be obviated in the course of the further deployment for attack and the normal arrangement regained by advancing the second regiment to the side of the first, in case the conditions of battle have not forced the regiment in front to make too broad a deployment—a possibility which we will leave out of consideration.

The brigade commander directs the brigade's deployment for attack by assinging to each regiment its special mission, designating the objective for attack. He must also have due regard for the extension of front of the brigade, which in the first deployment should be from 1,000 to 1,200 meters, or thereabouts. The brigade commander will have to keep at his own disposal, in most cases, a reserve of at least one battalion. The deployment of the brigade would therefore naturally be: the 31st Infantry Regiment, already advancing on the grove 1 km south of Kohlo, will have to carry through the attack on that objective, while the 85th Infantry Regiment goes into action on the right of the 31st Infantry Regiment, in order to extend the front of battle and to reach a hand to the 35th Infantry Brigade by advancing against the windmill hill northeast of Kum-

*One regiment behind another.—*Translator.*

Digitized by Google

meltitz. One battalion of the 85th Infantry Regiment should be kept back as a reserve because that regiment has the easier task in the combat while the decision lies with the 31st Regiment on the left and will require a larger force.

In addition to the assigning of special combat missions to the regiments, the order should contain an accurate orientation for the subordinate leaders in regard to the situation and provide for reconnaissance (by the Hussar platoon) on the exposed flank, as well as for the replenishment of ammunition and for the sanitary service.

The verbal orders of the brigade commander would accordingly be about as follows:

"The enemy stands on the line brick-kiln (north of Kummeltitz)–grove (1 km south of Kohlo); his artillery on the windmill hill northeast of Kummeltitz. The division will attack the enemy, enveloping his right flank. The 35th Infantry Brigade deploys for the present from Neu-Weltho for a containing engagement against the line brick-kiln–windmill hill at Kummeltitz. The artillery brigade takes position on the hill west of Jessnitz. The reserve infantry brigade is marching on the Kohlo sheep-farm to execute an enveloping movement.

"The 31st Infantry Regiment immediately takes possession of the grove 1 km south of Kohlo, but does not go beyond it for the present.

"The 85th Infantry Regiment deploys in the di-

Digitized by Google

rection of windmill hill at Kummeltitz, connecting on its left with the 31st Infantry Regiment and on its right keeping touch with the 35th Infantry Brigade. One battalion is to remain as reserve at my disposal immediately north of Kohlo.

"The Hussar platoon reconnoiters on the left flank of the brigade.

"The emptied cartridge-wagons go for refilling to the ammunition column, which will be brought to Wirchenblatt.

"The ½ Sanitary Company establishes the main dressing-station at the southern exit of Kohlo.

"I shall be at the southern exit of Kohlo."

CONCLUSION.

The operations of the cavalry brigade on August 9th are in the nature of a defensive retreat. By fighting on foot, utilizing the horse battery and machine-gun detachment, by throwing up obstructions and by destroying and obstructing bridges with the aid of the engineers, the brigade succeeds in holding back the hostile detachment advancing from Gassen, at the Kulmer Berg as well as on the lines of the Tümmnitz and Strang, until the main battle has been brought to a decision.

The attack of the Blue division is successful. The battle concludes with the defeat of the Red division which has to take up a difficult and costly retreat across the Neisse on Cottbus.

Digitized by Google

The enemy becomes disqualified for active field operations for a long time to come.

The Blue division takes possession of Cottbus, and thereby fulfills the final mission assigned it by general headquarters. Its active operations are at an end.

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

This book should be returned to the Library on or before the last date stamped below.

A fine of five cents a day is inc by retaining it beyond the spe time.

Please return promptly.

Digitized by Google